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Appealed from the District Court of the 
Second Judicial District of the State of Idaho, 
in and for the County of Nez Perce 
The Honorable Jeff M. Brudie 
Supreme Court No. 36916-2009 
RODERICK C. BOND 
ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT 
GARY D. BABBITT 
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT AlA CORP-RESPONDENTS 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE 
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
REED J. TAYLOR, a single person, 
P laintiff-Counterdefendant -Appellant-
Cross Respondent, 
v. 
AIA SERVICES CORPORATION, an Idaho 
corporation; AIA INSURANCE, INC., an Idaho 
corporation; R. JOHN TAYLOR and CONNIE 
TAYLOR, individually and the community 
property comprised thereof, BRIAN FREEMAN, 
a single person; JOLEE DUCLOS, a single person 
and JAMES BECK and CORRINE BECK, 
and 
Defendants-Counterclaimants-
Respondents-Cross Appellants-Cross 
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CROP USA INSURANCE AGENCY, INC., 
an Idaho corporation; 
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and 
401(k) PROFIT SHARING PLAN FOR THE 
AIA SERVICES CORPORATION, 
Intervenor-Cross Appellant-Cross 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
REED J. TAYLOR, a single person, ) 
) 
Plaintiff, ) 
) 
v. ) 
) 
AlA SERVICES CORPORATION, an Idaho ) 
corporation; AlA INSURANCE, INC., an ) 
Idaho corporation; R. JOHN TA YLOR and ) 
CONNIE TAYLOR, individually and the ) 
community property comprised thereof, ) 
BRIAN FREEMAN, a single person; and ) 
JOLEE DUCLOS, a single person, ) 
) 
Defendants. ) 
CASE NO. CV07-00208 
OPINION AND ORDER ON 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR 
RECONSIDERATION, MOTION 
FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION, 
AND MOTION FOR 
RESTRAINING ORDER 
This matter is before the Court on the following Motions filed by the Plaintiff: (1) Motion 
for Reconsideration; (2) Motion for Preliminary Injunction; and, (3) Motion for Restraining 
Order. Hearings on the motions were held March 29, 2007. Defendants AlA Services 
Corporation, AlA Insurance, Inc. and R. John Taylor were represented by attorney Michael E. 
McNichols. Plaintiff Reed Taylor was represented by attorneys Paul R. Cressman, Jr. and 
Roderick C. Bond. The Court, having read the motions, briefs, and affidavits submitted by the 
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parties, having heard oral arguments of counsel and being fully advised in the matter, hereby 
renders its decision. 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
AlA Insurance Inc. is a business under the umbrella of AlA Services Corporation. 
Plaintiff Reed Taylor founded the business. Eventually the Plaintiff's brother, Defendant R. 
John Taylor, joined the business and together, the brothers developed the parent company into a 
holding for numerous diversified insurance businesses. In 1995, Plaintiff Reed Taylor decided to 
retire. In order to effectuate his retirement, Reed Taylor and AlA Services, along with counsel 
for the respective parties, entered into a stock redemption agreement. The agreement included a 
promissory note payable to Reed Taylor in the amount of $6,000,000.00 plus interest, which was 
executed on August 1, 1995. 1 In 1996, the agreement was amended and the parties executed an 
Amended and Restated Stock Pledge Agreement and an Amended and Restated Security 
Agreement. 2 
Some ten years later, in a letter dated December 12, 2006, Plaintiff Reed Taylor's 
attorney notified Defendant John Taylor and AlA Services Corporation that AlA Services was in 
default under several sections of the Amended Stock Pledge Agreement, including but not 
limited to failure to pay the $6 million promissory note.3 The letter further notified the 
Defendants that Plaintiff intended to exercise his right to vote the redeemed shares pursuant to a 
reversion of voting rights upon default as provided for in the Pledge Agreement. Included in the 
letter was Plaintiff's demand for a special meeting of the shareholders for the purpose of electing 
a new board of directors, with the special meeting to occur on December 26,2006. Plaintiff's 
demand for a December 26,2006 special shareholder's meeting was rejected. 
1 Plaintiffs Exhibit "A". 
2 Plaintiffs Exhibit "C" and Exhibit "E". 
3 Plaintiffs Exhibit "F". 
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On January 29, 2007, Plaintiff Reed Taylor filed the above-entitled action seeking 
recovery of amounts owed under the Promissory Note\ but making no claim seeking 
enforcement of other terms of the parties' written agreements. On an unknown date, Plaintiff 
made a second demand for a special shareholder's meeting to occur on February 5,2007. 
Plaintiffs second demand for a special shareholder's meeting was denied by the Board's 
secretary, JoLee Duclos, in a letter dated February 1,2007.5 On February 5,2007, Plaintiff filed 
an Amended Complaint adding as Defendants Bryan Freeman and JoLee Duclos and asserting 
several additional claims.6 
On February 22, 2007, Plaintiff Reed Taylor executed a Consent in Lieu of Special 
Meeting of Shareholders of AlA Insurance, Inc., in which Plaintiff removed the current AlA 
board members and elected himself, Reed Taylor, the sole board member.7 At 3:00 a.m. on 
Sunday, February 25, 2007, Plaintiff Reed Taylor went to the business offices of AlA Services 
Corporation along with a locksmith and security personnel hired by the Plaintiff, and changed 
the locks on certain doors within the building housing AlA Insurance. 8 However, the activity 
caused an alarm system to go off and police arrived on scene. The police determined the matter 
was civil in nature, the old locks were put back in place and both parties had a representative 
remain at the premises. 
On Monday morning, February 26, 2007, Defendants John Taylor and AlA Services 
Corporation filed a Motion for Temporary Restraining Order. Later the same day, Plaintiff filed 
an Emergency Motion (1) to Enforce Shareholder Vote and Board of Directors Resolution, (2) to 
4 Plaintiffs Complaint asserted claims for breach of contract and constructive trust. 
5 Plaintiffs Exhibit "H". 
6 Plaintiffs Amended Complaint added claims for fraudulent transfer, fraudulent misrepresentation, conversion, alto 
ego, equitable indemnification, account statedJmonies due, unjust enrichment and director liability. 
7 Plaintiffs Exhibit "K". 
8 The building houses other business as well that lease space from AlA Services Corporation. 
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Confirm Termination of Counsel for AlA Insurance Inc. along with affidavits and a Motion for 
Order to Shorten Time. The Court took up the motions of the parties on the afternoon of 
February 26, 2007 and entered a Temporary Restraining Order against the Plaintiff and granted 
Plaintiff's Motion to Shorten Time. The Court then set a hearing on March 1, 2007 for 
Defendant's motion for preliminary injunction and the Plaintiff's pending motion. 
At the March 1, 2007 hearing, the Court informed the parties that, after reviewing the 
flurry of pleadings and other documents filed over the three days, including several binders 
worth of exhibits, the Court had determined it would not hear the Plaintiff's lengthy and complex 
motion upon the grounds stated in open Court. The Court then proceeded on the preliminary 
injunction hearing only. 
On March 8,2007, the Court entered its Opinion and Order on Defendants' Motion for 
Preliminary Injunction. The Court granted the Defendants' Motion for preliminary injunction 
after finding the risk of irreparable harm to all of the parties, including the Plaintiff, of sufficient 
significance to merit granting the motion until the complex legal issues asserted by the Plaintiff 
could be determined on the merits. 
On March 6,2007, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Preliminary Injunction. On March 12, 
2007, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Court's Opinion and Order entering a 
preliminary injunction against the Plaintiff. On March 22, 2007, Plaintiff filed a Second 
Amended Complaint asserting a claim for enforcement ofrights.9 On March 28,2007, Plaintiff 
filed a Motion for Restraining Order. 
9 Plaintiffs Second Amended Complaint incorrectly lists two of his claims as his "seventh" claim, causing his total 
number of claims to be incorrectly reflected as ten claims rather than eleven. Plaintiffs most recent claim is based 
on his assertion that he became the sole stockholder upon nonpayment of the promissory note and, therefore, he 
seeks enforcement of his asserted rights as sole shareholder. 
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ANALYSIS 
(1) PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 
"The decision to grant or deny a request for reconsideration generally rests in the sound 
discretion of the trial court." Jordan v. Beeks, 135 Idaho 586, 592,21 P.3d 908, 914 (2001). 
When a motion for reconsideration is brought pursuant to LR.C.P. 11(a)(2)(B), a trial court is to 
consider any new facts presented by the moving party that bears on the correctness of the court's 
order. Coeur d'Alene Mining Co. v. First National Bank, 118 Idaho 812, 800 P.2d 1026 (1990). 
In the instant case, the Plaintiff presents the Court with no new facts. Rather, Plaintiff asserts the 
Court erred in granting Defendants' motion for preliminary injunction because (1) Defendants 
had filed no counterclaim as required under LR.C.P. 65(e), and (2) Defendants failed to meet the 
necessary burden of showing a likelihood of prevailing at trial andJor irreparable injury. Plaintiff 
further contends the Court failed to make critical findings of fact in its decision. 
Plaintiffs contentions are not supported by the Court's written opinion but instead 
exhibit Plaintiff s misunderstanding or misinterpretation of the Court's articulation of its opinion. 
The "critical findings" Plaintiff contends the Court failed to make are findings on the merits of 
Plaintiffs action brought against the Defendants. In its opinion, the Court articulated at length 
the facts presented to the Court by the parties and referenced within the factual portion of the 
opinion numerous exhibits submitted by the parties. What the Court did not do was decide the 
merits of the case, nor could the Court decide the merits of the case within the context of the 
hearing on Defendants' motion for a preliminary injunction.] 0 Plaintiff argues that the Court was 
10 In Plaintiff's motion for reconsideration, he argues the Court did not maintain the status quo by entry of the 
preliminary injunction. Plaintiff argues the "status quo" is that Defendants are in default, making Plaintiff the sole 
shareholder, who then voted himself president, vice president and treasurer of the corporation. This argument 
presumes Plaintiffs claims to be correct and true. As the Court stated before and states again, the complexity of the 
issues did not, and do not, allow the Court to decide the merits of the case at the outset of the case. Therefore, this 
argument by Plaintiff will not be addressed separately in this opinion. 
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required to determine whether Defendants are in default and, if in default, whether certain 
shareholder rights transferred to and were rightfully exercised by Plaintiff. 11 The Court is not 
persuaded. In the context of a motion for preliminary injunction, the Court is to look at whether 
the moving party is likely to prevail, not determine a prevailing party. The Court must also look 
at the potential for irreparable harm. The Court weighed both of these questions in deciding 
whether to grant the Defendants' motion for a preliminary injunction. 
As the Court stated in its prior opinion, the issues in the instant matter are complex, as is 
evident by the multiple volumes of documents submitted by the Plaintiff. The complexity of the 
issues cannot be altered or minimized simply because Plaintiff argues that the case is a simple 
matter of contract breach. Plaintiff clearly expects the Court to lightly decide matters that 
Plaintiff concedes took multiple attorneys months to formulate and that resulted in the drafting of 
complex legal documents that are intertwined with the unique and complex business of 
Insurance. 
The Court did not treat the substantial issues in the instant matter lightly when it entered 
its opinion on Defendants' motion for a preliminary injunction nor will the Court do so now 
based on Plaintiffs motion for reconsideration. The Court articulated its analysis of the issues in 
its earlier opinion. The arguments of the Plaintiff on motion for reconsideration have not altered 
the Court's opinion that the issues are complex and not conducive to being decided in a hearing 
on a motion for preliminary injunction. Therefore, the Court must reject Plaintiffs assertion that 
the Court failed to make critical findings in its March 8, 2007 Opinion and Order. 
II It is evident from Plaintiff's filing of his lawsuit that he recognizes the question of default must be determined 
through the judicial process. Even so, approximately three weeks after filing his lawsuit, Plaintiff apparently self-
declared that default had occurred, declared himself the sole holder of the corporate shares, and attempted a hostile 
take-over ofthe corporation despite the fact that no legal determination of the issues had been rendered. Plaintiff 
cannot provide himself with a remedy but must instead allow the judicial process to run its course. 
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Next, Plaintiff contends the Defendants' motion for preliminary injunction failed to fall 
within the requirements ofI.R.C.P. 65(e) and, therefore, should not have been granted. Rule 
65(e)(5) provides that "[a] preliminary injunction may also be granted on the motion of the 
defendants upon filing a counterclaim, praying for affirmative relief upon any of the grounds 
mentioned above in this section, subject to he same rules and provisions provided for the 
issuance of injunctions on behalf of the plaintiff." 
Plaintiff contends, and correctly so, that the Defendants in the above-entitled action filed 
no counterclaim. The Court recognizes the Defendants chose to bring their motion within the 
confines of the already pending action though no counterclaim had been filed. As the Court 
contemplated the issue of a preliminary injunction, the Court considered the following: (1) no 
counterclaim was filed by the Defendants; (2) an independent action for a preliminary injunction 
may have been available to the Defendants; (3) requiring the Defendants to bring an independent 
action would not be in the interests of judicial economy; (4) the actions of the Plaintiff created a 
high risk of irreparable harm to all of the parties, including the Plaintiff; and (5) the grant or 
denial of a preliminary injunction is within the sound discretion of the trial court. After 
consideration of these factors, the Court determined the lack of a counterclaim was not fatal to 
the Defendants motion. The Court continues to be of the same opinion. 
Plaintiff next argues the Defendants failed to show a likelihood of prevailing at trial and 
failed to present sufficient evidence of irreparable harm. The Court's prior opinion clearly 
weighed the evidence presented on the two prongs of the required showing and stated: 
Given the substantial risk of financial loss that all ofthe parties will suffer if this 
matter is not addressed with a greater degree of composure and temperance, the 
Court finds irreparable harm is likely if Plaintiff's conduct is not kept in check 
while the critical issues are researched and resolved. Which party is likely to 
prevail on the question of default and voting rights has yet to be determined. 
Nevertheless, the Court finds the risk of irreparable harm of sufficient 
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significance to merit granting a preliminary injunction that will provide a degree 
of protection for all the parties until the complex legal issues can be determined. 
Opinion and Order on Defendants' Motion for Preliminary Injunction, entered March 8, 2007, 
page 6. 
Contrary to Plaintiff s argument, the Court was not prevented from entering the requested 
preliminary injunction simply because the Court found the issues in the pending action complex, 
making it difficult to determine which party is likely to prevail at trial. "Whether to grant or 
deny a preliminary injunction is a matter for the discretion of the trial court." Brady v. City of 
Homedale, 130 Idaho 569, 572, 944 P.2d 704, 707 (1997). As the Court stated after noting the 
difficulty in determining which party is likely to prevail, "Nevertheless, the Court finds the risk 
of irreparable harm of sufficient significance to merit granting a preliminary injunction that will 
provide a degree of protection for all the parties until the complex legal issues can be 
determined." In entering its Order, the Court acted within its discretionary powers and within 
the boundaries established by law. 
Plaintiff next argues the Court failed to set security for the preliminary injunction. 
Plaintiff's argument is without merit. When the temporary injunction was entered in this action, 
the Court ordered the Defendants on the record to post a $10,000.00 bond as security in the 
matter. Defendants posted the bond on February 27,2007 and the bond continues to be held by 
the Court. After further review, the Court believes that the bond amount posted is inadequate 
and will require that Defendants post bond in the increased amount of $200,000.00. 
Plaintiffs final two arguments are that (1) the Court incorrectly stated in its Opinion that 
Plaintiff was required to seek a judicial order for a shareholder's meeting pursuant to 1. C. § 30-1-
703 and (2) the Court failed to correctly evaluate the credibility of John Taylor and his 
testimony. At no point in the opinion did the Court state, or even imply, that the Plaintiff was 
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required to seek a judicial order for a shareholder's meeting when his written requests were 
rebuffed by Defendants. Rather, the Court clearly stated that it was an option available to the 
Plaintiff and one that would have been preferable to the non-judicial option Plaintiff attempted. 
As for Plaintiffs argument that "the Court should have considered John Taylor's lack of 
credibility", such comment and argument is improper. As noted by Plaintiff in his own brief, 
"The credibility of witnesses who testify in open court is for the trier of fact to determine." The 
Court was the trier of fact in the hearing on the preliminary injunction and any determination on 
witness credibility was the Court's to make. 
In a supplemental filing, Plaintiff contends the Court failed to put forth its findings as 
required by LR.C.P. 52(a). Plaintiffs arguments attempts to set form over substance. While the 
Court did not entitle its document "Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order", the 
Court's written opinion met all the requirements ofLR.C.P. 52(a). First, the Court articulated its 
factual findings. Next, the Court set out the standards applicable to the issue before it. Finally, 
the Court articulated its analysis of the law and, acting within the Court's discretion powers 
applicable to the issue, entered its Order granting a preliminary injunction to the Defendants. 
Therefore, the Court adopts as its findings of fact and conclusions of law the Opinion and Order 
entered by the Court on March 8, 2007. 
(2) PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION 
Plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction is simply a back-door attempt by Plaintiff to 
persuade the Court to rule on the merits of Plaintiff s lawsuit without allowing the parties the 
opportunity for trial on the merits. The Court provided the parties with its analysis of the nature 
of the issues in the lawsuit, informing the parties in clear and unambiguous language that the 
issues are complex legal issues that require trial on the merits after sufficient opportunity to 
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engage in discovery and case preparation. In order to grant Plaintiff s motion for preliminary 
injunction, the Court would have to find, or at minimum presume, that Defendants are in default 
and that Plaintiff is the sole shareholder of the corporation and the only individual who may 
lawfully run the corporation. The Court is unwilling, and unable, to make such a finding given 
the complexity of the issues in the instant matter and the many relevant facts in dispute. 
As stated by the Court in its March 8, 2007 Opinion and Order, and as reiterated by the 
Court in its analysis of Plaintiffs motion for reconsideration: (1) the issues in the instant matter 
are complex, (2) the complexity of the legal issues makes it extremely difficult to determine 
which party is likely to prevail; (3) the situation created by Plaintiff by his attempt at a hostile 
take-over poses a significant risk of irreparable financial harm to all of the parties, including the 
Plaintiff; and, (4) as a result, an injunction maintaining the status quo of the parties as it existed 
at the time Plaintiff filed his Complaint is necessary in order to allow the case to be tried on the 
merits. 
It is the opinion of the Court that the temporary injunction it entered on March 8,2007 is 
in the best interest of all the parties. The injunction as it currently exists provides the only 
equitable remedy available given the complexity of the legal issues and given the right of all the 
parties to properly litigate the issues. While the Court understands the Plaintiffs concern that 
corporate assets are potentially being siphoned off into another corporation to the benefit of 
Defendant John Taylor and to the detriment of Plaintiff Reed Taylor, the issue of default and 
corporate voting rights must be decided only after appropriate litigation processes have occurred. 
Giving due regard to the concerns of the Plaintiff, the Court is not willing to set aside due 
process and decide such complex matters without affording all the parties the ability to defend 
against Plaintiff s claims. 
Taylor v. AlA Services, et al. 
Opinion & Order on 7['S Motions for Reconsideration, 
Preliminary Injunction & Restraining Order 
10 
(3) PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER 
The Plaintiff seeks to have the COUli enjoin Defendant AlA Services Corporation from 
paying legal fees incurred by Defendants John Taylor, Bryan Freeman and Jo1ee Duclos in 
defending against this action. Plaintiff asserts that Defendants John Taylor, Bryan Freeman and 
J olee Duclos, acting in their capacity as members of the AlA board of directors, scheduled a 
shareholder meeting to gain approval to pay their attorneys' fees and costs from the corporate 
assets. 
Idaho Code § 30-1-853 reads: 
(1) A corporation may, before final disposition of a proceeding, advance funds to 
pay for or reimburse the reasonable expenses incurred by a director who is a party 
to a proceeding because he is a director ifhe delivers to the corporation: 
(a) A written affirmation of his good faith belief that he has met the relevant 
standard of conduct described in section 30-1-851, Idaho Code, or that the 
proceeding involves conduct for which liability has been eliminated under a 
provision of the articles of incorporation as authorized by section 30-1-
202(2)( d), Idaho Code; and 
(b) His written undertaking to repay any funds advanced if he is not entitled to 
mandatory indemnification under section 30-1-852, Idaho Code, and it is 
ultimately determined under section 30-1-854 or 30-1-855, Idaho Code, that 
he has not met the relevant standard of conduct described in section 30-1-851, 
Idaho Code. 
(2) The undertaking required by subsection (1 )(b) of this section must be an 
unlimited general obligation ofthe director but need not be secured and may be 
accepted without reference to the financial ability of the director to make 
repayment. 
(3) Authorizations under this section shall be made: 
(a) By the board of directors: 
(i) If there are two (2) or more disinterested directors, by a majority vote of 
all the disinterested directors, a majority of whom shall for such purposes 
constitute a quorum, or by a majority of the members of a committee of two 
(2) or more disinterested directors appointed by such a vote; or 
(ii) If there are fewer than two (2) disinterested directors, by the vote 
necessary for action by the board in accordance with section 30-1-824(3), 
Idaho Code, in which authorization directors who do not qualify as 
disinterested directors may participate; or 
(b) By the shareholders, but shares owned by or voted under the control of a 
director who at the time does not qualify as a disinterested director may not be 
voted on the authorization. 
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Idaho's statutory scheme specifically provides for payment of legal fees reasonably 
incurred by a corporate director, who is a party to an action because of the individual's status as 
a director, to be paid by the corporation if the statutory requirements are met. The Court's 
record in the above-entitled matter reflects I.C. § 30-1-853 has been met by Defendants John 
Taylor, Bryan Freeman and JoLee Duclose.12 Therefore, the Court will not order AlA Services 
Corporation to refrain from paying legal expenses reasonably incurred by the Defendants. 
(4) PLAINTIFF'S REQUEST FOR RULE 54(b) CERTIFICATION 
Rule 54(b)(1) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure provides in relevant part: 
Certificate of Final Judgment. When more than one claim for relief is presented 
in an action, whether as a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third party claim, 
or when multiple parties are involved, the court may direct the entry of a final 
judgment upon one or more but less than all of the claims or parties only upon an 
express determination that there is no just reason for delay and upon an express 
direction for the entry of the judgment. In the absence of such determination and 
direction, any order or other form of decision, however designated, which 
adjudicates less than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of less than all the 
parties shall not terminate the actions as to any of the claims or parties, and the 
order or other form of decision is subject to revision at any time before the entry 
of judgment adjudicating all the claims and the rights and liabilities of all the 
parties. If any parties to an action are entitled to judgments against each other 
such as on a claim and counterclaim, or upon cross-claims, such judgments shall 
be offset against each other and a single judgment for the difference between the 
entitlements shall be entered in favor of the party entitled to the larger judgment. 
In the event the trial court determines that a judgment should be certified as final 
under this Rule 54(b), the court shall execute a certificate which shall 
immediately follow the court's signature on the judgment and be in substantially 
the following form: ... 
The Court finds Rule 54(b) certification inapplicable to the Court's entry of the 
preliminary injunction at issue. The Court made no entry of judgment upon any claim of the 
Plaintiff and, therefore, the Court carmot direct the entry of a final judgment as to any claim for 
12 Exhibits C, D and E of Plaintiff Reed Taylor's Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order. 
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relief. The Court's entry of the preliminary injunction in this matter does nothing more than 
maintain the status of the parties as they were at the time of the filing of the above-entitled action 
until such time that a determination on the merits may occur. Therefore, the Court declines to 
issue a Rule 54(b) certification on the Court's entry of the preliminary injunction and/or the 
Court's Order on Plaintiffs Motion to Reconsider. 
ORDER 
Plaintiffs Motion for Reconsideration is hereby DENIED, except that bond to be posted 
by the Defendants as a condition of the previously issued preliminary injunction is HEREBY 
increased to the amount of $200,000.00. 
Plaintiffs Motion for Preliminary Injunction is hereby DENIED. 
Plaintiffs Motion for Restraining Order is hereby DENIED. 
Plaintiffs request for Rule 54(b) certification is hereby DENIED. 
Taylor v. AlA Services, et al. 
Opinion & Order on :rc's Motions for Reconsideration, 
Preliminary Injunction & Restraining Order 
Dated this 3>/ day of May 2007. 
I 
13 7~1 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certifY that a true copy ofthe foregoing OPIN10N AND ORDER was: 
V hand delivered via court basket, or 
-1L- mailed, postage prepaid, by the undersigned at Lewiston, Idaho, this 3L day of May 
2607, to: 
Roderick Bond 
508 Eighth St 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Paul Cressman 
999 Third Ave., Ste., 3100 
Seattle, W A 98104-4088 
Michael McNichols 
POBox 1510 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Jonathan Hally 
PO Box 285 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
David Gittins 
PO Box 191 
Clarkston W A 99403 
Gary Babbitt 
PO Box 1617 
Boise, ID 83701-1617 
Taylor v. AlA Services, et al. 
Opinion & Order on n's Motions for Reconsideration, 
Preliminary Injunction & Restraining Order 
14 
David A. Gittins 
Law Offices of David A. Gittins 
843 Seventh Street 
P.O. Box 191 
Clarkston, W A 99403 
Telephone: (509) 758-2501 
ISB#6514 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
REED J. TAYLOR, a single person, ) 
) 
Plaintiff, ) 
) 
vs. ) 
) 
AlA SERVICES CORPORATION, an ) 
Idaho corporation; AlA INSURANCE, ) 
INC., an Idaho corporation; R. JOHN ) 
TAYLOR and CONNIE TAYLOR, ) 
individually and the community property ) 
comprised thereof; BRYAN FREEMAN, ) 
a single person; and, JOLEE DUCLOS, ) 
a single person, ) 
) 
Defendants. ) 
) 
Case No. CV-07-00208 
DEFENDANTS BRYAN FREEMAN 
AND JOLEE DUCLOS' JOINDER 
IN MOTION TO DISMISS FILED 
BY AlA SERVICES CORPORATION 
AND AlA INSURANCE, INC. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
REED J. TAYLOR, a single person, ) 
) 
Plaintiff, ) 
) 
vs. ) 
) 
AlA SERVICES CORPORATION, an Idaho ) 
corporation; AIA INSURANCE, INC.) an ) 
Idaho corporation; R. JOHN TAYLOR and ) 
CONNIE TAYLOR. individually and the ) 
community property comprised thereof; ) 
BRYAN FREEMAN a single person; and ) 
JOLEE DUCLOS, a single person, ) 
) 
Defendants. ) 
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-----------------------------------) 
Case No. CV-07-00208 
REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO 
DISMISS 
Defendants AlA Services Corporation CAlA ScrvicesH ) and AIA lnsumnce, Inc. ("AlA 
Insurance") (collectively referred to as 'LAIA") submit this reply brief in support of their Motion 
to Dismiss 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
AlA filed a motion to dismiss, not a motion for summary judgment. PIaintiffrecites the 
rule that "[o]n a motion to dismiss for failure La state a claim. the Court looks only ut the 
pleadings ... ". but then Plainliffimmediately proceeds to introduce a litany of factual assertions 
that arc not contained within the four corners of the complaint, effectively attempting to convert 
the motion into a motion for summary judgment. 
OLherthan improperly introducing facts not pled in the complaint, Plaintiff's Response 
Bricfdocs very little to counter AIA's Motion to Dismiss. Plaintiff begins with an assertion that 
the motion to dismiss sboulcl be disregarded because such motrons are "disfavored." See 
Plaintiff's Response Brief, p. 9 (citing Wackerl), v. Martindale. 82 Idaho 400, 404,353 P.2d 782 
(1960». or course, right after the lVackerly Court described the caution it applies with regard to 
a motion to dismiss, it explained the circumstances under which a motion to dismiss is 
commonly granted: 
A (complaint) may be dismissed on motion if clearly without 
merit; and this want of merit may consist in an absence ofluw to 
support a claim of the sort mude. or of facts sufficient to make a 
good claim. or in th(! disclosure ofsomc fact which will necessarily 
defeat the claim. 
ld. (quoting 2 Moore's Federal Practice (2d cd.) Sec. 1208) (emphasis added). 
Plaintiff's complaint is precisely the type of complaint where a motion to dismiss is 
proper because it discloses facts that demonstrate, on the face of the complaint, that it is barred 
by the statute of limitations. Moreover. it contains numerous causes of action that fail as a 
maHer oflaw. The complaint is a classic example of throwing mud at the wall. hoping some of 
the mud sticks. Plaintiff is attempting to twist his breach of contract cause of action into a 
variety oflegallhcories that either (I) simply do not fit the facts alleged (Le., fraud, conversion. 
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unjust enrichment, equitable indemnification. and account stated) or (2) arc not causes of action 
at an (i.c., aller ego, constructive trust, and director liability) 1. 
AIA's motion to dismi.ss serves the important purposes of wiping the excess mud off the 
,\-vaU - eliminating the causes of action that fail to state a claim - so the parties can prepare for 
trial under the proper legal theories. 
H. ARGUMENT 
A. PlaintifPs Complaint Is Barred By The Statute Of Limitations 
1. PlaintifPs Breach of Contract Accrued More Than Five Years Before 
Plaintiff Filed Suit 
PlaintifTargues that H[wJhcn questions exist as to whether a cause of action has accrued 
and the Statute has begurr to run, dismissal under LR.C.P. 12(b)(6) is improper." See Plaintiff's 
Reply Brief, p. 10 (emphasis added). For this proposition. Plaintiff cites to Singlet Oil v. Forster, 
98 Idaho 149, 151,559 P.2d 765 (1977), which expressed reluctance to grant a motion to dismiss 
on statute of limitations grounds whcre is was "unclear at what point a cause of action came into 
existence." Id. The facts before the Court now arc not the situation contemplated by Singlcton 
·where t11e date the cause of action accrued is in question. Here, Plaintiff's own complaint makes 
it clear that the stntutc oflimitations has already run. 
1 Plaintiffhas objected generally La AlA's Motion to Dismiss on grounds that certain of the 
causes of action, accor-ding to Plaintiff, are pointed more at the director Defendants. This 
objection is irrelevant. The complaint docs not make clear exactly who the account statcd 
cause of action is asserted against. The Halter ego" cause of action is asserted against not 
only the directors, but also "ccrtairr shareholders of AIA Services." AIA has an interest in 
protecting its unnamed shareholders from faciaI1y invalid causes of action. Moreover, the so-
called "causes of action" that Plaintiff asserts are only directed at the other defendants fail as 
a matter onaw on their face, so it should not particularly mattcr which defendant moves to 
dismiss them as all defcndants have an intcrest in having a clean and appropriate complaint 
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PlaintiITs Complaint alleges that the Amended Agreements were entered into in 1996. 
See Second Amended Complaint, 'iJ 2.10. The Complaint then asserts that AIA services would 
be in breach ofthe Amended Agreements and in default if, for example, AIA Services failed to 
nlake timely interest payments (8 114% on the $6,000,000 note); became insolvent; failed to 
llluintain a Lock Box to hold insurance commissions; failed (0 keep Plaintiffon AIA Services' 
Board of Directors; or several other events of default. Id. at 'iJ 2.12. 
The CompIaint then alleges that Defendants breached the agreement in several respects 
TIlore lhan five years prior to Plaintiff's filing of the lawsuit. See e.g., id. at'iJ 2.13. ("In cxeess of 
six years, AIA Services. John Dudas and/or Freeman have intentionally refused to appoint Reed 
to the Board as I"cquired."); id. at'iJ 2.15 ("During all relevant times, the value of AIA Services 
... vas less than the aggregate amount orits debts, which constitutes AIA Services' insolvency. 
During a1] rdevant times, AIA Services was in default ofvarious provisions of the agreements 
"\ .... ith Reed, insolvent andlor unable to timely pay its debts to Reed. During ail relevant times, 
AlA Services has failed to comply with the temlS ofthe promissory note.") (emphasis added). 
Plaintiff now attempts to take back those statements by disingenuously arguing that he 
only aUeged breaches "at aU relevant times" and did not spccifical1y give a date for the alleged 
breaches. See Plaintiff's Response Brief, p. 11, footnote L This argument misrepresents not 
only the unambiguous allegations onhe complaint - see id. at ~ 2.13 (<LIn excess ofsix years, 
AIA Services. John Duclos an dIo I." Freeman have intentionally refused to appoint Reed 10 the 
Boa.rd as required.") - but also the position Plaintiff has taken throughout tbis litigation. For 
example. in Reed Taylor'S Affidavit in Support of Emergency Motion "iJ 35, Reed Taylor aUaches 
for purposes of preparing for trial. Finally, the director Defendants have joined in the Motion 
to Dismiss. rendering Plaintiffs objection moot. 
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the financial statements for AIA Services AlA Insurance for 2001-2002 and asserts that "these 
Financial Statements show that AlA Services was insolvent in 2001 and 2002," which is more 
than five years before Pluiotifffiled his complaint. 
With regard to payments on the note, PlaintiIrs Response Brief, page 5, sets forth the 
total payments made per year by AlA between 1997 and 2006. According to PlaintifPs 
Compiaint, AlA was to make interest payments of8 114% on the $6,000,000 note, which is 
$495,000 per year or $41.250 per month. According to Plaintiff, Defendants failed to meet those 
contractual obligations in any single year between 1997 and 2005. See id. (setting forth 
payments of$229,689 in 1997, $318,605 in 1998, etc.) Thus, according to plaintiff. Defendants 
have been in breach of their payment obligations since 1997. 
With rcgard to the Lock Box, PJaintiffstated under oath at the preliminary injunction 
hearing that he docs not remember the lock box eve. being used other than around the time: it was 
set up (1996), and that he was not particularly concerned about whether it was being used: 
Q: Let me ask you to refer to paragraph 21 on page 5. "Plaintiff 
now aUeges as an egregious event of default that the company 
alIed to provide a lock box that diminished his security. In fact, 
Plaintiff consented to and was intricately involved in the 
termination ofihe lock box agreement by his efforts and consent to 
assist in thc transfer ofthe AIA Insurance block ofheaIth 
insurance business in 1997 from Universal Life and Centennial 
Life insurance companies to Trustmark Insurance." Do you agree 
with that? 
A: No, other than when it was initially set up, I have no 
recollection of anything about a lock box. And. frankly, I don'1 
understand his previous discussion of why we didn't need it with a 
different company because we always usc thc same: system. 
Frankly. I wasn"t too concerned. \YC had so much money coming 
in, mine was of smaB amount ofthc. tolaL 
Hearing Transcript. p. 171. 
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In Plaintiff's Motion to Compel Audit briefing, he asserts even more alleged breaches 
that fall outside of the statute oflimitations. In his Second Supplemental Memorandum In 
Support OfRis Motion To Compel Audit, page 3, Plaintiff asserts the "Amended and Restated 
Stock Pledge Agreement requires that AlA Services be audited annually," and that Defendants 
are in breach oflhat agreement because "AlA Services was last audited in 1999." 
All oflhese allegations demonstrate. beyond any doubt, that praintiffis now bringing a 
breach ofcontrnct cause of action aI1eging breaches that accrued more than five years before 
PlaintiiTmed suit.2 Despite Plaintifrs attempt to now take back the allegations of his complaint. 
it is clear that Plaintiff is aHeging breached going back as far a ten years and, in any event, well 
beyond lhe five-year statute oflimitations. This is not a case where it IS unclear when Plaintiff's 
cause of action accrued. and the motion to dismiss is, therefore. appropriate. 
As set forth in AlA's opening brief, there 1S no question that Plaintiff's breach of contract 
cause ofaclion accrued mOTe than five years prior to Plaintiff's filing ofthe complaint. AJA 
cited multiple Idaho Supreme Court cases holding that a breach of contract cause of action 
accrues, and the statute of limilations begins to run, upon the first breach. (see I"'femorandum In 
Support OrMation To Dismiss, pp. 4-6). Plaintiff's Reply Briefignores these authorities. 
Plaintiff's Reply Brief further ignores AlA's citation to the Idaho Supreme Court 
decision that dooms Plaintiff's case, Skaggs v. Jensen, 94 Idaho 179,484 P.2d 728 (1971). 
2 Although Plaintiff, htmsclf, invites the court to look at these facts outside of the four corners of 
the complaint, the Court need not do so for purposes of this motion to dismiss in light of the 
allegations in (he complaint that Defendants have been in breach "in excess of six years" and 
"at all relevant times." These facts. all of which are taken from Plaintiff, himselt: are merely 
recited to expose Plaintiff's misrepresentation that he is not really alleging breaches beyond 
the statute of limitations. 
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There, because the plaintiff alleged a breach in a lease agreement that occurred more than five 
years prior to the filing of his complaint, the court held that the alleged breaches were barred by 
the statute of limitations. Not only were they barred, but the Court explained that: 
[I)t is evident that more than five years e1apsed between the time 
the cause of action accrued and the time suit was instituted. The 
lcnsens (lessors) wcre entitled to rely on the statute of limitations 
as a defense to the Skaggs' (lessees') claim since actions in contract 
must be brought within five years in this jurisdiction .... In view 
of the length of time that Skaggs rested on their rights, it 'would 
be inequitable in this Court's opinion to allow them to now 
bring suit. By failing to object within a reasonable time aftei" 
tIlC·Y felt their rights were being violated, they ratified and 
modified the restrictive provision, thus vitiating its force. 
lei., 94 Idaho at 180.484 P.2d at 729 (emphasis added). 
PlaintiffaUeges mUltiple breaches that occurred well over five years ago, including 
failure to make the required interest payments, failure La put Reed Taylor on the board of 
directors. insolvency. failure to maintain the lockbox. and failure to audit AlA Services. As 
explained in Skaggs, "By failing to object within a reasonable time after they felt their rights 
were being violated, they mti fied and modified the restrictive provisl0n[s], thus: vitiating [their] 
force." Ie!. (emphasis added). 
2. Plaintiff's Time-Barred Complaint Is Not Saved By Idaho Code § 5-23!l Or 
Any Of The Other Theories Raised By Plaintiff 
Piaintiffasscrts that his breach contract cause of action is not time-barred under Idaho 
Code § 5-238, which provides: 
No acknowledgment or promise is sufficient evidence ofa new or 
continuing contract by which to lake the case out ofthe operation 
of this chapter, unless the same is contained in some \vriling, 
signed by the party to be charged thereby; but any paym.ent of 
principal or interest is equivalent to a new promise in wrHing, 
duly signed> to pay the residue ufthe debt. 
[d. (emphasis added). 
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Undcr Idaho raw, the stutute oflimitations "must be applied in all cases whe.c an 
exception is not specifically made." Melldini v. Milner, 47 Idaho 439, 276 P. 313.314 (1929). 
"Statutes creating exemptions [to the statute of limitations] arc to be strictly construed al,d will 
not be extended by implication." lei. The Court must apply the clear language ofthe statute, 
strictly construed, which provides that payrrlent of principal or interest creates a "new promisc" 
to "pay the residue of the debt." By the clear language ofthe statute. the part payments do not 
toll the statute of limitations as to the obligations under the original contract. Rather, they create 
a "new promise." That new promise is not the same as the original time-barred contract, but, 
ruther, is a new promise only "to pay the residue oflhe debt." See also ]ylendini, 47 Idaho 439, 
276 P. at 314 (applying the predecessor statute to Idaho Code § 5-238, and explaining that the 
acknowledgment of the debt «did not therefore continue an existing contract, but created a neW 
one"); Brower v. E.1. DuPoHt De Nemollrs and Co .• 117 Idaho 780,792 P.2d 345,347 ("[Idaho 
Code § 5-238] provides that an acknowledgment or promise in writing and signed by tbe party to 
be charged may constitute sufficient evidence ofa new or continuing contract in order to allow 
recovery for a debt where the statute of lim ita lions bars recovelV under the original contract.") 
(emphasis added). 
AIA will concede, for purposes of this Motion to dismiss only. that PIaintiff's invocation 
of Idaho Code § 5-238 prevents the Court fi-om concluding at this point whether or not AlA is 
obligated "to pay the residue ofthe debt." However. Idaho Code § 5-238 docs not remove the 
bar with regard to the alleged breaches of coo tract - aU of which accrued more than five years 
prior Lo Plaintiff's filing oflhe complainl-- because Section 5-238 only creates n new promise to 
pay the residue onhe debt. It does not res.urrect the other time-barred breach ofcontracl 
allegations. 
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This same conclusion is reached whether by application of the clear language of Idaho 
Code § 5-238 orby application ofIdaho case law as set forth in Skaggs, 94 Idaho at 180. By 
failing to file suit within five years, Plaintiff"ratified and modified the restrictive provIsion, thus 
vitiating its force." Id. at 180. Either way, Plaintiffcannot assert the time-barred breaches (i.e., 
the alleged failure to make the required interest payments, failure to put Reed Taylor on the 
board of directors, insolvency, failure to maintain the 10ckbox, and failure to audit AIF. Services) 
because those breaches arc time-barred. 
Finally, the srune conclusion is also reached through application of the PlaintifTs citation 
to Cassia Creek Reservoir Co. v. Harper, 91 Idaho 488,492,426 P.2d 209 (l967}. There. the 
court addressed the statute onimitations with regard to an installment contract in which one of 
two installments was due more than five ycars before the filing of the complaint. and the second 
installment was due within the five yearpcriod. The court held that "[w]here money is payable 
in installments, the statute of limitations begins to run against a cause of action for the recovery 
ofa delinquent installment as of the time it becomes due." ld. Thus, the five-year statute of 
limitations barred the corporation's action for :recovery oflhe first installment payment, but not 
the second. Under this theory, at bes!, payments due iller January 0[2002 would bc the only 
obligations not barred by the statute of limitations. Again, this theory would not resurrect the 
other aileged breaches that arc already time-barred. 
Given that Plaintiff's complaint establishes that aU of the aUeged breaches arc time 
barred, the motion to dismiss should be grantcd ... vith leave for Plaintiff to amend the complaint 
to allege facts supporting his claim that AlA is obligated <Lto pay the residue of the debt" 
pursuant to Idaho Code § 5-238. 
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B. Third Cause of Action - IVUsrcpresentation/Fraud. 
Plainti.ff's cause ofaclion for fraud must be dismissed [or failure to plead ftuud with 
particularity. As set forth previously. Plninti.fPs complaint docs not aHege with particularity a 
single specific misrepresentation. PJaintiffresponds by asserting that he "spccificnHy pled all 
nine required clements of fraud," (Response Brief, p. 20). but the fact remains that Plaintiff"s 
Complaint does not allege the who, when, where, or what of any specific misrepresentations. 
In apparent recognition of the lack of specificity, Plaintiff now sels forth at pages' 21 to 
22 ofllis Response Brief essentially what he would allege in the complaint if given another 
opportunity: 
.. "Reed relied on the representation that he would be a member of the board of directors." 
II> "Reed relied on the representation that he would have a security interest in all 
commissions" 
«Reed again relying on the fact that he had a valid and perfected security interest in all 
commissions" 
" «Reed relying on the Defendants' representations that tile corporation would be operated 
in accordance with applicable legal standards" 
.. "Reed relying on the fact. or omission. thereof, that all available sums would be paid on 
his Note und/or that the corporations ,vouid be operated in accordance with legal 
standards." 
Even jgnoring the fact that these aIIegations stiH lack specificity as to who made what 
specific misrepresentations, none of these representations support a cause of action for fraud 
because they arc aUeged representations as to future actions rather than :representations of current 
facts. Gillespie v. ivE01f11fa(n ParkEs/ales, L.L.C., 142 Idaho 671.674. 132 P.3d 428,430-31 
(2006) ("As a general rule, fraud cannot be based upon statements promissory in nature tbat 
relate to future actions or upon the mere failure Lo perform a promise or an agreement to do 
something in the future .... The allegedly false representation must concern past or existing 
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material facts."); Thomas v. Medical CeWer Physicians, P.A., 138 Idaho 200,207,61 P.3d 557, 
564 (2002) C"An action for fraud or misrepresentation wiii not lie for statements of future events . 
. . . The law requires the plaintiff to fonn his or her own conclusions regarding the occurrence of 
future events."). 
Finally, Plaintiff asserts that, ifhis actual fraud cause of action fails. he has stated a valid 
cause of action for constructive fraud. Even ignoring the fact that Plaintiirs complaint docs not 
allege "constructive fraud," that cause of action fails as a matter of law. As recognized in even 
the authorities cited by Plaintiff, constructive fraud can only exist where a defendant owes 
fiduciary duties to the plaintiff.. See, e.g., 37 Am.Jur2d Fraud and Deceit, § 9 (2007) 
('<Constructive Fraud arises on a breach of duty by one in a confidential or fiduciary relationship 
to another that induces justifiable reliance by the other to his or her prejudice.") (emphasis 
added) (cited at p. 20 ofPlaintiWs Response Brief); see also Hilles v. Hilles. 129 Idaho 847,934 
P.2d 20. 26 (1997) ("An action in constructive fraud exists when there has been a breach ofa 
duty arising from a relationship oftrust and confidence, as in a fiduciary duty."); J..lcGllee v. 
McGbee. 82 Idaho 367, 371,353 P.2d 760, (1960) ("Constructive fraud usually arises from a 
breach of duty where a relation of trust and confidence exists."). 
Here, tilere is no fiduciary relationship as a matter of law. The parties arc in a cI"cditor-
debtor relationship, which does not create fiduciary duties. See, e.g., Idaho First Nat. Bank v. 
Bliss Valley Foods. Inc., 121 Idaho 266, 277,824 P.2d 841,852 (1991) ("'the relationship in a 
tender-borrower situation is a debtor-creditor relationship. and not a fiduciary relationship") 
(citations omitted). PlaintiiT, a sophisticaled, multi-millionaire,businessman and founder ofa 
successful insurance agency entered into an anus-length creditor-debtor relationship in which aIL 
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parties were representcd by counsel. That creditor-debtor re1ationship does not give rise to 
fiduciary duties and cannot, as a matter of law, support a constructive lraud cause of action. 
C_ Fourth Cause of Action - Conversion. 
In its opening brief, AlA set forth the general rule that the fallure to pay money due under 
a contrnct is actionable in contract, but, as a mattcr of law, does not constitute conversion. 
Indeed, Idaho courts expressly hold that a cause of action for conversion requires and affinnative 
act, i.e., that the defendant takes property lrom the plaintiff's possession. See e.g., Peasley 
Transfer & Storage Co., 132 Idaho at 743 CHA [conversion] right of action accrues in favor ofihe 
owner ofpropcrty as soon as the property is wrongfully taken froITl his possession or wrongfully 
converted.") (emphasis addcd)~ see, also, 18 AM. JUR. 2D Conversion § 21 ("Some affirmative 
act on the part of the defendant is usually regarded as necessary to constitute a conversion .. _ 
Even where it results in the loss ofthc property, the failure to perfoffil an act made obligatory by 
contract will not amount to a conversion."). Here, plnintiffaUeges that he was not paid funds 
due to him, not that any property has been taken from his possession. 
PlaintiITdoes not offer any countcr to the above authorities, other than the unsupported 
argument that allegations of misappropriation ofcorpornle assets "have historically been 
regarded as conversion." See Response Brief,. p. 24-25. The authorities citcd by Plaintiff, 
however, do not support his proposition. PlainlifPs citation to Nelson Y. Jones, 38 Idaho 664, 
224 P. 435 (1924), is not helpful. Nelson did not involve a conversion cause of action at alL 
Rather, it involved a lraudulent transfer cause of action. Id. at 437. The court affinned the 
fraudulent transfer judgment, noting in passing ahat the fraudu1ent transfer «was in legal effect an 
unlawful conversion of this property to his O\\ITI use:' ki at 438. The court did not address a 
conversion cause of action. much less hold that failure to pay a debt constitutes conversion. 
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Lussier v. Mall Van Development, Inc .• 667 P.2d 804, 814 (Hawaii App. 1983). similarly 
did not involve a conversion cause of action at alL Moreover, it involved a shareholder 
derivative action, not an action by a creditor against a corporation. Rather than allege a cause of 
action for conversion. the shareholder brought a claim for "misuse of corporate funds," i.e., a 
claim by the shareholders that the directors had misappropriated corporate assets to the detriment 
of the shareholders. In affinning summary judgment in favor of1he directors, the Court noted 
that "directors and officers must use corporate funds for corporate purposes only or they will be 
liable [or misappropriation, diversion. or conversion of corporate assets." Id. at 814. Oicourse. 
all this statement means is that the directors may be liable to the corporation and/or its 
slmreholdcrs for misappropriation, diversion, or conversion of corporate assets. This case docs 
not support Plaintiff's argument that failure to pay a contractual obligation to a creditor satisfies 
the clements of conversion. 
The only case ci1ed by Plaintiff that even addresses an actual conversion cause ofactlon 
is Western Farm Services, Inc. v. OlselT, 90 P.3d 1053 (\Vn. 2004). and that case is easily 
distinguishable because it involved an affirmative act of conversion. There, Key Bank held a 
security interest in potato crops purchased by Simp]ot. Key Bank scnt notice to Simp lot that Key 
Bank should be listed as a co-payee on any check wriHen by Simplot to the seller ofthc potatoes. 
Simplot,.l1Dwcvcr, issued a check made payable only to the seller, not to Key Bank. Thus, unlike 
a si.mple failure to perfolln contractual obligations, IVestern Farm Sen/ices involved an 
affirmative act of conversion. 
D. Fifth Cause of Action - Alter Ego. 
As set forth previously, the rule recognized both by the courts and leading treatises is that 
"aller ego" is not an independent cause ofaction at all. Plaintiff's response is that the Court 
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should not fo11o"" this well-settled rule because there does not appear to be an Idaho case directly 
on point. Of course, the fact that there is not a single Idaho case recognizing ''-aIter ego" as an 
independent cause of action actually provides addition support that it is not recognized as a cause 
ofacLion in Idaho.3 
Plainlifffurther argues that the Court should be reluctant Lo dismiss the alter ego cause of 
action (and Llle constnlctive Lrust and director liability causes of action) "','vher-e the asserted 
theory ofEability is novel or unusual since it is important that such legal theories be explored 
and assayed in the light of actual facts, not apleader's supposition." See Plaintiff's Response 
Brief, p. 27 (citing Stewart v. Arrington COllst. Co., 92 Idaho 526, 531 (19G8). However, there is 
nothing «novel or unusual" about these theories. They arc remedies that arc triggercd by other 
valid causes of action, not independent causes of action in and of themselves. 
Finally, for the reasons previously set forth in detail, alter ego liability is inappropriate 
under the facts pled by Plaintiff. 
E. Sixth Cause of Action - Equitable Indemnification. 
Under clear Idaho law, and as accepted by leading treatises and courts across the country, 
PlalntiWs contract cause of action cannot support a claim for the tort cause of action of equitable 
indemnification. Plaintiffsirnply ignores AIA's citation to the Idaho authority directly on point. 
See Mitchell v. Valerio. 124 Idaho 283.285, 858 P.2d 822. 824 (Idaho App. 1993) (HAn 
indemnity relationship between tortfeasors exists when the parties share a common liability for 
3 Plaintiff ciles A£agic Valley Radiology, P.A. v. KoloHeh. 123 Idaho 434. 849 P.2d 107 (1993), 
as u case that UrccognizIes] alter ego as a claim." See Plaintiff"s Response Brief. p. 27 
(emphasis added). That case, however, only discusses an alter ego "claim" in the context of 
a rcs judicata analysis, and docs not address whether alter ego is an independent cause of 
action. 
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the same barrn") (emphasis added); see, also, 41 AM. JUR. 2D Indemnity, § 20 ("For 
indemnification imp1ied~jn-iav ... , more an equitable remedy than an action in and ofitself, there 
must be an underlying injury sounding in tort, and the party seeking indemnity must have 
imputed or derivative liability for the tortious conduct from which indemnity is sought .... The 
doctrine of equitable indemnity applies only among defendants who are jointly and severally 
liable 10 the plaintiff."). 
Morcover. as set forth previously - but whoUy ignored by Plaintiff - any claim for 
indemnification is not ripe because Plaintiff's own complaint states that he has not paid anything 
to Donna Taylor. See May Trllck-ing Co. v. International Harvester Co., 97 Idaho 319,322, 543 
P.2d 1159, 1162 (1975) (explaining that an indemnity cause of action arises at "the time of 
paym.ent or settlement by the indenmitee," and that, "[iJn this case lhe record is unclear as to 
when. if ever, May Trucking Company paid Fanner for the damage"). 
The equitable indemnification cause of action should be dismissed both because there is 
no joint tortfeasor relationship and because any indemnity cause of action has yet to accrue. 
F. Seven tIl C~use of Action - Account Statcdfl\1onies Due. 
PlnintiffwhoHy fails to respond to AIA's argument with regard to 1he account stated 
cause ofactioo. As set forth prevlously, an account stated cause of action must be supported by 
a writing that "exhibits the state of account bet"\vccn parties and the balance owed one to the 
other, UIld when assented la, either expressly or irnpliedly. it becomes a new contract .... [T]he 
account, in order to constitute a contract, should appear to be something more than a mere 
memorandum; it should show upon its face that it was intended to be a final settlement up 10 
date, and this should be expressed with cleanlcss and certainty ..... The transaction must be 
understood by the parties as a final adjustment of the respective demands between them and of 
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the amount due." 1l1oden: A1ills, IHc. v. Havens. 112 Idaho 1101, 1105-06,739 P.2d 40D. 404-
05 (Ct. App. 1987) (emphasis added) (citations oITliHed). 
The complaint demonstrates that there is no written agrecITlent establishing a final 
adjustment as to the "runount due." Rather, it alleges that the account stated "remains unpaid, 
along with any oLbers which mav have occurred but which Reed is unaware of at this time, the 
dates and exact amount of which wi]] be proven at tria1." Second Amended Complaint, "il9.2. 
Plaintiff's Reply Brief does nothing to save 11[S account stated cause of action. It refers 
the court to Exhibit AJ. from the preliminary injunction hearing. Even lfthe court reaches 
outside the four corners of the complaint to consider that document, it certainly does not "show 
upon its face that it was intended to be a final settlement up 10 date," much less with the required 
"clearness and certainlY" required by Alodern1vIiiTs. Moreover, it docs not set forth a ba1ance 
owed as admitted even by Plaintiff. Indeed, Plaintiff's Response Brief continues to concede that 
it docs not set forth a specific balance due. See p. 30 (stating that defendants owe "at least 
$307,271") (emphasis added). Moreover. Exhibit AJ is an internal ALA. accounting document, 
not a writing that the parties understood to be a final settlement of an amount due. 
G. Seventh Cause of Action - Unjust En!"ichment. 
Plaintiff's unjust enrichment cause ofaction should be dismissed for two reasons. First, 
under any interpretation ofPlaintifPs complaint, even accepting all inferences as true. Plaintiff 
cannot satisfy the first element of an unjust claim - that a benefit is conferred upon defendant Qy 
plaintiff. Plaintiff asserts only that: 
AIA Services, AlA Insurance, John. Duclos, andior Freeman have 
retained the benefit of their fraudulent, >V"rongful, improper andIor 
overreaching conduct amito. transfers. 
John and/or anyone o. more oflhc othel Defendants would be 
unjustly enriched if allowed to retain the benefit of the assets, 
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securities, loans. advances and/or other services received through 
AIA Services and/or AlA Insurance, aU ofwhich funds should 
have been paid to Reed. 
See Second Amended Complaint, 'lI 10.2 (emphasis added). 
Second, Plaintiff's allegations ofa written contract governing I.he alleged obligations to 
Plaintiff precludes a separate cause of action .for unjust enriclunent. This clear rule of Idaho law 
is set forth in the four Idaho Supreme Court and Idaho Court of Appeals cases cited previously, 
to which Plaintiff offers no counter. Pl.aintiffstates that "Defendants appear to be suggesting that 
Reed Taylor cannot requests relicf under alternative theDries of contract and quasi.-
contmctJunjust enrichment." See PlatntifI's Rcsponse Brief, p. 2. \Vith aU due respect, it is nDt 
AlA that is "suggesting" such a rule. ActuaUy, the Idaho Supreme Court has specifically so held 
an numerous occasions. and Plaintiff has presented no authority to the contrary. 
H. Eighth Cause of Action- Constructive Trust. 
Plaintiffhas done nothing to rebut the universally recognized rule thut "constructive 
tiUst» is a remedy that is availab1e in the event that a plai"ntiffprevails on certain causes of action 
that trigger such a remedy. but tIltlt it is not an independent cause of action. 
Like the other improper causes of action, the constructive fraud cause of action should be 
dismissed, leaving Plaintiffwith the option of seeking the remedy ifhe prevails on any causes of 
action that would entitled him to the remedy ofa constructive trust. See, e.g, Fujisawa 
Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd. v. Kapoor. 16 F.Supp.2d 941. 952 (N.D. Ill. 1998) (HA constructive 
trust is an equitable remedy, not an independent cause of action .... Accordingly, while the 
claim is dismissed. it is understood Fujisawa may attempt to prove a constructive trust is an 
appropriate equitable remedy should it prevail on other claims."); 3Com Corp. v. Electronics 
Recovery Specialists, inc., 104 F.Supp.2d 932.942 (N.D. III. 2000) (same). 
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1. Ninth Cause of Action - Dircdor LiabUity. 
Like the alter ego and constructive trust causes o!action, "director liability" is nDt a cause 
of action. Plaintiff's only response is to assert that it need not engage in a "battle ofoul-of-slate 
authority," followed by a citation 10 Ong Hillg v. Arizona Harness Raceway. Inc., 459 P .2d 107 
(Ariz. App. 1969). That case, however, just proves Defendants' point that Hdirector liabIHty" is 
not a separate cause of action. Plaintiff cites the case as one ·<recognizing a cause of action for 
director liability;' but it certainly does not. Plaintiff apparently is relying on one sentence in the 
decision that states: '<'Ne find that Count III ofPlaintifrs complaint states a cnuse of action for 
individual corporate director liability." Id. at ll5. However,just a few paragraphs prior to that 
statement, the court explains that "Count ill ofPfaintifi's complaint was an action for wrongful 
interference with contractual relations. The claim was asserted against the individual directors 
and personal liability sought to be imposed." Id. at 114. In other words. the actual cause of 
action \vas for wrongful interference with contractual relations that was being asserted against 
the directors personally, not a separate cause of action for "director liability" with no real cause 
of action attached to it. The court's statement that "Count ilr of Plaintiff's complaint states a 
cause of action for individual corporate director liability" simply means that the PlaintUTstated a 
cause of action - for wrongful interference with contractual relations - and that the cause of 
action was facially valid against the individual directors. 
III. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, AIA respectfully requests that its motion to dismiss be 
granted. 
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMlTTED THIS -L day ofJune. 2007. 
HA VlLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HA\VLEY LLP 
BY~~ 
_ J shby ISB No. 7228 
'A .omeys for Defendants AlA Servlces 
Corporation and AlA Insurance. Inc. 
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this ~taay of June, 2007, I caused to be serVed a true 
copy of the foregoing REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISM1SS by the method 
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Roderick C. Bond 
Ned A. Cannon 
SlTIith. Cannon & Bond PLLC 
508 Eighth Street 
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Seattle, WA 98104-4088 
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David A. Gittins 
Law Office of David A. Gittins 
P.O. Box 191 
Clarkston. W A 99403 
[Attorney for Defendants Duclos and Freeman] 
1Y1ichael E. McNichols 
Clements Brown & McNichols 
32l 13th Street 
Lewiston, lD 83501 
[Attorneys for Defendant R. John Taylor] 
Jonatban D. Hany 
Clark & Feeney 
P.O. Box 285 
Lewiston, ID 8350J 
[Attorneys for Defendant Connie Taylor) 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
REED J. TAYLOR, a single person, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
AlA SERVICES CORPORATION, an 
Idaho corporation; AlA INSURANCE, INC., 
an Idaho corporation; R. JOHN TA YLOR 
and CONNIE TAYLOR, individually and 
the community property comprised thereof; 
BRYAN FREEMAN, a single person; and 
JOLEE DUCLOS, a single person, 
Defendants. 
Case No.: CV-07-00208 
PLAINTIFF REED J. TAYLOR'S 
AMENDED MOTION AND 
MEMORANDUM OF LAW TO 
AMEND AND SUPPLEMENT 
COMPLAINT 
Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor ("Reed Taylor") moves the Court for an Order to Amend and 
Supplement his Complaint in the form attached as Exhibit A to this Motion: 
III 
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77~ 
ORIGI Al 
I. EVIDENCE RELIED UPON 
This Amended Motion and Memorandum of Law to Amend and Supplement Complaint, 
the attached Exhibit A, and the Court's file. 
II. LEGAL AUTHORITY AND ARGUMENT 
"[A] party may amend a pleading only by leave of the court ... and leave shall be freely 
given when justice so requires ... " LR.C.P. 15(a). Similarly, a party may move to supplement a 
"pleading setting forth transactions or occurrences or events which have happened since the date 
of the pleading sough to be supplemented ... " LR.C.P. 15( d). "Great liberty should be shown in 
allowing amendments to pleadings in furtherance of justice between parties." Smith v. Shinn, 82 
Idaho 141, 149,350 P.2d 348 (1960). 
Here, Reed Taylor is moving the Court to amend and supplement his Third Amended 
Complaint in the form attached as Exhibit A to this Amended Motion. The attached proposed 
Fourth Amended Complaint supersedes and replaces that proposed Fourth Amended Complaint 
attached to Reed Taylor's original Motion to Amend and Supplement Complaint. 
The purpose of the amendment and supplement is to: (1) incorporate events which have 
transpired since the filing of the Second Amended Complaint; (2) clarify claims, causes of action 
and requested relief; (3) allege new claims and causes of action against present and new 
defendants; and (4) to name new defendants. 
III 
III 
III 
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III. CONCLUSION 
Reed Taylor should be permitted to file his Fourth Amended Complaint in the form 
attached as Exhibit A to this Amended Motion to Amend and Supplement Complaint. 
DATED: This 7th day of June, 2007. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, Roderick C. Bond, declare that, on the date indicated below, I served a true and correct 
copy of Plaintiff's Amended Notice of Hearing, Plaintiffs Amended Motion to Amend and 
Supplement Complaint (including Exhibit A - Plaintiffs Proposed Fourth Amended Complaint) 
and Proposed Order on Amended Motion to Amend and Supplement on the following party(s) 
via the methode s) indicated below: 
David A. Gittins 
Law Office of David A. Gittins 
P.O. Box 191 
Clarkston, W A 99403 
Attorney for Defendants Duclos and Freeman 
Michael E. McNichols 
Clements Brown & McNichols 
321 l3th Street 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
Attorneys for Defendant R. John Taylor 
Jonathan D. Hally 
Clark & Feeney 
P.O. Box 285 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
Attorney for Defendant Connie Taylor 
Gary D. Babbitt 
D. John Ashby 
Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley LLP 
877 Main Street, Suite 1000 
P.O. Box 1617 
Boise, Idaho 83701-1617 
Attorneys for AlA Services and AlA Insurance 
Via: 
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
(X) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) Facsimile 
Via: 
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
(X) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) Facsimile 
Via: 
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
(X) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) Facsimile 
Via: 
(X) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
(X) Facsimile - (208) 342-3829 
Signed this 7th day of June, 2007, at Lewiston, Idaho. 
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RODERICK C. BOND 
NED A. CANNON, ISB #2331 
Smith, Cannon & Bond PLLC 
Attorneys for Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor 
508 Eighth Street 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
Telephone: (208) 743-9428 
Fax: (208) 746-8421 
PAUL R. CRESSMAN, JR., ISBA #7563 
Ahlers & Cressman PLLC 
Attorneys for Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor 
999 Third Avenue, Suite 3100 
Seattle, Washington 98104-4088 
Telephone: (206) 287-9900 
Fax: (206) 287-9902 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF 
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
REED J. TAYLOR, a single person, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
AlA SERVICES CORPORATION, an 
Idaho corporation; AIA INSURANCE, 
INC., an Idaho corporation; R. JOHN 
TAYLOR and CONNIE TAYLOR, 
individually and the community property 
comprised thereof; BRYAN FREEMAN, 
a single person; JOLEE DUCLOS, a single 
person; CROP USA INSURANCE 
AGENCY, INC., an Idaho Corporation; and 
JAMES BECK and CORRINE BECK, 
individually and the community property 
comprised thereof; 
Defendants. 
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Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor submits this Fourth Amended Complaint against the Defendants 
alleging as follows: 
I. PARTIES, JURISDICTION AND VENUE 
1.1 Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor ("Reed") is a single person and a resident of Lewiston, 
Nez Perce County, Idaho. 
1.2 Defendant AlA Services Corporation ("AlA Services") is an Idaho corporation 
with its principal place of business located in Lewiston, Nez Perce County, Idaho. 
1.3 Defendant AlA Insurance, Inc. ("AlA Insurance") is an Idaho corporation with 
its principal place of business is located in Lewiston, Nez Perce County, Idaho. AlA Insurance 
is a wholly owned subsidiary of AlA Services. 
1.4 Defendant Connie Taylor ("Connie") is a single person residing in Lewiston, Nez 
Perce County, Idaho. 
1.5 Defendants R. John Taylor and Connie Taylor, were husband and wife until on or 
about December 16, 2005 (collectively "John") and at all relevant times were residents of 
Lewiston, Nez Perce County, Idaho. All references to "John" are for acts, omissions, claims, 
causes of action, and/or liabilities that accrued on or before December 16, 2005, are for John 
individually, and were also performed on behalf of R. John Taylor and Connie Taylor's marital 
community (which benefited from R. John Taylor's acts andlor omissions) as to divided and 
undivided community property. All references to "John" for acts, omission, claims, causes of 
action, and/or liabilities that accrued after December 16, 2005, are for John individually and 
pertain to Connie as to their divided and undivided community property. 
III 
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1.6 Defendant JoLee Duclos ("Duclos") IS a single person residing in Clarkston, 
Washington. 
1.7 Defendant Bryan Freeman ("Freeman") is a single person residing in Lewiston, 
Nez Perce County, Idaho. 
1.8 Defendant Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc. ("Crop USA") IS an Idaho 
corporation. 
1.9 Defendant James Beck and Corrine Beck (collectively "Beck") are residents of 
the state of Minnesota. All references to "Beck" are for acts, omissions, claims, causes of action, 
and/or liabilities that accrued are for James Beck individually, and were also performed on 
behalf of James Beck and Corrine Beck's marital community (which benefited from James 
Beck's acts and/or omissions) and pertain to Corrine Beck as to acts and/or omissions on behalf 
of the community and as to all community property. 
1.10 The District Court has jurisdiction over this matter under I.e. § 1-705. 
1.11 Venue is proper in the District Court of the Second Judicial District, Nez Perce 
County pursuant to I.C. § 5-404. 
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
2.1 John, was at all relevant times, an officer and director of AIA Services, AIA 
Insurance, and Crop USA. During the certain relevant times in which John was a director and 
officer of AIA Insurance and AlA Services, he owed fiduciary duties to Reed as the single 
largest creditor of AIA Insurance and AlA Services. John and Connie are the majority 
shareholders in AlA Services and own approximately 40% of the outstanding shares of Crop 
USA. 
III 
FOURTH AMENDED COMPLAINT - 3 
PLAINTIFF'S AMENDED MOTION TO 
AMEND AND SUPLEMENT COMPLAINT 7JI 
2.2 R. John Taylor and Connie Taylor were divorced through an Interlocutory Decree 
filed on December 16, 2005, under which only a portion of their community assets were divided 
and other property remained undivided. This action includes, but is not limited to, acts, 
omissions, transactions, debts, claims, andlor causes of action which accrued prior to R. John 
Taylor and Connie Taylor's dissolution. All references to "John" in this Complaint are for 
claims, breaches of duties, acts, omissions and liabilities incurred by R. John Taylor on behalf of 
the marital community of R. John Taylor and Connie Taylor, together with their community 
property, whether divided or not through the effective date of their dissolution decree entered on 
or about December 16,2005. 
2.3 After the effective date of R. John Taylor and Connie Taylor's decree of 
dissolution, all references to "John" in this Complaint are for claims, breaches of duties, acts, 
omissions and/or liabilities incurred by R. John Taylor individually. One of the reasons Connie 
Taylor is named as a party in this action for her derivative liability by virtue of her marriage to R. 
John Taylor and her interest in the community property of the marriage (including all divided 
and undivided community property of their marriage) all of which is subject to liability for the 
allegations in this Complaint of the acts, breaches of duties, claims, omissions, and conduct of R. 
John Taylor on and prior to December 16, 2005. 
2.4 During the certain relevant times that Connie Taylor ("Connie") was a director of 
AIA Insurance and AIA Services, she owed fiduciary duties to Reed as the single largest creditor 
of the corporations. Connie is also individually liable for all claims, breaches of duties, acts, 
omissions and/or liabilities during certain relevant times in which she was a member of the board 
of directors of AlA Services and AlA Insurance. 
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2.5 Duclos is, and was at certain relevant times, an officer and director of AlA 
Services, AIA Insurance, and Crop USA. Duclos is a shareholder in AlA Services and Crop 
USA. During the certain relevant times that Duclos was a director and officer of AIA Insurance 
and AlA Services, she owed fiduciary duties to Reed as the single largest creditor of the 
corporations. 
2.6 Freeman is, and was at certain relevant times, a director of AlA Services, AIA 
Insurance, and Crop USA. Freeman is a shareholder in AlA Services and Crop USA. During the 
certain relevant times that Freeman was a director of AIA Insurance and AIA Services, he owed 
fiduciary duties to Reed as the single largest creditor of the corporations. 
2.7 Defendants R. John Taylor and Connie Taylor own approximately 40% of Crop 
USA, which remained undivided community property at the time Reed filed his original 
Complaint. 
2.8 Defendant Beck is a shareholder in AlA Services and Crop USA. During the 
certain relevant times that Beck was a member of the board of directors of AIA Insurance and 
AIA Services, he owed fiduciary duties to Reed as the single largest creditor of the corporations. 
2.9 Reed was the founder and majority shareholder of AlA Services. In 1995, John 
desired to redeem Reed's 613,494 shares of common stock in AIA Services through a stock 
redemption agreement. Upon the closing of the transaction of AlA Services' redemption of 
Reed's shares, John became the majority shareholder in AIA Services. 
2.10 AIA Insurance, a subsidiary of AIA Services, is wholly owned by AIA Services 
and where virtually all of AlA Services' revenues are derived. AlA Insurance is lessee of the 
office building located at 111 Main Street, Lewiston, Idaho. 
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2.11 On or about July 22, 1995, AIA Services and Reed entered into a Stock 
Redemption Agreement, Stock Pledge Agreement, and Security Agreement. Under the terms of 
the Stock Redemption Agreement and related agreements, AIA Services agreed to execute 
promissory note to timely pay Reed $1,500,000 Million in 90 days ("Down Payment Note") and 
$6,000,000, plus accrued interest due and payable monthly at the rate of 8~% per annum 
("Promissory Note"). 
2.12 The Promissory Note was executed by John on behalf of AlA Services on or 
about August 1, 1995. Under the terms of the Promissory Note, AlA Services was required to 
timely pay all accrued interest monthly to Reed and the principal amount of $6,000,000, plus all 
accrued but unpaid interest was due and payable on August 1,2005. 
2.13 Under the terms of the Stock Redemption Agreement, AIA Services and AIA 
Insurance also agreed to contemporaneously execute a Security Agreement and Stock Pledge 
Agreement, among other agreements and documents. The Stock Redemption Agreement, Stock 
Pledge Agreement, and Security Agreement were all either authorized by the Board of Directors 
of AlA Services and/or AlA Insurance and/or approved by a shareholder vote. 
2.14 When AIA Services was unable to comply with the Stock Redemption 
Agreement, Stock Pledge Agreement, and Security Agreement, John (on behalf of AlA Services) 
entered into negotiations with Reed regarding restructuring the obligations. In 1996, AlA 
Services, AIA Insurance and Reed agreed to modify the Stock Redemption Agreement and 
executed the Stock Redemption Restructure Agreement ("Restructure Agreement"). 
Contemporaneously with the execution of the Restructure Agreement, the parties executed an 
Amended and Restated Stock Pledge Agreement ("Amended Stock Pledge Agreement") and an 
Amended and Restated Security Agreement ("Amended Security Agreement"). 
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2.15 Under the terms of the Restructure Agreement, the terms of the Promissory Note 
remained unchanged and were not modified (including the $6,000,000 principal amount, due 
date, and required monthly interest payments). Under the terms of the Amended Security 
Agreement, Reed received a security interest in all of AIA Services and AlA Insurance's 
commissions and related services (and all proceeds thereof) and AlA Services and AlA 
Insurance were required to have a Lock Box for all commissions for the benefit of Reed. 
2.16 Under the terms of the Amended Stock Pledge Agreement, AlA Services pledged 
all of the outstanding shares in AlA Insurance to Reed as partial security for AlA Services' 
indebtedness to Reed under the agreements. Under the terms of the Amended Stock Pledge 
Agreement, AlA Services' failure to timely pay Reed interest or principal under the Promissory 
Note or Down Payment Note constituted an Event of Default. In an Event of Default for failure 
to timely pay interest or principal under the Promissory Note, AIA Services' insolvency, or AlA 
Services' failure to maintain the required Lock Box (among other Events of Default), AlA 
Services' right to vote the pledged shares of AlA Insurance ceased and terminated and vested 
exclusively in Reed. 
2.17 Under the terms of the Amended Stock Pledge Agreement, Reed was required to 
be a member of the board of directors of AlA Services until Reed was paid in full or sufficient 
security was posted to ensure the payment of the Promissory Note. AIA Services never posted 
bonds or other security for the payment of the Promissory Note. In excess of six years, AlA 
Services, John, Duclos and/or Freeman have intentionally refused to appoint Reed to the Board 
as required. A new right to be a member of the board of AlA Services is created every year as 
directors are elected yearly. Despite Reed's demands and AlA Services' contractual obligations 
to keep Reed on the board of directors, AlA Services, John, Duclos, Freeman, Connie and/or 
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Beck have refused to appoint Reed to the Board of Directors of AIA Services as required. 
Because Reed has not been on the Board as required, all actions taken by AlA Services' Board 
were not properly authorized and, therefore, not ratified by AlA Services; and such acts are the 
personal actions of John, Duclos, Freeman, Connie and/or Beck during their tenure on the board 
of AlA Services. 
2.18 Under the Amended Stock Pledge Agreement, AIA Services agreed to not loan 
money to any affiliate other than a wholly owned subsidiary. AIA Services has loaned money to 
or provided other services or benefits to affiliates and other parties in violation of the Amended 
Stock Pledge Agreement, and such loans or benefits were made during times in which John, 
Duclos, Freeman, Connie and/or Beck were Board members. 
2.19 The Promissory Note required monthly interest payments with an acceleration 
clause if payments were not properly made to Reed. The acceleration clause requires written 
notice from Reed to AIA Services of default and AIA Services would be entitled to a five day 
opportunity to cure before Reed could exercise his rights under the Amended Stock Pledge 
Agreement or Amended Security Agreement. The obligations owed to Reed under the 
Promissory Note are independent of any other obligations owed by the Defendants and secured 
by the Amended Stock Pledge Agreement and Amended Security Agreement. 
2.20 During relevant times, the value of AlA Services and AlA Insurance was less than 
the aggregate amount of their total debts, which constitutes AIA Services and AIA Insurance's 
insolvency. During relevant times, AlA Services and AIA Insurance were unable to pay their 
debts as they became due, which constitutes AIA Services and AIA Insurance's insolvency. 
2.21 During certain relevant times, Reed was the largest and only significant creditor 
of AIA Services. Because AlA Services has failed to timely and properly pay creditors as 
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required during certain relevant times andlor was insolvent, John, Duclos, Freeman, Connie and 
Beck owed fiduciary duties to creditors and, specifically Reed because of his status as AlA 
Services' largest creditor. 
2.22 During certain relevant times, AIA Services and/or AIA Insurance were in default 
of various provisions of the agreements with Reed, insolvent andlor unable to timely pay its 
debts to Reed and/or other creditors. During certain relevant times, AIA Services has failed to 
comply with the terms of the Promissory Note. 
2.23 Instead of paying Reed as required, AIA Services, AlA Insurance, John, Duclos, 
Connie, Beck, and/or Freeman utilized funds that Reed had a security interest in to make 
investments in, transfer assets to, or loan money to, or provide services on behalf of John and/or 
entities operated andlor partially owned by John, Connie, Beck, Freeman, Duclos and/or one or 
more of the other Defendants. 
2.24 On or about December 12, 2006, Reed provided AlA Services written notice of 
default under various provisions of the Restructure Agreement, Amended Stock Pledge 
Agreement, and Amended Security Agreement, including, without limitation, AlA Services' 
failure to pay principal and interest due under the Promissory Note, failure to maintain the Lock 
Box, loaning money to non-wholly owned subsidiaries (including guaranteeing the $15 Million 
revolving line-of-credit for Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc.), failure to provide all required 
financial information, and other defaults as set forth in the notice. AlA Services and AlA 
Insurance have failed to timely cure the defaults and all applicable cure periods have expired. As 
of the date of this Complaint, the principal owed to Reed under the Promissory Note of 
$6,000,000, plus accrued interest of over $2,000,000 had not been paid in full as required. 
III 
FOURTH AMENDED COMPLAINT - 9 
PLAINTIFF'S AMENDED MOTION TO 
AMEND AND SUPLEMENT COMPLAINT 
7?7 
2.25 Prior to Reed's Notice of Default dated December 12, 2006, Reed had never 
accelerated any of the indebtedness due under the Promissory Note. Even though AlA Services 
and AIA Insurance failed to cure such defaults set forth in Reed's Notice of Default dated 
December 12, 2006, AlA Services continued to make partial interest payments before and after 
the date of Reed's original Complaint. All amounts due under the Promissory Note are secured 
by the remedies available under the Amended Stock Pledge Agreement and Amended Security 
Agreement. 
2.26 Despite Reed's demands, AlA Services, AlA Insurance, John, Freeman, Duclos, 
Connie and/or Beck have failed to comply with the terms of the Restructure Agreement, 
Amended Stock Pledge Agreement, and Amended Security Agreement. Under the Amended 
Stock Pledge Agreement, the right to vote all of AlA Insurance's shares ceased and terminated 
for AIA Services and became vested in Reed when AIA Services failed to timely pay the 
required monthly interest payments due under the Promissory Note and its subsequent failure to 
pay the $6,000,000 principal due under the Promissory Note on August 1, 2005. AlA Services 
was in default before Reed demanded to exercise his right to hold a special shareholder meeting 
to vote the shares to appoint a new board of directors for AIA Insurance. 
2.27 On December 12, 2006, Reed timely provided notice of his demand for a special 
shareholder meeting of AlA Insurance for the purpose of removing and appointing new board 
members on December 26, 2006. AlA Services, AlA Insurance, John, Duclos and/or Freeman 
refused to comply with Reed's demand for a special shareholder meeting by representing that 
AlA Insurance's offices were closed on December 26,2006. 
2.28 Through a letter dated January 3, 2007, John acknowledged Reed's rights under 
the Amended Stock Pledge Agreement when he stated "I fully recognize that [Reed] Taylor may 
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take actions he deems appropriate, including calling a special shareholders meeting." 
2.29 On or about January 25,2007, Reed hand delivered another demand for a special 
shareholder meeting for the removal and appointment of the board of directors for February 5, 
2007, pursuant to his rights under the Amended Stock Pledge Agreement. Through a letter from 
Duclos, AIA Insurance refused Reed's request and denied that he had the right to call a meeting 
to vote the AlA shares. Despite Reed's demands, AIA Insurance refused to hold a special 
shareholder meeting. 
2.30 Despite Reed's demands, AlA Services and AlA Insurance failed to cure the 
numerous Defaults under the terms of the Restructure Agreement, Amended Stock Pledge 
Agreement and Amended Security Agreement, among other obligations (as described above). 
Through the date of this Complaint, AIA Services and AlA Insurance's Defaults were not timely 
cured and they remained in Default. 
2.31 On February 22, 2007, Reed exercised his right to vote the pledged shares by 
executing a Consent in Lieu of Special Shareholder Meeting of AlA Insurance removing John, 
Duclos and Freeman from the Board of Directors and appointed himself the sole Board Member, 
pursuant to his right to vote the pledged shares under the Amended Stock Pledge Agreement. 
Because AIA Services' right to vote the pledged shares had ceased and terminated when it 
became in Default and failed to timely cure such Defaults, the right to vote the pledged shares in 
AIA Insurance vested exclusively in Reed and he exercised his right to vote the pledged shares 
pursuant to the Amended Stock Pledge Agreement and the Articles of Incorporation of AIA 
Insurance. Because the shares pledged to Reed account for all the outstanding shares of AlA 
Insurance, Reed had the authority to waive the notice requirement, notice period, and the 
formality of holding a shareholder meeting. Because Reed appointed himself as the sole director 
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of AIA Insurance, he had the exclusive authority to appoint himself as the officers of AlA 
Insurance through a Consent in Lieu of a Board Meeting. 
2.32 In the weeks leading up to the filing of this action, Reed discovered that more 
than one transfer of assets occurred during the time in which AIA Services had failed to service 
its debt to Reed. In 2004, AIA Insurance paid $1,510,693 to purchase Series C Preferred Shares 
in AIA Services from Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc., an entity in which John was the single 
largest shareholder (John holds approximately 40% of the outstanding shares in Crop USA 
Insurance Agency, Inc.) and Beck also owns a substantial stake. This transaction inappropriately 
and/or fraudulently transferred $1,510,693 of AlA Insurance's funds to Crop USA Insurance 
Agency, Inc. when such funds should have been tendered to Reed and/or used to pay the holder 
of the Series A Preferred Shares in AIA Services. This $1,510,693 transfer occurred at a time in 
which AIA Services and/or AIA Insurance were insolvent as defined above. This $1,510,693 
transfer also occurred at the same time that AlA Services' 401(k) Plan (the "Plan") held over 
$750,000 in Preferred C Shares in AlA Services. No shares were purchased or redeemed from 
the Plan, even though John and Duclos were the Co-Trustees of the Plan at the time of the 
transfer. 
2.33 Reed also discovered that John had purchased a parking lot and entered into a 
lease agreement with AlA Services andlor AIA Insurance to lease the parking lot from him for 
$1,250 per month. This transaction was also the fraudulent transfer of funds to John and funds 
which should have been paid to Reed during a time in which AIA Services was unable to service 
its debt to Reed and was otherwise insolvent. The parking lot is not utilized by AlA Insurance or 
AlA Services. Such acts and/or transfers have occurred during John, Freeman, Duclos, Connie 
andlor Beck's tenure as members of the Board of AlA Insurance and/or AIA Services. 
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2.34 Based upon the above-referenced acts, transfers and transactions, together with 
transactions referenced in the foot notes to AlA Services and/or AlA Insurance's financial 
statements, there are other unauthorized and inappropriate transfers, loans, payments, advances 
and other actions which occurred during times AlA Services defaults and inability to timely pay 
Reed and at times in which AlA Services was insolvent. Upon information and belief, Reed 
believes that forensic accounting and further scrutiny of AlA Insurance and AlA Services' books 
and records will reveal additional improper and actionable activities. 
2.35 During times in which John, Freeman, Duclos, Connie and/or Beck owed Reed 
fiduciary duties, they have used AlA Services and AIA Insurance as their personal source of 
funds and/or assets, including, without limitation, acts in which John has transferred assets to 
their name; taken advances that John never paid back; transferred assets, rescourses, and/or funds 
to Crop USA, Sound Insurance and/or other entities partially owned or controlled by John; 
entered into transactions which constitute a violation of AlA Services' Articles of Incorporation; 
made transfers and/or entered into transactions which benefited them; and provided services for 
entities partially owned by them without such actions being arms-length transactions. The above 
acts occurred when John, Duclos, Freeman, Connie and/or Beck were directors and/or officers of 
AlA Services and AIA Insurance. All of the above acts occurred during certain relevant times in 
which AIA Services was not current with payments to Reed under the Promissory Note and was 
insolvent. 
2.36 On February 22,2007 (after executing the Consent in Lieu of Special Shareholder 
Meeting), Reed executed a Consent in Lieu of Board Meeting to terminate all officers, terminate 
the employment of John, authorize the change of locks, and take such other actions deemed 
appropriate. When Reed attempted to take action in accordance with the Consents described 
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above, AlA Services, AlA Insurance, John, Duclos andlor Freeman refused to abide by the 
Consents. 
2.37 Donna Taylor, the holder of the Series A Preferred Shares in AIA Services, 
subordinated all of her rights to payment of the redemption of her shares in favor of the Plaintiff 
Reed J. Taylor. Through the date of Reed's original Complaint, AlA Services had not timely 
and properly paid all sums owed to Donna Taylor. 
2.38 During the relevant times that John, Duclos, Freeman, Connie and/or Beck were 
directors of AlA Services and AlA Insurance, they failed to take appropriate legal action on 
behalf of AIA Insurance and AIA Services. During the relevant times that John, Duclos, 
Freeman, Connie and/or Beck were directors of AIA Services and AIA Insurance, they breached 
their fiduciary duties owed to Reed. 
2.39 Sometime after filing Reed's original Complaint, Freeman and Duclos resigned as 
members of the board of directors of AlA Insurance and AlA Services. John, in breach of his 
fiduciary duties owed to Reed and in violation of Reed's vote of the pledge shares in AlA 
Insurance, appointed Connie and Beck to the board of AIA Insurance. John also appointed 
Connie and Beck to the board of AIA Services in breach of his fiduciary duties owed to Reed. 
These appointments were conflicts of interest and breaches of John's fiduciary duties owed to 
Reed. 
2.40 During certain relevant times that John, Connie and Beck were directors of AIA 
Services and AlA Insurance, they failed to take appropriate legal action on behalf of AlA 
Insurance and AlA Services. During certain relevant times that John, Connie and Beck were 
directors of AlA Services and AlA Insurance, they breached their fiduciary duties owed to Reed. 
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2.41 Reed has a valid and perfected security interest in all commissions from sale of 
insurance and related services received by or on behalf of, or payable to, AlA Insurance and AIA 
Services, and interest thereon. Reed demanded that no funds which he had a security interest in 
and/or which should be paid to him could be used to pay the legal fees of John, Duclos or 
Freeman. Despite Reed's demands, AlA Services, AIA Insurance, John, Connie and/or Beck 
have unlawfully, improperly and inappropriately diverted funds to pay John, Duclos and/or 
Freeman's attorneys' fees and costs. Because all of AlA Services' revenues are derived from 
AlA Insurance's commissions and related services that Reed has a valid security interest in, such 
payments also constitute an illegal and/or unauthorized dividend from AIA Insurance to AIA 
Services, conversion, fraud and fraudulent conveyances. 
2.42 Prior to the filing of Reed's original Complaint and without Reed's knowledge or 
consent, John paid a debt he owed to AIA Services in the amount of $307,271 by transferring 
said indebtedness to Reed's Promissory Note. Such payment constitutes fraud (as set forth 
below), an account stated and/or moneys personally owed to Reed from John (including Connie) 
as the payment was reflected on AlA Services' financial statements. 
2.43 After the filing date of Reed's original Complaint, Duclos and Freeman resigned 
as directors of AlA Services and AIA Insurance. John appointed Connie and Beck as 
replacement board members without holding a shareholder vote of AlA Services or AlA 
Insurance. John's appointment of Connie and Beck as directors of AlA Services and AlA 
Insurance was a conflict of interest and breach of his fiduciary duties owed to Reed and other 
creditors. 
2.44 Sound Insurance has been operating through AlA Services and/or Insurance and 
with funds, assets, rent, and/or services provided by AlA Services and/or AlA Insurance during 
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certain relevant times that John, Freeman, Duclos, Connie and/or Beck owed fiduciary duties to 
Reed. Since the filing of Reed's Original Complaint and upon information and belief, Crop USA 
purchased Sound Insurance from John and/or other unknown parties. The Defendants' operation 
of Sound Insurance and subsequent sale constitutes breaches of fiduciary duties, converSIOn, 
fraud and/or a fraudulent conveyance. 
2.45 Global Travel was a tenant III ALA Insurance's office building located in 
Lewiston, Idaho. Since the filing of Reed's original Complaint, Global Travel has relocated as a 
tenant in an office building owned by R. John Taylor. Such actions are a breach of R. John 
Taylor, Duclos, Freeman, Connie and Beck's fiduciary duties owed to Reed, fraud and/or a 
fraudulent conveyance. 
2.46 Through a letter dated February 27, 2001, John represented to Reed that AlA 
Services and/or AlA Insurance was developing a new crop insurance program through a new 
company called Crop USA. Reed relied on John's representation that ALA Services and/or AlA 
Insurance were the owners of Crop USA, when John's representation was false in that Crop USA 
was not owned by ALA Insurance or AlA Services, but instead owned by John, Beck, Freeman, 
and Duclos. 
2.47 John made representations to Reed that he would not be taking a salary in certain 
year(s). Reed relied on John's false representation and in late 2006 or early 2007 learned that 
John had in fact taken a salary during the respective times. 
2.48 John made representations and/or omitted material facts to Reed that AlA 
Services and AlA Insurance were being operated for the benefit of AlA Services and ALA 
Insurance. AlA Services and AlA Insurance made representations and/or omitted material facts 
to Reed through their financial statements that they were being operated for the benefit of the 
FOURTH AMENDED COMPLAINT - 16 
PLAINTIFF'S AMENDED MOTION TO 
AMEND AND SUPLEMENT COMPLAINT 
corporations. Reed relied on AlA Services, AIA Insurance, John's false representations and/or 
omissions of material facts when in fact AlA Services and AIA Insurance were not being 
operated for the benefit of the corporations, but instead were being operated for the benefit of 
John, Freeman, Duclos, Crop USA, Sound Insurance, and/or Beck. As directors, Freeman, John 
and Duclos also made the false representations and/or omitted material facts by and through the 
corporations' financial statements. 
2.49 John, Freeman, and Duclos breached their fiduciary duties owed to Reed Taylor 
when AlA Insurance guaranteed a $15,000,000 loan for Crop USA. This guarantee is also a 
violation of AIA Insurance's Bylaws and the terms of the Amended Stock Pledge Agreement. 
AIA Insurance received no benefit from this loan and received no consideration. 
2.50 After the inappropriate and fraudulent transfer of $1,510,693 to Crop USA 
described above, the wrongful transfer was misrepresented on the financial statements of AlA 
Insurance as an investment with a value of approximately $1,500,000, when the "investment" 
was worthless. John, Duclos and/or Freeman were aware, or should have been aware, of this 
false fact as AIA Services was insolvent. 
2.51 Reed believes that there are other acts, fraud, breaches of fiduciary duties, 
wrongful transfers and/or fraudulent transactions that he will itemize and detail through future 
amended complaints upon completion of discovery and/or at trial. By and through this 
paragraph, the Defendants should be placed on notice that Reed intends to recover every dollar 
of funds, assets, services, loans, barters and the like that were utilized and/or transferred through 
fraud, constructive fraud, breaches of fiduciary duties, fraudulent conveyances, and any other 
causes of action set forth below. 
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2.52 The unity of ownership of AIA Services, AlA Insurance and/or Crop USA is such 
that the separate personalities of the corporations and the individuals no longer exist. Equity 
should prevent the acts and omissions from being solely those of AIA Services, AIA Insurance 
and/or Crop USA. As a result of the unlawful acts, conduct, omissions, fraud, failure to observe 
corporate governance, and breaches of fiduciary duties as set forth in this Complaint, AIA 
Insurance, AlA Services and/or Crop USA are the alter-egos of John, Duclos, Freeman, Connie 
and/or Beck and such corporate veils should be pierced thereby imposing personal liability on 
John, Duclos, Freeman, Connie and Beck. 
2.53 AlA Services, AlA Insurance, John, Duclos, Freeman, Connie andlor Beck 
unlawfully provided Crop USA, Sound Insurance, and/or other entities with rent, labor, funds, 
services, resources, and/or other assets without adequate compensation to the detriment of AlA 
Services, AIA Insurance and Reed. 
III. FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION-BREACHES OF CONTRACT 
3.1 Reed re-alleges and incorporates each and every allegation contained in other 
paragraphs of this Complaint necessary to support every claim under this cause of action. 
3.2 AIA Services, AlA Insurance and/or John's acts and/or omissions and failure to 
pay Reed the amounts owed and/or comply with the Promissory Note, Amended Stock Pledge 
Agreement, Amended Security Agreement and Restructure Agreement constitute a breach of 
their contractual obligations owed to Reed. AlA Services, AlA Insurance, and/or John's acts 
and/or omissions constitute the breach of obligations owed to Reed under the Promissory Note, 
Amended Stock Pledge Agreement, Restructure Agreement, Amended Security Agreement, and 
monies owed to Reed. 
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3.3 As a result of AIA Services, AIA Insurance and/or John's acts and/or omissions 
which constitute numerous breaches of contractual obligations, Reed has suffered and is entitled 
to damages of $6,000,000, plus accrued interest in an amount to be determined at trial to be 
allocated between the defendants as the evidence and claims show at trial. In addition, Reed is 
entitled to an award of attorneys' fees and costs as under the Promissory Note, Amended Stock 
Pledge Agreement, I.C. § 12-120 and/or I.C. § 12-121. 
IV. SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION-FRAUDULENT TRANSFERS 
4.1 Reed re-alleges and incorporates each and every allegation contained in other 
paragraphs of this Complaint necessary to support every claim under this cause of action. 
4.2 The Defendants' actions constitute fraudulent transfers and/or conveyances under 
I.e. § 55-901, et seq. and/or the common law doctrine of Fraudulent Conveyances. 
4.3 As a result of John, Duclos, Freeman, Connie and/or Beck's participation and/or 
approval of the fraudulent transfers, John, Duclos, Freeman, Connie and/or Beck are personally 
liable for all fraudulent transfers, plus accrued interest, in an amount to be proved at trial. All 
fraudulent transfers should be avoided and/or rescinded and/or all assets placed in a constructive 
trust for the benefit of Reed. 
4.4 Crop USA is and/or was the recipient of various fraudulent transfers from AlA 
Services andlor AlA Insurance, and should be required to return all funds, rescind all 
transactions, and/or the ownership interest in Crop USA should be placed in a constructive trust 
for the benefit of Reed. 
III 
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v. THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION-MISREPRESENTATIONSIFRAUD 
(Fraud and/or Constructive Fraud) 
5.1 Reed re-alleges and incorporates each and every allegation contained in other 
paragraphs of this Complaint necessary to support every claim under this cause of action. 
5.2 AIA Services, AIA Insurance and/or John made statements of fact andlor omitted 
material statements of fact, including, without limitation those facts set forth in Paragraphs 2.33, 
2.42, 2.44, and 2.45-2.48 above; such statements of fact were false or omitted material facts; 
such false statements or omitted facts were material; AIA Services, AlA Insurance and/or John 
knew or should have known the falsity of such statements; AIA Services, AIA Insurance andlor 
John intended to induce reliance; Reed was ignorant to the falsity of such statements and/or 
omissions; and Reed relied on such statements and/or omissions; Reed had a right to rely on such 
false statements and/or omissions. 
5.3 By and through their fraudulent acts and/or omISSIons, including, without 
limitation, the allegations set forth in this Complaint and in Paragraphs 2.33, 2.42, and 2.45-2.48 
above, AlA Services, AlA Insurance, John, Freeman, Duclos, Connie and/or Beck's acts and/or 
omissions constitute fraud, constructive fraud, and/or fraud as set forth in Smith v. Great Basin 
Grain Co., 98 Idaho 266, 561 P.2d 1299 (1977), and Reed is entitled to recover all damages 
attributable to such fraud. Under the theory set forth under Smith v. Great Basin Grain Co., AlA 
Services, AlA Insurance, John, Freeman, Duclos, Connie andlor Beck are liable for all funds, 
assets, and services that were unlawfully and/or inappropriately transferred and/or utilized to 
their benefit during their tenure as officers, directors, and/or shareholders in AlA Services and 
Crop USA. 
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5.4 As a result of AlA Services, AlA Insurance, John, Duclos, Freeman, Connie, 
and/or Beck's acts, false statements, omissions, and/or fraud, Reed was damaged as consequence 
or proximate result of such acts, false statements, omissions, and/or fraud and is entitled to 
recover such damages from the responsible Defendants. 
VI. FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION-CONVERSION 
6.1 Reed re-alleges and incorporates each and every allegation contained in other 
paragraphs of this Complaint necessary to support every claim under this cause of action. 
6.2 AIA Services, AIA Insurance, Crop USA, John, Duclos, Connie, Freeman and/or 
Beck's conduct constitutes the willful interference with Reed's property and money which 
should have been paid to him and/or money in which he had a valid security interest (whether 
through UCC filings andlor through security interests in the Amended Stock Pledge Agreement), 
without lawful justification, which deprived Reed of the possession of such money and/or 
property. Crop USA, John, Duclos, Freeman, Connie and/or Beck were recipients of the 
converted assets, funds, and/or services (including for any attorneys' fees and costs paid on their 
behalf by AIA Services and/or AIA Insurance). 
6.3 As a result of the AlA Services, AIA Insurance, Crop USA, John, Duclos, 
Freeman, Connie andlor Beck's unlawful acts and/or conduct, Reed has been damaged and is 
entitled to damages proven at trial. 
VII. FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION-ALTEREGO/PIERCING CORPORATE VAIL 
(As a Cause of Action and/or as Notice of Personal Liability) 
7.1 Reed re-alleges and incorporates each and every allegation contained in other 
paragraphs of this Complaint necessary to support every claim under this cause of action. 
III 
FOURTH AMENDED COMPLAINT - 21 
PLAINTIFF'S AMENDED MOTION TO 
AMEND AND SUPLEMENT COMPLAINT 711 
7.2 Reed also specifically re-alleges and incorporates Paragraph 2.52 above. 
7.3 Because of the lack of proper corporate governance, lack of capitalization, fraud, 
and the unlawful and/or inappropriate acts and/or omissions of AIA Insurance, AlA Services, 
Crop USA, John, Duclos, Freeman, Beck, and Connie, the corporate veil of AlA Services, AIA 
Insurance and Crop USA should be pierced thereby holding John, Duclos, Freeman, Connie 
and/or Beck personally liable for all indebtedness to Reed as equity requires such action. 
VIII. SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION-EQUITABLE INDEMNIFICATION 
8.1 Reed re-alleges and incorporates each and every allegation contained in other 
paragraphs of this Compliant necessary to support every claim under this cause of action. 
8.2 Donna Taylor is the holder of Series A Preferred Shares in AlA Services, and 
such shares were issued to her as a result of a dissolution action between Donna Taylor and 
Reed. AlA Services was required to pay all sums owed to Donna Taylor by a contract also 
signed by Reed. AlA Services and John have failed to redeem Donna Taylor's shares as 
required. But not for AlA Services, John, Duclos, and/or Freeman's fraudulent, wrongful and/or 
inappropriate acts, Donna Taylor's Series A Preferred Shares would have been redeemed by AlA 
Services. As of the date of Reed's original Complaint, over $500,000 must be paid to Donna 
Taylor to redeem her Series A Preferred Shares in AlA Services. 
8.3 In addition, John personally guaranteed all deferred payments to Donna Taylor 
through a letter dated February 27, 2001. As of the date of Reed's original Complaint, all of 
Donna Taylor's shares should have been redeemed thereby paying her in full. John has failed to 
pay the deferred payments to Donna Taylor which constitutes the full balance owed to Donna 
Taylor. John and Connie are personally liable for all amounts owed to Donna Taylor through the 
theory of Equitable Indemnification. 
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8.4 Reed is entitled to be equitably indemnified by AlA Services, John, Duclos, 
Connie and/or Freeman for any sums owed to Donna Taylor and paid by Reed because of their 
failure to redeem the Series A Preferred Shares as required. 
IX. SEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION-ACCOUNT STATED/MONIES DUE 
9.1 Reed re-alleges and incorporates each and every allegation contained in other 
paragraphs of this Complaint necessary to support every claim under this cause of action. 
9.2 In or about 2002 or 2003, John owed AlA Services at least $307,271. In order to 
extinguish John's liabilities to AIA Services, John debited Reed's Promissory Note with a 
payment of at least $307,271 and credited John's indebtedness with a payment of at least 
$307,271. John did not obtain Reed's approval or consent to transfer funds between John's 
indebtedness and Reed's Promissory Note and John has not tendered payment of these funds to 
Reed. This debt constitutes a personal loan from Reed to John. This account stated and/or debt 
remains unpaid, along with any others which may have occurred but which Reed is unaware of at 
this time, the dates and exact amount of which will be proven at trial. 
9.3 Reed is entitled to the payment of all amounts owed by John as a result of all 
transfers between Reed's Promissory Note and John indebtedness from AlA Services and/or AlA 
Insurance. Reed is also entitled to pre-judgment interest on all amounts owed to him by John for 
all such accounts stated and/or debts from the date of such transfers until payment in full is made 
to Reed. 
9.4 AIA Services reflected momes due to Reed on its financial statements and 
statements, which constitutes written evidence of amounts due Reed on an account stated/monies 
due as an alternative cause of action for the collection of sums owed under the Promissory Note. 
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9.5 As a direct and/or proximate result of AlA Services and/or John's acts and/or 
omissions, AIA Services and/or John are in breach of their obligations to pay Reed, and Reed is 
entitled to damages in an amount to be proven at trial. 
X. EIGHTH CAUSE OF ACTION-UNJUST ENRICHMENT 
10.1 Reed re-alleges and incorporates each and every allegation contained in other 
paragraphs of this Complaint necessary to support every claim under this cause of action. 
10.2 Reed conferred the benefit of John being the controlling shareholder of AlA 
Services when he agreed to sell his shares back to AlA Services. By and through his control of 
AIA Services, John, Crop USA, Freeman, Duclos, Connie and/or Beck have benefited from their 
control of AlA Services and AlA Insurance. Crop USA, John, Duclos, Freeman, Connie and/or 
Beck have retained the benefit of their fraud, fraudulent conveyances, wrongful, improper acts, 
overreaching conduct, and/or conduct which constitutes the breach of their fiduciary duties owed 
to Reed. 
10.3 Crop USA, John, Duclos, Freeman, Connie andlor Beck would be unjustly 
enriched if allowed to retain the benefit of the assets, securities, loans, advances and/or other 
services received through AIA Services and/or AIA Insurance, all of which funds should have 
been paid to Reed as it would be inequitable for the them to retain the benefit without payment of 
value. 
XI. NINTH CAUSE OF ACTION-CONSTRUCTIVE TRUST 
(As a Cause of Action and/or as Remedies) 
11.1 Reed re-alleges and incorporates each and every allegation contained in other 
paragraphs of this Complaint necessary to support every claim under this cause of action. 
1/1 
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11.2 Reed has a valid security interest in AIA Services andlor AIA Insurance's 
commissions and all of the outstanding shares of AlA Insurance, among other security interests. 
The boards of AIA Services and AlA Insurance owed Reed fiduciary duties to Reed. AIA 
Services, AIA Insurance, Crop USA, John, Duclos and/or Freeman fraudulently, wrongfully 
and/or improperly used funds, transferred assets andlor provided services (which should have 
been paid to Reed or benefited AlA Services and/or AlA Insurance) for investments, personal 
use, inappropriate transactions, loans, advances, self-dealing, and/or other wrongful, fraudulent 
and/or inappropriate purposes. 
11.3 AlA Services, AlA Insurance, Crop USA John, Duclos, Freeman, Connie, and/or 
Beck's acts and/or omissions resulted in Crop USA, John, Duclos, Freeman, Connie and/or 
Beck's acquisition of money, securities andlor services which should have been paid to Reed but 
for their fraud, misrepresentation(s), bad faith, fraudulent conveyances, breaches of fiduciary 
duties, and/or overreaching activities; and AIA Services, Crop USA, John, Duclos, Freeman, 
and/or other entities' retention of the money, investments, securities and property would be 
unjust. 
11.4 Reed requests the imposition of a constructive trust for his benefit to recover the 
proceeds of all such fraud, fraudulent conveyances, breaches of fiduciary duties, overreaching, 
improper, self-dealing, wrongful and/or inappropriate transfers, acts and/or omissions. 
XII. TENTH CAUSE OF ACTION-DIRECTOR LIABILITY 
(As a Cause of Action and/or Notice of Personal Liability) 
12.1 Reed re-alleges and incorporates each and every allegation contained in other 
paragraphs of this Complaint necessary to support every claim under this cause of action. 
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12.2 John, Duclos, Freeman, Connie and/or Beck are personally liable for all relevant 
breached fiduciary duties, wrongful acts, improper acts, omissions, overreaching transactions, 
fraud, loans, advances, loan guarantees and/or fraudulent conveyances which occurred during 
their tenure as a member ofthe Board of Directors of AlA Service and AIA Insurance. 
12.3 Because John, Duclos and Freeman were both directors and officers during 
certain relevant times, they owed Reed fiduciary duties for the damages set forth in this 
Complaint. 
XIII. ELEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION-SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE 
(As a Cause of Action and/or as Remedies) 
13.1 Reed re-alleges and incorporates each and every allegation contained in other 
paragraphs of this Complaint necessary to support every claim under this cause of action. 
13.2 Under the Amended Stock Pledge Agreement, Amended Security Agreement, and 
Restructure Agreement, Reed is entitled to vote the pledged shares of AIA Insurance (and all 
ancillary rights, including, without limitation, to vote the shares to remove the board and take all 
actions related in any way to his right to vote the pledged shares), sell the shares of AlA 
Insurance at public or private sale, judicially sell the pledged shares in AlA Insurance, entitled to 
timely receive audited financial statements and financial information, and/or seize all of the AIA 
Insurance and AIA Services' commissions in the required Lock Box. When AIA Services 
became in Default, it lost its right to vote the pledged shares of AIA Insurance and the right 
vested exclusively in Reed. 
13.3 Despite Reed's demands for AIA Services, AlA Insurance, John, Duclos, 
Freeman, Connie and/or Beck to comply with the provisions in the Amended Stock Pledge 
Agreement, Amended Security Agreement and Restructure Agreement, AIA Services, AlA 
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Insurance, John, Duclos, Freeman, Connie and Beck have refused to comply. Reed is entitled to 
the relief afforded to him or reasonably contemplated under the foregoing agreements and such 
other rights, remedies and/or relief as may be available under Idaho Code, including, without 
limitation, any action, relief and/or order authorized under I.C. § 30-1-701 et seq. and/or I.e. § 
28-9-101 et seq. (including the sale of the pledged shares, protection of security interest, seizure 
of security, and any other available remedy). 
13.4 Reed is entitled to an award of attorneys' fees and costs incurred, at or before 
trial, in enforcing any provision of the Promissory Note, Amended Stock Pledge Agreement, 
Amended Security Agreement, and/or Restructure Agreement for relief sought before or at trial. 
XIV. TWELFTH CAUSE OF ACTION-BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTIES 
14.1 Reed re-alleges and incorporates each and every allegation contained in other 
paragraphs of this Complaint necessary to support every claim under this cause of action. 
14.2 During certain relevant times, John, Connie, Beck, Duclos and/or Freeman owes 
and/or owed Reed fiduciary duties because of his status as the largest creditor of AlA Services 
and/or AlA Insurance and because AlA Services and/or AlA Insurance were insolvent as 
described in this Complaint; and such fiduciary duties include, without limitation, the duties of 
care and loyalty to Reed. During the relevant times that any of the Defendants acted as both a 
director and an officer of AlA Insurance and/or AlA Services, he/she/they owed even more 
elevated fiduciary duties to Reed as the single largest creditor of AlA Services and/or AlA 
Insurance. 
14.3 John, Connie, Beck, Duclos and/or Freeman breached their fiduciary duties owed 
to Reed when they failed to operate AlA Services and AlA Insurance for the benefit of Reed. 
John, Connie, Beck, Duclos and/or Freeman further breached their fiduciary duties when they 
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failed to take legal action against past and/or present officers and/or directors of AIA Services 
and AIA Insurance. 
14.4 As a result of John, Connie, Beck, Duclos and Freeman's breaches of their 
fiduciary duties owed to Reed, they are individually liable to Reed for all sums deemed the 
product of their breached fiduciary duties, including without limitation, all damages attributable 
to inappropriate transfers of assets and/or services, inappropriate use of assets and/or services, 
the failure to pursue claims against other past and/or present officers and directors, inappropriate 
guarantee of loans, and such other wrongful acts and/or omissions that Reed will demonstrate at 
trial. 
xv. PRAYERFORRELIEF 
Without waiving any claims, rights and/or remedies under any of the above-referenced 
agreements and/or Idaho Code as a secured party, Reed respectfully requests the following relief: 
15.1 For a judgment against AlA Services for the principal of $6,000,000, plus accrued 
pre-judgment interest, in the total amount to be proven at trial. 
15.2 For the imposition of a constructive trust for all shares of common and/or 
preferred shares in Crop USA owned and/or held by John, Connie, Freeman, Duclos, and Beck 
for the benefit of Reed and for all ancillary actions necessary to transfer said shares to Reed. 
15.3 For a preliminary and permanent injunction enjoining any of the Defendants from 
preventing Reed from exercising his right under the Amended Stock Pledge Agreement to vote 
the pledged shares in AlA Insurance and taking any ancillary actions which relate in any way to 
voting the pledged shares, including, without limitation, removing the board of directors of AIA 
Insurance and appointing a revised board and such other actions he deems appropriate in his sole 
discretion as the exclusive person entitled to vote all the outstanding shares of AlA Insurance. 
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15.4 For a preliminary and permanent injunction enjoining any of the Defendants from 
interfering with the actions taken pursuant to the February 22, 2007, Consent in Lieu of Special 
Meeting of Shareholders of AIA Insurance and the actions taken pursuant to the February 22, 
2007, Consent in Lieu of Meeting of Board of Directors of AIA Insurance. 
15.5 For a preliminary and permanent injunction enjoining the Defendants and any 
entity owned, partially owned or operated by anyone or more of them from interfering with, 
disturbing, and transferring any of AlA insurance's customers, contracts, agreements and 
business. 
15.6 Until such time that Reed Taylor's vote of the pledged shares is honored and he is 
permitted to operate AlA Insurance, Reed Taylor requests a preliminary and permanent 
injunction against the Defendants as follows: 
(a) Enjoining the Defendants from utilizing, transferring or disposing of any 
funds, assets, labor, facilities or services of AlA Insurance for any other 
person, entity or business, unless such transactions are arms-length and 
payment is received by AlA Insurance prior to providing such funds, assets, 
labor, facilities or services (e.g., no credit arrangements for such activities). 
(b) Enjoining the Defendants from disposing of, using, transferring or utilizing 
any of the funds received from the lawsuit entitled In re: Universe Liquidator 
Grain Growers Trust, et al. v. Idaho Department of Insurance a/kIa GGMIT 
suit. All funds from the foregoing should be held in trust until further notice 
from the Court. 
( c) Enjoining the Defendants from negotiating or entering into any loans, credit 
arrangements, credit facilities, or borrowing any funds under any loan, line-of-
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credit, credit facility, open account and the like for which AIA Insurance is a 
guarantor or a signatory, unless utilized for the exclusive benefit of AIA 
Insurance to provide funding for AIA Insurance and approved by Reed Taylor 
or such other party appointed by Reed Taylor or the Court. 
(d) Enjoining the Defendants from destroying, altering, deleting, purging, and/or 
removing any documents (including drafts, proposals, electronic files, email, 
back-up media and the like), property, computers and the like from AIA 
Insurance's office. 
(e) Enjoining the Defendants from advancing or lending any funds, assets or 
services to R. John Taylor, JoLee Duclos, Bryan Freeman, Connie Taylor or 
AIA Services without first obtaining written consent from Reed Taylor or the 
Court. 
(f) Enjoining the Defendants from entering into or negotiating any substantive 
contracts or agreements without first obtaining approval from Reed Taylor or 
the Court. 
(g) Enjoining the Defendants from holding, calling or participating in any 
shareholder meetings, board meeting, and/or executing any Consents in Lieu 
of the foregoing without permitting Reed Taylor to vote the pledged shares or 
take such other action permitted to him as the holder of the right to vote all 
outstanding shares of AlA Insurance. 
(h) Enjoining the Defendants from using or transferring any funds, assets, or 
services of AlA Insurance for the purpose of providing any retainers or 
payments for the legal services for R. John Taylor, Bryan Freeman, JoLee 
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Duclos, and Connie Taylor. 
(i) Enjoining R. John Taylor from being paid compensation for work performed 
for AlA Insurance and/or AIA Services, required to disgorge all compensation 
and benefits. R. John Taylor's time expended for Crop USA Insurance 
Agency, Inc. and any other entities partially owned by him shall be paid by 
the appropriate entity and not AlA Insurance or AlA Services. 
G) Enjoining the Defendants from not having AlA Insurance and AlA Services 
accurately and properly itemizing every employee's daily time sheet to reflect 
the number of hour(s) performed for AlA Services and AlA Insurance and 
such other unrelated entities such as Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc. and 
Sound Insurance. 
(k) Enjoining the Defendants from such other actions as may be reasonably 
contemplated from this Complaint, the Amended Stock Pledge Agreement, 
the Amended Security Agreement, the Restructure Agreement and/or which 
would otherwise protect Reed Taylor's interests. 
15.7 For a preliminary and permanent injunction against the Defendants requiring them 
to timely and promptly provide Reed Taylor with all financial information required under the 
Amended Stock Pledge Agreement. 
15.8 For a preliminary and permanent injunction enjoining John and any of the other 
Defendants from entering the offices of AlA Insurance, if necessary. 
15.9 For an order and/or judgment permitting Reed to sell the pledged shares of AlA 
Insurance at public or private sale or, in the alternative, judicially. 
III 
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15.10 For an order compelling an audit of AIA Services and AlA Insurance. 
15.11 For a declaratory judgment or order requiring specific performance of AlA 
Services and/or AIA Insurance's obligations and Reed's rights under the Amended Stock Pledge 
Agreement, Amended Security Agreement, Promissory Note and/or Restructure Agreement. 
15.12 For a preliminary injunction and/or order invalidating the appointment of Connie 
and Beck from the Boards of AlA Services and AlA Insurance. 
15.13 AIA Insurance and AlA Services have been operated as the alter-egos of John, 
Duclos, Freeman, Connie and/or Beck, and they are personally liable for all sums owed to Reed 
by AIA Services in an amount to be proven at trial. 
15.14 For a preliminary and permanent injunction enjoining John from appointing any 
directors for AIA Services or AIA Insurance. 
15.15 For a declaratory judgment and/or order enforcing the February 22,2007, Consent 
in Lieu of Special Meeting of Shareholders of AlA Insurance and the actions taken pursuant to 
the February 22, 2007, Consent in Lieu of Meeting of Board of Directors of AIA Insurance, as 
valid and duly executed Consents. 
15.16 For a judgment for damages and attorneys' fees incurred by Reed as a result of 
being wrongfully enjoined by the Defendants. 
15.17 For such other relief that Reed may request before or at trial to enforce his rights 
under the Amended Stock Pledge Agreement, Amended Security Agreement, and/or Restructure 
Agreement, including, without limitation, any action or order authorized under I.e. § 30-1-701 et 
seq. and/or I.C. § 28-9-101 et seq. 
15.18 For judgment, order and/or declaratory relief as may be necessary for Reed to 
effectuate any and all rights and remedies under I.C. § 28-9-101 et seq. (including the sale of the 
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pledged shares, protection of security interest, seizure of security, and any other available 
remedy) 
15.19 For the avoidance of the improper and/or fraudulent transfers of funds, assets 
and/or services from AlA Services and/or AIA Insurance to John, Beck, Freeman, Connie, 
Duclos, Crop USA, and any entity partially owned by John, and/or any other party who received 
such transfers under I.C. § 55-916, et seq. and/or other applicable legal authority. 
15.20 For judgment against John for $307,271, plus accrued interest for the money he 
owed AlA Services which was improperly paid by transferring his indebtedness to Reed's 
Promissory Note. 
15.21 For judgment against Connie Taylor to the fullest extent of her derivative liability 
by virtue of her marriage to R. John Taylor and her interest in the community property in an 
amount to be proven at the time of trial. 
15.22 For judgment against Connie Taylor individually for an amount to be proven at 
trial, plus pre-judgment interest. 
15.23 For a judgment against John (both individually and through his marriage to 
Connie Taylor) in an amount to be proven at trial, plus prejudgment interest. 
15.24 For judgment against John, Duclos, and/or Freeman, jointly and severally, for all 
funds, assets, services, property and/or any other benefit fraudulently transferred and/or 
fraudulently conveyed, and which such transferred may not be avoided, rescinded and/or paid to 
Reed. 
15.25 For judgment against Crop USA for all sums and the value of all servIces 
wrongfully, fraudulently, and/or inappropriately transferred, converted and/or conveyed from 
AlA Insurance and/or AlA Services. 
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15.26 For a declaratory judgment and/or order requmng AIA Services, Duclos, 
Freeman, John and/or Connie to indemnify Reed for all amounts owed to Donna Taylor and paid 
by Reed. 
15.27 For judgment against John, Duclos and/or Freeman, jointly and severally, for 
amounts owed to Reed in an amount to be proven at the time of trial because AlA Services and 
AlA Insurance are alter egos of John, Duclos and/or Freeman. 
15.28 For judgment against John, Connie, Duclos, Freeman and Beck disgorging all 
compensation (including all salaries), benefits, assets, stock (including, without limitation, shares 
held directly or indirectly in Crop USA) and other ill-gotten gains as a result of the breaches of 
their fiduciary duties, fraudulent transfers, unlawful acts, and/or fraud. 
15.29 For the imposition of a constructive trust for the benefit of Reed on all funds, 
investments, loans, advances, securities, property, transactions, services and/or self-dealing 
which were fraudulently, wrongfully and/or improperly made for the benefit of Duclos, Freeman, 
John, Beck, Connie and/or other parties or entities, which sums should have been paid to Reed. 
15.30 For a preliminary and permanent injunction against the Defendants from 
transferring, encumbering or otherwise disposing of any improperly and/or fraudulently obtained 
and/or transferred assets under I.C. § 55-916, et seq. and/or other applicable legal authority. 
15.31 For a judgment against John, Freeman, Duclos, Connie and Beck, jointly and 
severally, for all damages resulting from the breaches of their fiduciary duties owed to Reed 
during the periods of time of their relevant tenures as directors of AlA Insurance and AlA 
Services, in an amount to be proven at trial. 
15.32 For judgment and/or relief for all claims which conform to the evidence obtained 
through discovery and/or forensic accounting. 
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15.33 For an award of Reed's attorneys' fees and costs as under the Promissory Note, 
Amended Stock Pledge Agreement, I.C. § 12-120 and/or I.e. § 12-121. 
15.34 Reed expressly reserves the right to amend this Complaint upon the completion of 
discovery and/or present causes of action and remedies which conform to the evidence at the 
time of trial. 
15.35 For such other relief as Reed may request before or at the time of trial and/or that 
the Court may find just, equitable, or warranted before or at the time of trial. 
DATED this __ day of June, 2007. 
SMITH, CANNON & BOND PLLC 
AHLERS & CRESSMAN PLLC 
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Roderick C. Bond 
Paul R. Cressman, Jr. 
Ned A. Cannon 
Attorneys for Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor 
VERIFICATION 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss. 
COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE ) 
I, Reed J. Taylor, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and says: 
I am the plaintiff in the above-entitled action. I have read the contents of this Fourth 
Amended Complaint, know the contents of this Fourth Amended Complaint, and believe that the 
facts in this Fourth Amended Complaint are true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and 
belief. 
Reed J. Taylor 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this __ day of June, 2007. 
Notary Public for Idaho 
Residing at: __________ _ 
My commission expires: ______ _ 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, Roderick C. Bond, declare that, on the date indicated below, I served a true and correct 
copy of Plaintiff Reed Taylor's Fourth Amended Complaint on the following party(s) via the 
rnethod(s) indicated below: 
David A. Gittins 
Law Office of David A. Gittins 
P.O. Box 191 
Clarkston, W A 99403 
Attorney for Defendants Duclos and Freeman 
Michael E. McNichols 
Clements Brown & McNichols 
321 - 13th Street 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
Attorneys for Defendant R. John Taylor 
Jonathan D. Halley 
Clark & Feeney 
P.O. Box 285 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
Attorney for Defendant Connie Taylor 
Gary D. Babbitt 
D. John Ashby 
Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley LLP 
877 Main Street, Suite 1000 
P.O. Box 1617 
Boise, Idaho 83701-1617 
Attorneys for AlA Services and AlA Insurance 
Via: 
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
(X) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) Facsimile 
Via: 
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
(X) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) Facsimile 
Via: 
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
(X) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) Facsimile 
Via: 
(X) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
(X) Facsimile - (208) 342-3829 
Signed this day of ________ ., 2007, at Lewiston, Idaho. 
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OF THE STATE OF IDAHO. IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
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VS. 
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AlA SERVICES CORPORATION. an Idaho ) 
corporation; AIA INSURANCE, INC., an ) 
Idaho corporation; R. JOHN TAYLOR and ) 
CONNIE TAYLOR. individualIy and the ) 
community property comprised lhereof; ) 
BRYAN FREEMAN. a single person; and ) 
JOLEE DUCLOS, a single person. ) 
Defendants. 
) 
) 
) 
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Case No. CV-07-00208 
STATUS CONFERENCE 
MEMORANDUM 
Dcfendanls AIA Services Corporation and AlA Insurance. Inc. (collectively, "AIA"), 
submit this Status Conference Memorandum in preparation for the status conference scheduled 
for Wednesday. June 20, 2007. The purpose ofthis memorandum is to briefly address a few 
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issues that AlA would like to discuss at the status conference so that all parties can be prepared 
to discuss these issues at the status conference. 
A. Mediation 
In its Order dated March 8, 2007, Lhe Court ordered that Lhe parties participate in 
mediation. The parties have selected Retired Judge Ron Schilling as the mediator, Judge 
Schilling has accepted the request l1mt he serve as a mediator, the parties have now all responded 
to Judge Schillings correspondence regarding the mediation, and l1le parties arc working towards 
mediation some time this falL 
Plaintiffs have served Requests for production of documents, to which AIA has 
responded, produced documents, and objected to some of the requests. The parties recently held 
a "meet and confer" conierence, which resulted in resolution ofsome of the discovery issues. but 
the parties remain in disagreement with regard to many of the discovery requests. AIA suggests 
that Retired Judge Ron Schilling's services may be very beneficial to Lhe discovery process. 
Whether by Court order or by agreement oflhc parties, Judge Schilling's mediation services 
would likely be able to help the parties resolve their discovery disputes and (hopefully) avoid or 
minimize motions to compel and/or motions for protective order. AIA is not suggesting the 
Judge SchiHing be appointed as an official discovery master, but that he could serve a more 
infonnaI role in hclping the parties resolve their discovery disputes. Judge Schilling's role in the 
discovery process would also scrve the purpose of getting him up to speed on the facts and the 
parties' positions in this litigation, creating a higher likelihood of resolution through the 
mediation process. 
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B. Bifurcation 
At the hearing on AlA's motion to dismiss, Plaintiff's counsel raised the issue of 
bifurcation of the trial pursuant to LR.C.P. 42(b), which provides: 
The court. in furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice. or 
when separate trials will be conducive to expedition and economy, 
may order a separate tria1 of any claim, cross-claim, counterclaim. 
or third-party claim. or of any separate issue or of any number of 
claims, cross-claims. counterclaims. third-party claims. or issues. 
always preserving inviolate the right ofma! by jury as declared by 
the Constitutions, statutes or rules of the court. 
As an initia1 maUer, a detennination as to whether bifurcation is appropriate in this 
matter is premature. A bifurcated trial is inappropriate unless there is a "clear separation of 
issues" based on "a clear understanding between the court and counsel of the issues involved in 
each phase and what proof will be required to pass .from one phase to the next." United States 
Gypsllm Co. v. Schiavo Bros., Inc., 668 F.2d 172. 18] (3d Cir. 1981). 
At this point in time. this case is nowhere near the point where the parties and the Court 
have a dear understanding of the issues and causes of action that will ultimately be presented to 
a jury. As evidenced by the five versions ofthe Complaint already on file, and the pending 
motion to dismiss many ofthe causes ofaetion. it is far too eady to delcnnine whether this is one 
of the rare cases where bifurcation is appropriate. Each time PlaintiIThas amended his 
complaint, he adds new causes of action and new parties. TIle most recent version of the 
complaint seeks to add two new causes of action and three new parties. AlA will likely file 
additional counterclaims. Moreover. the parties have just barely begun the discovery process 
that wiI! flush out the issues of the casco Upon completion of discovery. the parties will likely 
file motions for summary judgment that will further refine the issues .for trial and present the 
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Court with a sufficiently clear picture of the issues to detennine the procedure through which this 
case should be presented to ajury. 
Courts routinely decline to rule on a motion for bifurcation where, as here, discovery is 
not completed and the issues. causes o[action, and parties are not clear. See, e.g .• AjJjm1efrix, 
IlJc. Y. PE Corp .. 219 F.Supp.2d 390, 398 (S.D.N. Y. 2002) ("it would be premature at this eady 
stage in discovery to decide the question of bifurcation in the trial context"); Kn{eger Y. New 
York TeleplIoll? Co .• 163 F.R.D. 446,448-49 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) ("The motion is also premature 
because discovery is not yet complete. The continuing development of tIle factual record in this 
case may well affect the issues to be tried and the presentation of those issues in the Join[ Pretrial 
Order .... Moreover, both plaintiffs and defendants have indicated their intention to move for 
summary judgment. The disposition ofthose motions may alter or narrow the issues that remain 
to be tried."); Medina v. City ofClricago. 100 F.8upp.2d 893, 897 (N.D. Ill. 2000) ("At the 
present time, discovery has just begun. The Court believes that it is far 100 early to determine 
that the trial should be bifurcated .... But more importantly, at this point neither the parties nor 
the Court has the least idea what evidence aetuaHy would be offered at trial ... "). 
Finally, the decision of whether to bifurcate the trial should not be reached during a status 
conference. The bifurcation issue is governed by LR.C.P. 42(b), and there is a large body orease 
law discussing the factors courts should consider in detennining wllClher bifurcation is 
appropriate. The party seeking bifurcation bears the burden of establishing that bifurcation is 
appropriate, and that showing should be made by motion, giving all parties a full opportunity to 
state their positions on the matter and allowing the Court to make it decision with a full 
understanding of the facts and legal issues. For example. given that ajury is to be the ultimate 
trial of fact in this case, the parties should briefthe issue of how the trial could be bifurcated 
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consistent with the constitutional right to trial by jury. See I.R.C.P. 42(b) (providing that any 
bifurcation order should "always preserve[e] inviolate tile right of trial by jury as declared by the 
Constitutions, statutes or rules of the court"); see also, In re Visa Check/MasterMolley Antitrust 
Litigatio1l, 280 F.3d 124. 141 (2nd Cir. 2001) ("A district court's ability to bifurcate a trial is 
limited by the Seventh Amendment. See BlydelJ v. Maucusi, 186 F.3d 252. 268 (2d Cir. 1999) 
CAt boltom. issues may be divided and tried separately. but a given issue may not be tried by 
different, successivcjuries.·). Despite defendants' briefing on this issue, it would be premature 
.for us to determine whether and under what circumstances bifurcation might be permissible in 
this casco "). 
AJA respectfully suggests that a determination on the issue ofbiTurcation is premature at 
this stage in the litigation. Only after the parties have conducted discovery and rc.fined the 
issues, causes of action, and parties should the Court determine whether bifurcation is 
appropriate. Moreover. that determination should be made only upon the filing ofa Rule 42{b) 
motion and only after the parties have had an opportunity to brief the issue. Finally, the parties 
arc under a mediation order. The parties should be preparing lor mediation, and the question of 
how the case will ultimately be tried should wait until after mediation. 
DATED THIS \ t1~1,.... day of June, 2007. 
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP 
By:s~~~~~~~~-=~~ ____________ _ 
. ohn Ashby TSB No. 7228 
ttorneys for Defendants AIA Services 
Corporation and AIA Insttmncc. Inc. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
REED J. TAYLOR, a single person, ) 
) 
Plaintiff, ) 
) 
vs. ) 
) 
AIA SERVICES CORPORATION, an Idaho ) 
corporation; AlA INSURANCE, INC.. an ) 
Idaho corporation; R. JOI-IN TAYLOR and ) 
CONNIE TAYLOR. individually and the ) 
community property comprised thereof; ) 
BRYAN FREEMAN. a single person; and ) 
JOLEE DUCLOS, a single person, ) 
) 
Defendants. ) 
) 
---------------------------------) 
Case No. CV-07-00208 
OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF REED 
TAYLOR'S MOTION TO AMEND 
COMPLAINT 
Defendants AIA Services Corporation ("AlA Service") and AlA Insurance, Inc. ('·AIA 
Insurancen ) (sometimes collectively referred to as "AIA"), submit this Opposition to Plaintiff 
Reed Taylor's Motion to Amend Complaint. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
AlA filed a motion to dismiss PlaintiWs Second Amended Complaint, and that motion to 
dismiss is currently pending. AIA's motion to dismiss established that the majority ofthe causes 
of action in the Second Amended Complaint must be dismissed .for a variety of reasons. 
including: (1) that they are Lime-barred; (2) that they laillo state a claim; or (3) that they are not 
causes of action at aIL Rather than wait lor a ruling on the Motion to Dismiss. Plaintiff filed a 
Fourth Amended Complaint that purports to cure a few oflhe deficiencies in the Second 
Amended Complaint. Then. the day after the hearing on the Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiff filed 
yet another version in Plaintiff's "Amended Motion And Memorandum Of Law To Amcnd And 
Supplement Complaint," i.e., an Amended Fourth Amended Complaint, in an apparent attempt to 
cure additional deficiencies identified at the hearing. 
As repeatedly explained previously. the deficiencies in the complaint arc related to the 
statute of limitations. the lact that several oflhe causes of action are not causes of action at all, or 
that the facls Plaintiff did plead establish that various causes of action fail as a matter of law. 
With the exception ofthe fraud cause of action, which fails because it is not pled with 
particularity. AlA's motion to dismiss was not based on a failure to plead sufficient fncts. 
Simply stated. this is not a notice pleading issue. 
PlaintiiTs Fourth Amended Complaint, with very few exceptions, fails for exactly the 
same reasons as the Second Amended Complaint. Although Plaintiffs complaint is now even 
longer tilan it was before - now 34 pages long compared to the 23-puge Second Amended 
Complaint - the majority ofthc causes ofaclion still fail, as a matter of law. for the very same 
reasons as the Second Amended Complaint. The proposed Fourth Amended Complaint should 
be denied because: (1) it contains allegations of breach of contract that arc barred by the statute 
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oflimitations; (2) it conta.ins multiple causes of action that fail to stale a claim; and (3) it seeks to 
add as defendants 1\'10 members of the AIA Services and AIA Insurance Board of Directors that 
were appointed less than two months ago, without specifying any actions on the part of those 
directors over the 1ast two months that would subject them to personal liability. 
Given that PIaintitrs Fourth Amended Complaint fails for the same reasons as the 
Second Amended Complaint, much of this opposition is duplicative ofthe briefing on AIA's 
Motion to Dismiss. This opposition briefwili not repeat the arguments sct forth in the Motion to 
dismiss. Instead, the Motion to Dismiss briefing is incorporated herein by reference, and this 
briefwiH focus on the changes to the Fourth Amended Complaint and arguments raised by 
PlaintiIT for the first time at the hearing on the Motion to Dismiss. 
II. ARGUMENT 
A. The Motion to File the Proposed Fourth Amended Complaint Should be Denied 
Leave to file an amended complaint is properly denied where the amended complaint, 
itself., fails to slate a claim or otherwise fails as a matter ofJaw. As explained in Black Canyon 
Racquetball Club. It/c. v. Idaho First Nat. Bank, N.A., 119 Idaho 171. 175,804 P.2d 900,904 
(1991): 
In determining whether an amended complaint should be allowed, 
where leave of court is required under Rule 15(a), the court may 
consider whether the new claims proposed (0 be inserted into the 
action by the amended complaint stale a valid claim .... Ifthe 
amended pleading docs not set out a valid claim, or if the opposing 
party would be prejudiced by the dclay in adding thc new claim, or 
ifthe opposing party has an availablc defense such as a statute of 
limitations. it is not an abuse of discretion for the triaL court to 
deny the motion to file the amended complaint. 
Id. (emphasis added); see also 6 Wright & MiIler, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1487 
C2d cd. 1990) CHlfthe proposed change clearly is frivolous or advances a claim or defense that is 
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legally insufficient on its face. the court may deny leave to amend.") (analyzing the functionally 
identical Rule 15(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure). 
Here, the proposed Fourth Amended Complaint should be denied because (1) it contains 
allegations of breach of contract that are barred by the statute of limitations; (2) it contains 
Illultiple causes of action that fail to state a claim; and (3) it seeks to add as defendants two 
Illcmbers of the AIA Services and AIA Insurance Board ofDircctors that were appointed less 
than two months ago, without specifying any actions on the part of those directors over the last 
two months that would subject them to personalliabiliLy. 
B. The Complaint Contains Breach of Contract Allegations That Arc Barred By the 
Statute of Limitations 
1. The Alleged Breaches Occurred Over Five Years Before The Filing Of 
Plaintiff's Complaint 
The Fourth Amended Complaint. just like its prior versions, alleges sevcml breaches of 
contmct in addition to the alleged failure to pay a $6 million debt. The complaint continues to 
alleged that Defendants have breached the Amended Agreements by not appointing him to the 
board of directors (see Fourth Amended Complaint. 'lI2.17). failing to make timely interest 
payments; becoming insolvent; failing to maintain a Loek Box to hold insurance commissions, 
elc. Jd. at 'lI 2.16. 
As set forth in the prior Motion to Dismiss, these alleged breaches are barred by the 
statute oflimilations because Plaintiirs o'wn complaint alleges that these breaches occurred more 
tllan five years before the filing ofthis lawsuit. See, e.g., Second Amended Complaint at'll2.13. 
(Uln excess ofsix years, AIA Services, John Duclos andlorFrceman have intentionallyre[used to 
appoint Reed to the Board as required."); id. at 'lI2.1S ("During all relevant times. the value of 
AIA Services was less than the aggregate amount of its debts, which constitutes AlA Services' 
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insolvency. During all relevant times. AIA Services was in default of various provisions of the 
agreements with Reed. insolvent and/or unable to timely pay its debts to Reed. During ali 
relevant times, AIA Services has failed to comply with the tenos of the pWITlissory note.") 
(emphasis added). 
The Fourth Amended Complaint appears to be an attempt to recant the earlier version's 
clear allegations of time-barr cd bl"eaehes. For example. rather than a11ege that the bl"eaches 
occurred at "all relevant times," the Fourth Atnended Complaint makes slight wording changes 
to allege that the breaches occurred at "certain l"elevant times." See, e.g., Fourth Amended 
Complaint, ~ 2.22 (emphasis added). The change in language, however. does not change the fact 
that Plaintiffhas repeatedly gone on record in this matter as alleging that the bl"eaches of contract 
occurred ITluch more than five years prior to commencement of this litigation. See. e.g., Reed 
Taylor's Affidavit in Support of Emergency Motion "II 35 (attaching the financial statements for 
AlA Services and AlA Insurance for 2001-2002 and asserting that '~these Financial Statements 
show that AIA Services was insolvent in 2001 and 2002"); Plaintiff's Response To Defendants' 
LR.C.P. 12(b)(6) Motion, p. 5 {alleging untimely and ITlissed interest payments every single year 
between 1997 and 2006); Transcript of Preliminary Injunction Hearing. p. 171 (plainliffstating 
under oath that he does not remember the lock box ever being used othel." than around the time it 
was set up (1996), and that he was not particularly concerned about whether it was being used); 
Seeond Supplemental Memorandum In Support Of Motion To Compel Audit. p. 3 (asserting that 
the «Amended and Restated Stock Pledge Agreement requires that AlA Services be audited 
annually," and that Defendants arc in breach of that agreement because "AIA Services was last 
audited in 1999"). With regard to the alleged breach for failing to appoint Plaintiff to the board 
of directors. the Fourth Amended Complaint continues to allege that said breach first occurred at 
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least six years ago. See '1I 2.17 (<<Tn excess of six years. AIA Services, John Duclos andlor 
Freeman have intentionally refused to appoint Reed to the Board as required."). 
Plaintiffcan tinker with the language of his complaint, but it does not change the fact that 
Plaintiffhas unambiguously and repeatedly taken the posiLion in this litigation that the various 
alleged breaches occurred more than five years prior to the commencement ofLhis litigation. 
To be cIear. for purposes of this Motion to Amend the Complaint. the argument with 
regard to the statute oflimitations is limited to the alleged tangential breaches of contract, Le., 
that AlA is in breach of the Amended Agreements for railing to appoint Plaintiff to the board of 
direclors; failing to make timely interest paymenLs; becoming insolvent; failing to maintain a 
Lock Box, etc. While AlA reserves the right to raise the statute oflimitations on summary 
judgment or at some other point in this litigation, in light ofPlaintifPs invocation of Idaho Code 
§ 5-238, plaintiffhas raised the al1egation of a promise to pay the residue of the debt in a way 
that Defendants cannot defeat on a motion to dismiss. However. Idaho Code § 5-238 creates a 
"new promise ... to pay the residue of the debt." It does not revive the other alleged breaches 
that arc already time barred. Id.; see also MeIJdini. 47 Idaho 439, 276 P. at 314 (applying tile 
predecessor stature to Idaho Code § 5-238, and explaining that the acknowledgment ofthe debt 
"did not therefore continue an existing contract, but created a new one"); Brower v. E.L DuPont 
De Nemours arId Co., 117 Idaho 780,792 P.2d 345.347 ("[Idaho Code § 5-238] provides that an 
acknowledgment or pI"Omise in writing and signed by the party to be charged may constitute 
sufficient evidence ofa new or continuing contract in order to allow recoverY for a debt where 
the statute oflimitations bars recovery under the original contract.") (emphasis added); see also 
AIA's Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss, pp. 4-6, and Reply in Support orMotion 
to Dismiss. pp. 3-9. which arc incorporated herein by reference). 
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2. No New Cause Of Action Is Created Each Day Defendants Are In Breach 
At oral argument on the motion to dismiss, Plaintiffrnised for the first time an argument 
that Defendants have continuing contractual obligations to Plaintiff and that a new cause of 
action accrues for each day Defendants are in breach. 
Plaintiff's argument is inconsistent with Idaho law as established by the Idaho Supreme 
Court in Skaggs v. JelTsell. 94 Idaho 179. 180, 484 P .2d 728 (1971). There. the parties entered 
into a written leasing agreement in 1961 for the lease of an appliance store in the Overland 
Shopping Center located in Burley, Idaho. The leasing agreement contained a restrictive 
provision prohibiting the lessors from renting space in their shopping center to any otherparty 
engaged in the sale of major appliances. In 1962, the lessors, the lensens, leased a portion of 
their property to a Montgomery Ward Store which sold appliances and, in 1969, the lessors 
entered another leasing agreement with Scars Roebuck and Co., which also sold appliances. 
Despite the fact that the lease had been violated since 1962, the lessees, Skaggs, did not file suit 
until 1969. In affirming the lower court's holding that the statute of limitations barred the action 
related to the lease to the Montgomery Ward Slore, the Idaho Supreme Court explained: 
In 1962. the Jensens rented space to Montgomery Ward in 
violation of tIle first leasing agreement. Suit was not connnenced. 
however. until 1969. Thus it is evident that more than five years 
elapsed between the time the cause of action accrued and the time 
suit was instituted. The Jensens (lessors) were entitled to rely on 
the statute of limitations as a defense to the Skaggs' (lessees') claim 
since actions in contract must be brought within five years in this 
juriSdiction. See also Toellrrer v. McGil1nis, 55 Wash. 430, 104 P. 
641 (1909) where the Washington Supreme Court held an action 
on a lease covenant ,-vas barred after six years even though the 
lease itselfwas intended to run for fifteen. III · ... iew of the length of 
timc that Skaggs restcd on their rights, it would be inequitable 
in this Court's opinion to allow them to now bring suit.. By 
.failing to object within a reasonable time after they felt their 
rights were being violated, they ratified and modified the 
restrictive provision, thus vitiating its force. 
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ld., 94 Idaho at 180.484 P.2d at 729 (emphasis added). 
Just as Plaintiff claims here. the contract in Skaggs created conlinuing obligations, i.e., a 
continuing obligation over the term ofthe lease not to rent space to other appHance stores. The 
Court did not, however. hold that a new cause of action would accrue evelY day that the lessors 
were in violation of the restrictive covenant. Rather. the court held that failure to bring suit 
within 5 years of the time the restrictive covenant was first breached meant that the lessees had 
«ratified and modified the restrictive provision, thus vitiating its force." ld. Notably. the Idaho 
Supreme Court relied approvingly on Toellner v. McGinnis, 55 Wn. 430. 104 P. 64l (1909) 
"where the Washington Supreme Court held an action on a lease covenant was barred after six 
years even though the lease itsc1fwas intended to run for fifteen." [d. (emphasis added). Thus, 
under Idaho law, the fact that a contract creaLes obligations over a continuing period of time does 
not result in a new cause 01ac1ion for evelY day a provision of the contract is in breach. 
Notably. a differcnt rule arguably applies to the obligation to make payments under thc 
Amended Agreements. Plaintiffhas previously cited to Cassia Creek Reservoir Co. v. Harper, 
91 Idaho 488. 492. 426 P.2d 209 (1967). which held that "Where money is payable in 
installments, the statute oflimitations begins to run against a cause of action for the recovery ofa 
delinquent installment as of the time it becomes due." In addition to the fact that this doctrine 
continues to bar recovery orinstaHment payments due more than 5 years prior to suit. the 
doctrine is limited to payments under an installment contract. It does not apply to breaches like 
the tangential breaches alleged in Plaintiff's Complaint. The Ninth Circuit recently address this 
issue as follows; 
Here, the district court was correct in bolding that the 
"continuous breach" theolY does not extend the statute of 
limitations for Ancala's breach of contract claim for failing to 
operate the golf course as a premium private country club. Under 
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Arizona law, the continuing violation notion is an exception to the 
statute of limitations, not the rule, and it applies to recurring 
payments that have become due. Once a party fails to pay the 
agreed upon amount at the time the payment is due. a separate 
breach occurs and a cause of action accrues. The damages for each 
breach is severable from the damages suffered from the original 
breach and any subsequent breach of the defendant's obligation to 
pay an agreed upon amount. 
In this case, American Golfs aI1eged breach for failing to 
operate the golfcourse as a premium private country club was not 
continuous in such a way as to qualifY for the exception to the 
statute oflimitations. The breach began to accrue when Ancala 
determined that American Golfwas failing to operate the Country 
Club as a premium golf course, which could be as early as 1991, 
but clearly was no later than September 1994. While the breach 
continued to occur because American Golffailed to cure the initial 
breach. it 'was not "continuous" in the sensc that a separate and 
discrete obligation to operate the golf course in a certain manncr 
accrued each day. Moreover, unlike a failure-lo-pay type of 
continuous breach, the damages alleged by Ancala cannot be 
severed for each alleged daily breach. 
Allcala Holdings, L.L.G. v. Price, 2007 WL 387591. *3 (9th Cir. 2007). 
Just like the breach in Atlcala for failing to maintain the golf course as a premium country 
club does not constitute a separate and discrete breach each day it was not cured. the tangential 
breaches alleged in Plaintiff's complaint are not separate and discrete breaches. According to 
Plaintiff, he was not on the board of directors six years ago, and that same continuous breach has 
been in existence every single day for the past six years. With regard to the lock box. plaintiff 
alleges that thc lock box has not be used for approximately ten years. i.e., one continuous breach 
covering evcry singJe day for the last ten years. According to Plaintiff. AIA Services has been 
insolvent evcry single day since at least 200 L These alleged breaches are not the type that create 
a new cause ofaetion every single day because they arc not "separatc and discrete" breaches for 
which damages could be "severed for each alleged daily breach." Allcala Holdings, L.L.c. v. 
Price. 2007 WL 387591. *3 (9th Cir. 2007). 
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According to Plaintiff, the alleged tangential breaches occurred well over five years ago, 
and have been in the same state of breach every single day for at least the enlire five year period 
subsequent to the filing ofPlaintifPs complaint. As a matter of law, these breaches arc timc-
barred. See Skaggs. 94 Idaho at 180 (by not bringing suit within 5 years of the alleged breach, 
Plaintiff "ratified and modified the restrictive provision, thus vitiating its force."). 
C. Tile Majority ofPlaintifPs Causes Of Action Fail For the Same Reasons Set Forth 
In AlA's Motion To Dismiss 
1. Fourth Cause of Action - Conversion 
The conversion cause of action fails for the same reasons set forth in AIA's briefing on 
the Motion to Dismiss - an allegation of failure Lo pay money due under a contract is actionable 
in contract, but, as a matter o flaw, docs not constitute conversion. (See Memorandum In 
Support of Motion to Dismiss. pp. 9-10; Reply Memorandum, pp. 12-13 and the cases cited 
therein). Again. this is not an issue of not ice pleading, and the minor changes to the most recent 
version of the comp1aint do not salvage the conversion cause of action. 
2. Fifth. Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Causes of Action - Alter Ego, Constructive 
Trust, Director Liability, and Specific Performance 
Plaintiff's "Alter Ego," "Constructive Trust," and "Director Liability" causes of action, 
just like those SlliTIe causes of action in the previous versions ofllie complaint. fail because they 
arc not causes of action at aIL Plaintiff appears to now be recognizing as much by adding to the 
heading of each ofthes!! causes of action that these causes o:faction arc pled "As a Cause of 
Action andlor as Remedies." 
The newest version of the complaint adds a new cause of action for "Specific 
Performance," again with the disclaimer that it is pled "As a cause of Action andlor as 
Remedies." This disc1aimer is appropriate, given that specific performance is a remedy that may 
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or may not be applicable ifPlaintiffprevaiIs on his breach ofcontrnct cause of action, but 
«specific performance" is not a cause of action. See. e.g., LaSalle Nat. Ballk v. Metropolitan Life 
Ins. Co., 18 F.3d 1371. 1376 (7th Cil'. 1994) ("As to Count IV. specific perronnance is a remedy. 
not a cause of action."); Eliibee v. Fox, 2006 WL 2802207, 10 (D.Kan. 2006) e<First. the Court 
finds that plainliffcomp!etcly misapprehends the function of specific performance in contract 
law. It is uremedy. not a cause of action or something thai maybe breached."); Harara v. 
COllocoPhillips Co, 377 F Supp 2d 779, 796 {N.D. Cal 2005) (HSpecific performance is a form of 
cont.ractual relief. not an independent claim."). 
Defendants do not wish to belabor this point. Defendants acknowledge that they are on 
notice that Plaintiff seeks the remedies ofaHer ego liability, constructive trust, director liability, 
and specific perfonnance. and the question ofwhether those remedies arc appropriate under the 
facts of this case can be determined at a later date. Those remedies. however. simply are not 
separate causes ofaetion, and should not be pled as such. Those remedies belong in Plaintiff's 
prnycr for relief. and. in fact. are already there. See e.g., Fourth Amended Complaint, '11'IJ 15.2. 
15.11. 15.13. No AInended Complaint should bepennitted that continues Lo assert these 
remedies as separate causes of action. 
3. Sixth Cause of Action - Equitable Indemnification 
Plaintiff's cause of action for Equitable Indemnification fails for the same reasons sct 
f'orth in AlA's Molion to Dismiss. Equitable indemnification applies only to joint tortfeasors, 
which AIA and Plaintiff are not. and any indemnification action is premature because PlaintifPs 
complaint makes clear that he has not made payments to Donna Taylor for which he could be 
indernni fi cd. 
4. Seventh Cause of Action - Account Stated 
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Plaintiff's account stated cause of action fails for the same reasons sct forth in AlA's 
motion to dismiss. 
5. Eighth Cause of AcUon - Unjust Enrichment 
Idaho law is clear that. "where parties have entered into a contract. a claim for unjust 
enrichment will be precluded." MamlOs v. Moss. 155 P.3d 1166. __ Idaho __ (February 22, 
2007); see a/so Iron Eagle Development v. Quality Design Sys., 138 Idaho 487 (2003) ("When 
parties enter into an express contract. a claim based in equity is not allowed because the express 
contract precludes enforcement of equitable claims."); fYi/helm v. Johnston, 136 Idaho 145, 152, 
30 P.3d 300, 307 (Ct. App. 2001) Cocrecovery for unjust enrichment is not permissible where 
there is an enforceable express contract between the parties covering the same subject matter."). 
At oral argument on the Motion to Dismiss. PlaintifTraised for the first Lime an argument 
that the unjust enrichment cause ofnction is only barred if the contracts are enforceable. and that 
an unjust enrichment cause of action should be allowed Lo the extent the breach ofconLract cause 
ofaclion is barred by the statute oflimitations. However. the statute ofIimitations does not 
render a contract invalid, it simply precludes a remedy for a time-barred breach of that contract. 
One court recently rejected the exact same argument presented by Plaintiff as follows: 
Next, the parties move for summary judgment on the claim 
of unjust enrichment. This claim is subsumed and barred by the 10 
contracts covering the same subject matter. See California Medical 
Ass'll 1'. Aetna U.S. Healtlrcare of California. 94 Cal.AppAth 151. 
168. 114 CaI.Rptr.2d 109 (2001) ("[A]s a matter of1aw. a quasi-
contract action for unjust enrichment does not lie where. as here. 
express binding agreements exist and define the parties' rights. If); 
Lance Camper Manufacturing Corp. v. Republic Illdemnity Co., 44 
Cal.AppAth 194,203,51 Cal.Rptr.2d 622 (1996) e,[A] n implied-
in-fact or quasi-contract cannot He where there exists between the 
parties a valid express contract covering the same subject matter. If). 
Here, a written agreement governed the real estate venture, 
just as a promissory note governed the art acquisition venture. The 
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fact that the statute oflimitations expired on enforcement of those 
contracts does not render them invalid .... Accordingly. the court 
grants defendant's motion for summary judgment on the unjust 
enrichment c1aim. 
Ridgewood Associates, Inc. v. Tnmlpower. 2007 WL 1223666, *5 (B.D. CaL. Apr 25,2007) 
(only the slip opinion is currently available). 
At this point, Nobody is arguing that the Amended Agreements are invalid. Rather. 
Plaintiff cannot claim damage for the alleged breach of the Amended Agreements because the 
alleged breaches occurred more than five years prior to commencement of this litigation. 
In any event, Plaintiirs unjust enrichment cIaim accrued at Lhe same time as the breach 
of contract causes of action, ifnot earlier. Just like Lhe breach ofconf.mct claims. the unjust 
enrichment c1aim sterns from the redemption ofPlaintifPs AIA stock in 1995, and P1aintiffs 
own complaint establishes that it accrued in 1995. Sec Fourth Amended Complaint, 'II 10.2 
("Reed conferred the benefit of John being the controlling shareholder of AlA Services when he 
agreed to sell his shares back to AlA Services.") (emphasis added). A cause of action for unjust 
enrichment is governed by the four year statute of limitations for an oral contract set forth in I.C. 
§ 5-217. Sec Witt v. JOJles, 111 Idaho 165. 169,722 P.2d 474.478 (1986) ("claims of unjust 
enrichment partake of the nature ola contract and are therefore governed by statute otlimitation 
for orol contracts") (citing Templeton Patents, Ltd. v. J.R. Slinpiot Co., 220 F.Supp_ 48 (D. Idaho 
1963». Thus, the unjust enrichment cause of action accrued "when [Plaintiff] agreed to sell his 
shares back to AIA Services" in 1995, and the statute of limitations ran lour years later. 
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D. The Complaint's AtternptTo Add New Parties Is Futile 
The Proposed Fourth Anlended Complaint seeks to add new parties, including CropUSA, 
Connie Taylorl. and James and Corrine Beck. With regULd to the addition of Connie Taylor and 
James Beck. who are named as Defendants in their capacity as members ofthe BOULd of 
Directors of AIA Services and AIA Insurance, the proposed amended complaint should be 
rejected us futile becllUse it fails (0 stale any claims against Connie Taylor and James Beck that 
arose afierthose individuals were appointed to the Board of Directors of AIA Services and AIA 
Insurance. 
Connie Taylor and James Beck were appointed to the Board ofDirecLors of AlA 
Insurance and AIA Services on or around April 30, 2007. Notwithstanding the fact that Connie 
Taylor and James Beck have been directors for less than two months now, Plaintiff's proposed 
Fourth Amended Complaint simply lumps them together with the prior board members, Joue 
Duclos and Brian Freeman, as if Connie Taylor and James Beck had been personally involved in 
AlA's actions prior to their appointments to the board of directors. 
The complaint brings a variety of allegations against defendants and their Boards of 
Directors, all stemming from actions that tOt:>k place prior to Connie Taylor's and James Beck's 
appointments to the boards. PlaintiITappears (0 be asserting that Connie Taylor and James Bcck 
arc liable for the debts, contractual obligations, or torts of the corporations by virtue alone of 
their role as newly appointed board members. This assertion is contrary to the fundamental tenet 
1 Prior versions of the Complaint named Connie Taylor only to the extent that Connie Taylor 
and John Taylor shared community property interests. The proposed Fourth Amended 
Complaint names Connie Taylor as a member of the board of directors of AIA Services and 
AlA Insurance. 
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of corporate law that a director is not personally Hable for the acts ofa corporation. VFP VCv. 
Dakota Co., 141 Idaho 326.334, 109 P.3d 714, 722 (2005) ("It is an established principle of 
corporations [sic] law that corporate directors are not liable merely by virtue of their office for 
fraud or other tortious wrongdoing committed by the corporation or its officers. Instead, to be 
held liable a corporate director must specifically direct, actively participate in, or knowingly 
acquiesce in the fraud or other wrongdoing of the corporation or its officers."). 
IfPlaintiffwishes to amend his Complaint to add claims against Connie Taylor and 
James Beck as members of the Board of Directors. then Plaintiff should be required to set forth 
allegations oIwhat actions those individuals have taken over the Iast two months that subject 
them Lo personal liability. 
III. CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff's proposed Fourth Amended Complaint is futile, and 
Plaintiff's Motion to Amend the Complaint should be denied. 
tJ. l S~ 
DATED THIS --a.L:- day of June. 2007. 
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 21 day oflune. 2007, I caused to be served a true 
copy of the foregoing OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF REED TA YLOR~S MOTION TO 
AMEND COMPLATh.TT by the method indicated below, and addressed to each of the following: 
Roderick C. Bond 
Ned A. Cannon 
Smith. Cannon & Bond PLLC 
508 Eighth Street 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
[Attorneys for Plaintiff] 
Paul R. Cressman. Jr. 
Ahlers & Cressman PLLC 
999 Third Avenue, Suite 3100 
Seattle, WA 98] 04-4088 
[Attorneys for Plaintiff] 
David A. Gittins 
Law Office of David A. Gittins 
P.o. Box 191 
Clarkston. WA 99403 
[Attorney for Defendants Duclos and Freeman] 
Michael E. McNichols 
Clements Brown & McNichols 
321 13th Street 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
[Attorneys for Defendant R. John Taylor] 
Jonathan D. Hally 
Clark & Feeney 
P.O. Box 285 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
[Attorneys lor Defendant Connie Taylor] 
__ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
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__ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
REED J. TAYLOR, a single person> 
Plaintiff> 
13 VS. 
14 
15 
16 
17-
18 
19 
AlA SERVICES CORPORATION~ an Idaho 
corporation; AlA INSURANCE, INC.> an 
Idaho corporation; R JOHN TAYLOR and 
CONNIE TAYLOR, individually and the 
community property comprised thereof; 
-BRYAN FREEMAN, a single person; and 
JOLEE DUCLOS, a single person 
Defendant. 
Case No. CV 07-00208 
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TO AMEND COMPLAINT 
20 
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COMES NOW the Defendant, .Connie Taylor, by and through her attorney of record, 
Jonathan Hally of the law fiml of Clark and Feeney, and opposes Plaintiff's Motion to Amend 
Complaint. Connie Taylor incorporates the arguments contained within AlA Services Corporation 
24 
25 
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and AlA Insurance Inc's Opposition to PlailltiffReed Taylor's Motion to Amend, and further argues 
as follows: 
INTRODUCTION 
Plaintiff seeks pennission to file a Fourth Amended Complaint. The Plaintiff's motion 
comes ¥rer the Defendants filed motions to dismiss the Second Amended Complaint which said 
7 motions remain pending before this Court,l The Plaintiffs filed a Third Amended Complaint which 
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affected Defendant Connie Taylor after this Court ordered the Plaintiffto provide specific allegations 
attributed to Ms. Taylor. Based upon the Third Amended Complaint identifying that Ms. Taylor was 
only being named as a p8.1ty solely due to her prior m8.1ital relationship with Defendant R. John 
Taylor, Ms. Taylor has filed a Motion to Dismiss the Third Amended Complaint which is nOW 
pending before this Court. The Fourth Amended Complaint added Ms. Taylor's name to new claims 
based upon her very recent appointment to the Board of Directors of AlA Insurance and ALA 
Services. 
Given that Ms. Taylor cannot properly be named as a party due to her prior marital 
relationship \vith Mr. Taylor and that the allegati.ons of misconduct precede her April> 2007 
appointment to the Board of Directors, the Plaintiffs Motion to Amend the Fourth Amended 
Complaint should be denied as to Ms. Taylor since its amended pleading does not set forth a valid 
claim against her. 
IDefendants AlA Insurance and AlA Services moved to dismiss the Second Amended 
Complaint and the remaining Defendants filed notices in which they Joined in said motion. 
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ARGUMENT 
THE PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO AMEND THE COMPLAINT SHOULD BE DENIED. 
Although generally motions to amend complaints under I.R.C.P. 15(a) is liberally granted 
whenjustice so requires, the decision is left to the discretion of the court which will not be disturbed 
on appeal absent au abuse of discretion. Bissett v. State, III Idaho 865 (Ct. App.). It is not an abuse 
of discretion to deny a motion to amend if the proposed pleading does not set forth a valid claim. 
Becker v. Callahan, 140 Idaho 522, 527, 96 P Jd 623 J 628 (2004). In the case at bar, the new claims 
asserted against Ms. Taylor are not valid and as such the motion to amend should be denied. 
The initial complaint through the TIlird Amended Complaint, which was filed on May 31) 
2007 did not assert any specific claims against Connie Taylor. Instead, as explained in the Third 
Amended Complaint, Ms. Taylor was being named as a party solely due to her prior marital 
relationship with Defendant R. John Taylor. As a result ofthe improper inclusion ofller as a party> 
Ms. Taylor has filed amotion to dismiss the Third Amended Complaint. Obviously, the claims that 
carry over from the Third Amended Complaint that relate only to Ms. Taylor's marital relationship 
should not be allowed to be included within the Fourth Amended Complaint The invalidity of those 
claims are addressed within COIDlie Taylor's Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss that 
was previously filed with the court and which is incorporated herein. 
The Fourth Amended Complaint has also added Ms. Taylor'S name to general claims of 
misconduct that were asserted in the Third Amended Complaint solely due to her recent appointment 
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to the Board of Directors for AIA Insurance and AlA Services. However, these claims concern 
matters that occurred prior to Ms. Taylor's April 30, 2007 appointment to the Board of Directors. 
This fact alone evidences the invalidity of the claims as against Ms, Taylor and should prevent the 
fIling of the Fourth Amended Complaint. "It is an established principle of corporations law that 
corporate directors are not liable merely by virtue of their office for fraud 01' other tortious 
wrongdoing corrunitted by the corporation or its officers, Instead, to be held liable a corporate 
director must specifically direct) actively participate in, or knowingly acquiesce in the fraud or other 
\.VI'ongdoing of the corporation or its officers." L.B. Industries, Inc. v. Smith, 817 F.2d 69, 71 (9\h Cir. 
1987)(internal citations omitted); VPF VC v. Dakota Co., 141 Idaho 326, 334, 109 P.3d 714, 722 
(2005). Accordingly, this Court should deny the Plaintiff s Motion to Amend. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, this Court should deny the Plaintiffs Motion to. Am.end 
Complaint. 
DATED this __ day of June, 2007. 
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508 Eighth Street 
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Seattle, WA 98104 
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Michael McNichols 
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321 13th Street 
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Attorneys for Duclos and Freeman 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND mDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
REED J. TAYLOR, a single person; ) 
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AIA SERVICES CORPORATION, an Idaho) 
corporation; AlA INSURANCE, INC., an ) 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
REED J. TAYLOR, a single person, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
AIA SERVICES CORPORATION, an 
Idaho corporation; AlA INSURANCE, INC., 
an Idaho corporation; R. JOHN TAYLOR 
and CONNIE TAYLOR, individually and 
the community property comprised thereof; 
BRYAN FREEMAN, a single person; and 
JOLEE DUCLOS, a single person, 
Defendants. 
Case No.: CV-07-00208 
PLAINTIFF REED J. TAYLOR'S 
REPLY IN SUPPORT OF HIS 
AMENDED MOTION TO AMEND 
AND SUPPLEMENT COMPLAINT, 
OBJECTION TO DEFENDANT R. 
JOHN TAYLOR'S JOINDER, REPLY 
IN TO DEFENDANT CONNIE 
TAYLOR'S RESPONSE AND 
SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSE IN 
OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' 
12(B)(6) MOTION 
Plaintiff Reed 1. Taylor ("Reed Taylor") submits this Reply in Support of his Amended 
, 
Motion to Amend and Supplement Complaint, Objection to R. John Taylor'S Joinder, Reply to 
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Connie Taylor's Response, Supplemental Response in Opposition to Defendants' l2(b)(6) 
Motions to Dismiss, and incorporates by reference Reed Taylor's Response in Opposition to 
Defendants' 12(b)(6) Motion into this Response: 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Reed Taylor is requesting leave to file an amended complaint that amends and 
supplements the Third Amended Complaint, adds new parties, adds new causes of action and 
clarifies other causes of action. Defendants respond by inappropriately arguing that an 
amendment would be futile and should not be permitted based upon self-serving and flawed 
arguments. Reed Taylor's Proposed Fourth Amended Complaint is appropriate and warranted to 
prosecute his claims involving breaches of substantial obligations and corporate malfeasance to 
further the interests of justice. In sum, the facts and corporate malfeasance in this action are 
unlike any case seen by the Idaho Supreme Court. 
Contrary to the Defendants' allegations, Reed Taylor'S Complaint does not allege a 
single specific date of breach of contract, which is required for the relief sought by the 
Defendants under their 12(b)(6) Motion and opposition to Motion to Amend. Instead, the 
Defendants disingenuously argue that all inferences should be interpreted in their favor to 
support avoiding liability on alleged "technicalities." However, Reed Taylor's Complaint must 
be interpreted and construed in his favor as required by Idaho law. Reed Taylor should be 
permitted to amend his complaint in the interests of justice. 
Finally, even if Reed Taylor had alleged specific breaches on specific dates outside of the 
statute oflimitations, all of Reed Taylor's breaches of contract claims remain valid and viable as 
continuing obligations. 
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II. LEGAL AUTHORITY AND ARGUMENT 
A. Contrary to the Defendants' Arguments, Idaho Has NOT Abandoned the Notice 
Pleading Requirement. 
Idaho has adopted a system of notice pleading. Cook v. Skyline Corp., 135 Idaho 26, 33, 
13 P.3d 857 (2000). A pleading need only contain "a short and plain statement of the claim 
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. .. " Id., quoting Durstler v. Dursteler, 108 Idaho 230, 
697 P.2d 1244 (Ct. App. 1985). Under a notice pleading, "a party is no longer slavishly bound to 
stating particular theories in its pleadings." Cook, 135 Idaho at 33. All pleadings shall be so 
construed as to do substantial justice. LR.C.P. 8(f). 
Although the Defendants invite the Court to disregard Idaho's notice pleading status, 
Reed Taylor has far exceeded the notice pleading requirement by providing substantial facts, 
allegations and causes of action as demonstrated in his Fourth Amended Complaint. The 
Defendants' ongoing attacks against Reed Taylor's notice pleading complaints are simply a 
waste of resources and time. 
B. Reed Taylor Will Be Deprived of a Substantial Right if He is Not Permitted to 
Amend His Complaint. 
The twin purposes behind the court rule governing amendments to pleadings are to allow 
claims to be determined on the merits rather than on technicalities, and to make pleadings serve 
the limited role of providing notice of the nature of the claim and the facts at issue. Christensen 
Family Trust v. Christensen, 133 Idaho 866,993 P.2d 1197 (1999). If a complaint is capable of 
being amended to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, a refusal to grant 
permission to amend would deprive a plaintiff of a substantial right. Markstaller v. Markstaller, 
80 Idaho 129, 135,326 P.2d 994 (1958). 
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In contrast, the Defendants cite Black Canyon Racquetball Club, Inc. v. Idaho First Nat. 
Bank, N.A., 119 Idaho 171, 804 P.2d 900 (1991), as authority in opposition to Reed Taylor's 
Motion to Amend. However, Black Canyon Racquetball Club, involves an action where the 
plaintiff alleged that the bank had orally agreed to loan it money. Id. at 172. One and one-half 
years after filing the complaint, the bank moved for summary judgment on the alleged oral 
agreement. Id. After the bank: moved for summary judgment, the plaintiff moved to amend the 
complaint and allege new tort claims based upon the alleged oral agreement. !d. In contrast to 
Reed Taylor'S claims, the plaintiffs new belated tort claims were based upon the same facts as 
the alleged oral agreement, occurred at the exact same time, and involved invalid tort claims. Id. 
at 172-79. 
Reed Taylor's Fourth Amended Complaint contains twelve valid causes of action based 
upon different facts, different parties, and different periods of time. Moreover, Reed Taylor 
moved to amend and supplement his complaint less than six months after filing his complaint. 
Reed Taylor's Motion to Amend and Supplement Complaint is timely, warranted and required to 
in the interests of justice. 
C. Reed Taylor's Fourth Amended Complaint Has Alleged Twelve Valid Causes of 
Action and the Sufficiency of the Evidence Supporting His Twelve Causes of 
Action is Irrelevant 
As long as the proposed amendment states a valid claim, a court may not consider the 
sufficiency of the evidence supporting the proposed claim. Christensen Family Trust v. 
Christensen, 133 Idaho 866, 872, 993 P.2d 1197 (1999) citing Duffin v. Idaho Improvement 
Ass'n, 126 Idaho 1002, 1013,895 P.2d 1195,1206 (1995) (Emphasis added). 
III 
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Here, Reed Taylor's Fourth Amended Complaint states twelve valid causes of action and 
the Court may not consider the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the twelve causes of action 
when considering the motion to amend. Although the Defendants invite the Court to make an 
inquiry into the limited evidence presently available while the Defendants deny Reed Taylor 
discovery he seeks, the Court should decline such an invitation as the sufficiency of the evidence 
may not be considered at this point in time. 
Specifically, Reed Taylor's Fourth Amended Complaint states valid causes of action for 
(1) Breaches of Contract; (2) Fraudulent Transfers; (3) Misrepresentations/Fraud (See e.g., Smith 
v. Great Basin Grain Co., 98 Idaho 266,561 P.2d 1299 (1977)); (4) Conversion (See e.g., Luzar 
v. Western Sur. Co., 107 Idaho 693, 692 P.2d 337 (1984»; (5) Director Liability (See e.g., Magic 
Valley Radiology, P.A. v. Kolouch, 123 Idaho 434, 440, 849 P.2d 107 (1993)); (6) Alter 
EgolPierce Corporate Veil (See e.g., Magic Valley Radiology, P.A. v. Kolouch, 123 Idaho 434, 
438, 849 P.2d 107 (1993)); (7) Breaches of Fiduciary Duties (See e.g., Board of Trustees of 
Teamsters v. Foodtwon, Inc., 296 F.3d 164 (3rd Cir. 2002)); (8) Equitable Indemnification (See 
e.g., Mitchell v. Valerio, 124 Idaho 283, 285, 858 P.2d 822 (1993)); (9) Account Stated/Monies 
Due (See e.g., M.T. Deaton & Co. v. Leibrock, 114 Idaho 614, 759 P.2d 905 (1988)); (10) Unjust 
Enrichment (See e.g., Holladay v. Lindsay, 143 Idaho 767, 152 P.3d 638 (2006); (11) 
Constructive Trust (See e.g., Brasch v. Brasch, 55 Idaho 777, 47 P.2d 676 (1935»); and (12) 
Specific Performance (See e.g., Lexington Heights Development, LLC v. Crandlemire, 140 Idaho 
276,92 P.3d 526)). 
Contrary to the Defendants' allegations, Reed Taylor has not alleged any specific dates in 
any of his complaints regarding the dates of alleged breaches of contract, the dates of insolvency, 
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breaches regarding the lock box agreement, or the dates he was not a board member. 1 
Also contrary to the Defendants' allegations, all of the Defendants are alleged to be 
tortfeasers and all of the Defendants bear potential liability for equitable indemnification and 
other claims. See e.g., Mitchell v. Valerio, 124 Idaho 283, 285, 858 P.2d 822 (1993). 
Finally, Reed Taylor's unjust enrichment claim is simple. The Defendants have been all 
unjustly enriched through their receipt of salaries, benefits, stock options, stock and the like, 
while cheating Reed Taylor out of the over $8,000,000 owed to him. AIA Services and AIA 
Insurance do not have the resources or assets to pay the amounts due to Reed Taylor because of 
the Defendants' actions, and he is entitled to recover all such ill-gotten gains from the 
Defendants. See e.g., Holladay v. Lindsay, 143 Idaho 767, 152 P.3d 638 (2006)(The essence of a 
cause of action for unjust enrichment is the claim that the defendant has been enriched by the 
plaintiff and that it would be inequitable for the defendant to retain that benefit without 
compensating the plaintiff for the value of the benefit). Again, the Defendants attempt to 
misconstrue Idaho's notice pleading requirement to support their flawed arguments. The 
Defendants are on notice that Reed Taylor intends to recover all amounts and property that the 
Defendants have unjustly received. 
Of course, in the unlikely event that Reed Taylor is able to recover all of the 
approximately $8,500,000 owed to him from AIA Services, he will gladly withdraw unjust 
enrichment as a cause of action. 
III 
1 Reed Taylor's Fourth Amended Complaint alleges that the Defendants have refused to appoint Reed Taylor to the 
board of AlA Services for over 6 years. However, this was an error as Reed Taylor was last listed as a member of 
the board in 2001. See Affidavit of Roderick C. Bond, Ex. C. Nevertheless, for the reasons set forth in this 
Response, Defendants' arguments regarding statute oflimitations fail as a matter oflaw. 
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Finally, the Defendants (including Connie Taylor) argue that the newest members of the 
board of AIA Insurance and AlA Services are not liable. However, as noted above, AIA 
Services and AIA Insurance are insolvent and the Defendant directors owe Reed Taylor fiduciary 
duties. The Defendant directors have breached their fiduciary duties by paying the attorney fees 
of directors, failing to take action against certain Defendants on behalf of the corporations, 
wrongfully allowing a tenant of AIA Insurance to transfer to a building owned by John Taylor, 
failing to take action to terminate the $15,000,000 line-of-credit guaranteed by AIA Insurance, 
and permitting the corporations' assets to be utilized by others, among other breached duties. 
In sum, Fraud is the only claim that is required to be plead with specificity and the Court 
should decline the Defendants' invitation to extend such a pleading requirement to all causes of 
action. 
D. The Promissory Note is An Installment Contract Secured by the Amended Stock 
Pledge Agreement and Amended Security Agreemeut. 
If there was no election to accelerate the terms of a note under an installment contract, the 
statute of limitations applies to each installment separately, and does not begin to run on any 
installment until it is due. Thomas v. Goff, 100 Idaho 282, 285, 596 P .2d 794 (1979). 
Here, AIA Services was obligated to pay Reed Taylor monthly interest installments with 
a balloon payment of the principal balance and accrued interest being due on August 1, 2005. 
See Hearing on Preliminary Injunction, Ex. A. However, when the Defendants failed to timely 
pay certain interest installments, Reed Taylor never elected to accelerate the terms of the 
$6,000,000 Promissory Note. See Fourth Amended Complaint, ~ 2.25. The $6,000,000 
Promissory Note expressly states that upon default (the failure to timely pay an installment): 
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the entire remaining balance of principal and interest and all interest accrued thereon 
may, at the option of the holder hereof, be declared to be immediately due and payable 
without notice (the "Acceleration") and the lien given to secure its payment may be 
foreclosed. 
See Hearing on Preliminary Injunction, Ex. A. 
Because Reed Taylor, in his sole discretion, never accelerated the amounts due under the 
$6,000,000 Promissory Note, the statute of limitations only accrued on each interest installment 
as it became due and the $6,000,000 principal payment when it became due on August 1, 2005, 
with "all interest accrued." !d. Moreover, the indebtedness due under the $6,000,000 
Promissory Note is secured by the obligations and security interests set forth in the Amended 
, 
Stock Pledge Agreement and Amended Security Agreement. See Hearing on Preliminary 
Injunction, Exs. A-C and E. 
Accordingly, Reed Taylor'S cause of action to sue for the $6,000,000 under the 
Promissory Note accrued on August 1, 2005, when the balloon payment and all accrued interest 
came due. Thus, all interest installments for the five years preceding the filing of his original 
complaint are not barred by the statute of limitations. Moreover, Reed Taylor is entitled to seek 
all remedies and relief available under the Amended Stock Pledge Agreement and Amended 
Security Agreement, as such agreements secured the payment of all sums owed to Reed Taylor 
under the $6,000,000 Promissory Note. 
For the same reasons above, the Defendants' arguments regarding I.C. § 5-238 are moot. 
See AlA Services/In~urance's Response, p. 6. Because Reed Taylor never exercised his optional 
right to accelerate the obligations under the $6,000,000 Promissory Note and all amounts 
presently owed to Reed fall within the five-year statute of limitations, Reed Taylor need not 
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make any claims or arguments regarding the acknowledgement of a new debt. 
E. The Amended Stock Pledge Agreement and Amended Security Agreement Are 
Continuing Contracts To Reed Taylor Until the Earlier of Ten Years or 
Payment in Full of the $6,000,000 Promissory Note, Plus All Accrued Interest. 
In a continuing contract pertaining to the redemption of stock, the pledgee is under no 
obligation to "act, and, by acting, exhaust his remedy the moments the first default occurred ... " 
and the statute of limitations is only applicable to the appropriate period of time preceding the 
commencement of the action. Austin v. Wright, 156 Wn. 24,29,286 P. 48, 50 (Wash. Sup. Ct. 
1930)(holding that a pledgee is not barred by the statute of limitations from suing on a stock 
redemption agreement as it was a "continuing contract"). The doctrine of continuing contractual 
obligations has also been followed by Idaho District Court: 
There are contracts, however, that have been said to require continuing (or continuous) 
performance for some specified time, a period that may be definite or indefinite when the 
contract is made. These contracts too are capable of a series of 'partial' breaches, as well 
as of a single total breach by repudiation or by such a material failure of performance 
when due as to go to the 'essence' and to frustrate substantially the purpose for which the 
contract was agreed to by the injured party. For each 'partial' breach a separate cause of 
action is maintainable, just as in the case of an 'installment' contract; and for a series of 
'partial' breaches occurring before any action is brought only one action is maintainable. 
4 A. Corbin, Corbin on Contracts § 956 (1951). 
The period fixed by a statute of limitations begins to run from the 'accrual of the cause of 
action.' Since 'cause of action' is so uncertain and variable a concept, serious injustice 
may be done unless the court uses judicial discretion in applying such a statute in the case 
of 'partial' breaches of a single contract. No doubt there is much authority for the 
statement that where separate actions would lie for a series of breaches, the statute 
operates against each one separately as of the time when each one could have been 
brought, and that this rule is not affected by the fact that after two or more such breaches 
have occurred the plaintiff must join them all in one action. Of course, if an action for 
the first installment is barred by the statute, it can not be properly included in an action 
for later installments that are not yet barred. Corbin, supra, § 956. 
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The statute of limitations applies separately to the alleged breach of 1983. The fact that 
other partial breach claims, not raised in this litigation, are now time-barred is of no 
consequence. Because the final alleged breach occurred in October 1983, within the six-
year statute oflimitations, the District's cause of action is not time barred. 
Minidoka Irr. Dist. v. Department of Interior of us., 154 F.3d 924, 926 (D. Idaho 
1998)(Emphasis added). 
Other jurisdictions have also adopted the continuing contract doctrine. Haywood Street 
Development Corporation, Inc. v. Harry S. Peterson, Co., Inc., 120 N.C.App. 832, 463 S.E.2d 
564, (1995)(a new cause of action for breach of warranty accrued each day the work was not free 
of defects); Ballantyne House Associates v. City of Newark, 269 N.J. Super. 322, 635 A.2d 551 
(1993)(plaintiff could maintain an action for all breaches occurring within 6 years); West Haven 
v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 894 F.2d 540, 546 (2d Cir. 1 990)(If the breaches are partial and 
ongoing, each one re-commences the statute of limitations such that damages can be awarded 
beginning "from the date calculated by subtracting the limitations period from the date of 
filing"); The Singer Company v. Baltimore Gas and Electric Company, 79 Md.App. 461, 558 
A.2d 419 (1989)(statute of limitations on claims by customer against utility for breach of 
contractual obligation to supply power began running anew after each power outage, rather than 
accruing at the time of the first outage); Barker v. Jeremiasen, 676 P.2d 1259 (Col. App. 
1984)( damages for breach of covenants only barred for damages accruing outside of the statute 
oflimitations). 
Significantly, Austin was heard over 20 years after the inapplicable landlord-tenant case 
cited by the Defendants, Toellner v. McGinnis, 55 Wn. 430, 104 P. 641 (1909)(the same case 
relied upon by the Idaho Supreme Court in a similar landlord-tenant case which was also 
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ongoing contractual obligations and for the security the payment of all amounts owed under a 
promissory note. Moreover, Skaggs applies to a ruling on summary judgment and does not hold 
that an I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) motion should be granted or a motion to amend should be denied. In 
short, Skaggs and Toellner are both not on point and inapplicable to the facts and law in this 
case. Finally, it would be inequitable for AlA Services to avoid liability for any partial breaches 
outside of the applicable statute of limitations. See 4 A. Corbin, Corbin on Contracts § 956 
(1951)("Since 'cause of action' is so uncertain and variable a concept, serious injustice may be 
done unless the court uses judicial discretion in applying such a statute in the case of 'partial' 
breaches of a single contract"). 
In contrast to Toellner and Skaggs, Reed Taylor's claims do not involve a lease. Reed 
Taylor's claims pertain to perfected security interests and pledged stock. Significantly, the 
Defendants are required under the Amended Stock Pledge Agreement to name Reed Taylor to 
the board of AL<\' Services every year. Since under the Bylaws of AlA Services a board member 
may only serve until the next annual meeting, Reed Taylor has a new cause of action for each 
day/year he is not named to the board as this is a continuing obligation. See Affidavit of 
Roderick C. Bond, Exs. B-C. 
Similarly, because insolvency is also an ongoing obligation, every quarter/year that ALA 
Services issues a financial statement and such financial statement indicates insolvency, a new 
cause of action accrues for insolvency. See Hearing on Preliminary Injunction, Exs. AL-AV. 
The Defendants have ongoing obligations under all of the applicable agreements. Significantly, 
the Defendants were required to abide by all obligations under the Amended Stock Pledge 
Agreement and the Amended Security Agreement until the earlier of ten years or the payment of 
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erroneously relied upon by the Defendants, Skaggs v. Jensen, 94 Idaho 179, 484 P.2d 728 
(1971)). 
In this case, AlA Services and AlA Insurance are subject to continuing contractual 
obligations under the Amended Stock Pledge Agreement, Amended Security Agreement and 
$6,000,000 Promissory Note for the earlier of a period of ten years or until the $6,000,000 (Plus 
accrued interest) has been paid in full. AIA Services and AlA Insurance have failed to comply 
with such continuing obligations. Although the Defendants disingenuously argue that the 
obligations owed to Reed Taylor were "one time" contractual duties, the $6,000,000 Promissory 
Note, Amended Stock Pledge Agreement and Amended Security Agreement show otherwise. 
The Agreements are continuing contracts and Reed Taylor is entitled to all damages that 
flow from all breaches within the applicable statute oflimitations. 
For the same reasons above, the case cited by the Defendants, Ancala Holdings, L.L. C. v. 
Price, 2007 WL 387591, *3 (9th Cir. 2007), is yet another inapplicable lease convent case as 
distinguished below. 
F. The Obligations Owed To Reed Taylor Under the Agreements are Ongoing and 
the Defendants Erroneously Rely on Skaggs v. Jensen. 
The Defendants rely on Skaggs v. Jensen, 94 Idaho 179, 484 P.2d 728 (1971), for the 
proposition that Reed Taylor's breach of contract claims are barred by the statute of limitations. 
In Skaggs, the Idaho Supreme Court relied on Toellner v. McGinnis, 55 Wash. 430, 104 
P. 641 (1909), wherein the Washington Supreme Court held that a lease covenant action was 
barred by the applicable six-year statute of limitations. Toellner at 729. Significantly, however, 
Skaggs and Toellner do not pertain to a security interest in commissions, a pledge of stock for 
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all sums owed to Reed Taylor. The Defendants failed to do both. 
Instead, applying the proper Washington case law to the Amended Stock Pledge 
Agreement and Amended Security Agreement results in an entirely different holding. In Austin 
v. Wright, 156 Wash. 24, 29, 286 P. 48, 50 (1930)(a Washington Supreme Court case decided 
some 20 years after the case, Toellner v. McGinnis, which was the authority cited in Skaggs v. 
Jensen), the Washington Supreme Court held that when a stock redemption agreement was to 
run for a period of twenty years, the plaintiff need not act upon the first default and that the 
statute of limitations only barred claims exceeding six years from the commencement of the 
action. Id. at 29. Applying Austin to the facts in this case leads to but one conclusion-Skaggs 
and Toellner are inapplicable to security agreements and pledge agreements with ongoing 
contractual obligations such as the case in Reed Taylor's causes of action. 
Reed Taylor's causes of action involve a $6,000,000 Promissory note, an Amended Stock 
Pledge Agreement and an Amended Security Agreement-not a breached covenant in a real 
property lease agreement as in Skaggs. The Court should disregard the Defendants erroneous 
and misplaced reliance on Skaggs, 94 Idaho 179 (1971). Instead, the Court should follow the 
proper rationale as set forth in Austin, 156 Wash. 24 (1930) and Minidoka Irr. Dist., 154 F.3d 
924 (D. Idaho 1998). 
G. Even if the Statute of Limitations Defenses are Applicable to the Amended Stock 
Pledge Agreement and Amended Security Agreement, the Defendants' 
Obligations Under These Agreements Were Revived When Reed Taylor Sued 
Under the $6,000,000 Promissory Note. 
If an action is barred by the statute of limitations under a stock pledge agreement because 
a portion of the notes are no longer within the statute of limitations, a plaintiff keeps an action 
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alive by bringing suit upon the principal obligation within the statute of limitations. Riverside 
Portland Cement Co. v. Anchor Laundry, 94 Cal.App. 407,408-09,271 P. 367 (1928). 
Here, even if Reed Taylor was somehow barred from bringing claims under the Amended 
Stock Pledge Agreement and Security Agreement based upon the Defendants' flawed arguments, 
he revived al1 of the obligations and causes of action under the Amended Stock Pledge 
Agreement and Amended Security Agreement when he sued on the $6,000,000 Promissory Note, 
which is secured by these Agreements. See Hearing on Preliminary Injunction, Ex. A. 
H. Sufficiency of Evidence is More Properly Determined At the Summary 
Judgment Stage of Litigation. 
The sufficiency of evidence pertaining to a complaint is more appropriately determined at 
the summary judgment stage, not in a motion to amend or a 12(b)(6) motion. Duffin v. Idaho 
Improvement Ass 'n, 126 Idaho 1002, 1013,895 P.2d 1195, 1206 (1995). 
Here, the Defendants are requesting that the Court make evidenciary decisions in a 
motion to amend and LR.C.P 12(b)(6) motion. However, the Defendants' request is not 
appropriate and should be denied. 
I. Connie Taylor Is a Required Party Because of Her Role as a Director, Her Joint 
Ownership of Crop USA and AlA Services Stock, and Because the Community 
Benefited from the Various Wrongful Acts. 
"The obvious purpose of joining the spouses is to give each notice and an opportunity to 
defend ... [and] a judgment entered against a wife who had neither been served nor named, and 
had not appeared, was void insofar as it attempted to bind her or the community." Vikse v. 
Johnson, 137 Ariz. 528,531,627 P.2d 193,195 (1983). 
III 
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Here, Reed Taylor's Fourth Amended Complaint is requesting the return of wages paid to 
John Taylor and a constructive trust for all shares and ill-gotten gains. In addition, Reed Taylor 
has specific claims which would impose liability to the shareholders of the corporations. 
Connie Taylor's role in this matter cannot be underemphasized as she has exerted 
significant effort to assert her community property interests in an email dated January 19, 2007: 
Rod: 
I'd like to confirm our conversation of this afternoon, in which I advised you that I still 
own an undivided one-half interest with John Taylor in all shares of AIA Inc., AIA 
Services, and CROP USA. My approval is required prior to entering into any agreement 
which would impact those shares. I understand you will provide me with a copy of any 
documents which are filed with the court. 
Connie 
Affidavit of Roderick Bond, Ex. A. 
As the co-owner of the shares in AlA Services and Crop USA, Connie Taylor is liable for 
claims under alter-ego, fraud, fraudulent transfers and such other causes of action applicable to 
shareholders/owners who benefited from wrongful acts or are otherwise held liable under the 
law. This is further codified in AIA Service's Bylaws, which provides that co-owners of shares 
are jointly liable for acts of either owner's vote of the shares. See Affidavit of Roderick Bond, 
Ex. B,p. 4. 
Moreover, Connie Taylor's email clearly set forth two significant issues. First, she 
makes clear her ownership interest in the shares and her desire to protect those property interests. 
Second, Connie Taylor advises of her desire to have copies of pleadings filed in this action. 
If Connie Taylor were not named a party in this action and her property rights were 
affected, she would certainly exercise her right to void any decision which negatively impacted 
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her in this action. Likewise, she is now complaining of being named, even after sending the 
above-referenced email. 
Regardless, Connie Taylor has been appointed as a board member of AlA Services and 
AIA Insurance and she is liable for all breached fiduciary duties flowing from her role as a 
director, among other claims as a shareholder and recipient of funds from AIA Services. 
J. R. John Taylor's Joinder Is Untimely and Does Not Address Identical Issues. 
An untimely Joinder is only appropriate when the issues raised are identical and no 
objection is made to the timeliness of the Joinder. Ramos v. Dixon, 156 P.3d 533, 535-36 (Idaho 
2007). 
Here, John Taylor's Joinder was untimely served. Reed Taylor objects to his untimely 
Joinder, and John Taylor's Joinder does not address identical issues raised in AIA Services and 
AIA Insurance's Response. Thus, John Taylor's Joinder should be denied. 
III. CONCLUSION 
The Court should grant Reed Taylor's Amended Motion to Amend and Supplement 
Complaint and deny the Defendants' I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss. 
DATED: This 26th day of June, 2007. 
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SMITH, CANNON & BOND PLLC 
AHLERS & CRESSMAN PLLC 
annon 
Paul R. Cressman, Jr. 
Attorneys for Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, Roderick C. Bond, declare that, on the date indicated below, I served a true and correct 
copy of Plaintiffs Reply in Support of his Amended Motion to Amend and Supplement 
Complaint, Objections to John Taylor's Joinder, Reply to Connie Taylor's Response, and 
Supplemental Response in Opposition to Defendants' LR.C.P. l2(b)(6) Motion on the following 
party( s) via the methode s) indicated below: 
David A. Gittins 
Law Office of David A. Gittins 
P.O. Box 191 
Clarkston, W A 99403 
Attorney for Defendants Duclos and Freeman 
Michael E. McNichols 
Clements Brown & McNichols 
321 - 13 th Street 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
Attorneys for Defendant R. John Taylor 
Jonathan D. Hally 
Clark & Feeney 
P.O. Box 285 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
Attorney for Defendant Connie Taylor 
Gary D. Babbitt 
D . John Ashby 
Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley LLP 
877 Main Street, Suite 1000 
P.O. Box 1617 
Boise, Idaho 83701-1617 
Attorneys for AlA Services and AIA Insurance 
Via: 
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
(X) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) Facsimile 
Via: 
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
(X) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) Facsimile 
Via: 
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
(X) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) Facsimile 
Via: 
(X) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
(X) Facsimile - (208) 342-3829 
Signed this 26th day of June, 2007, at Lewiston, Idaho. 
PLAINTIFF'S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION TO AMEND COMPLAINT, 
OBJECTION TO JOINDER ... - 17 
Roderick C. Bond 
Ned A. Cannon, ISBA #2331 
SMITH, CANNON & BOND PLLC 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
508 Eighth Street 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
Telephone: (208) 743-9428 
Fax: (208) 746-8421 
Paul R. Cressman, Jr., ISBA #7563 
AHLERS & CRESSMAN PLLC 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
999 Third Avenue, Suite 3100 
Seattle, Washington 98104-4088 
Telephone: (206) 287-9900 
Fax: (206) 287-9902 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF 
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
REED 1. TAYLOR, a single person; 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
AlA SERVICES CORPORATION, an Idaho 
corporation; AlA INSURANCE, INC., an 
Idaho corporation; R. JOHN TAYLOR and 
CONNIE TA YLOR, individually and the 
community property comprised thereof; 
BRYAN FREEMAN, a single person; and 
JOLEE DUCLOS, a single person; 
Defendants. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss: 
COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE ) 
Case No.: CV-07-00208 
AFFIDAVIT OF RODERICK C. BOND IN 
SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF REED 
TAYLOR'S MOTION TO AMEND AND IN 
OPPOSITION TO CONNIE TAYLOR'S 
12(b)(6) MOTION TO DISMISS 
I, Roderick C. Bond, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and says: 
AFFIDAVIT OF RODERICK C. BOND - 1 ~lo1-
ORIGINAL 
1. I am one of the attorneys for the Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor in the above-entitled 
action. I make this Affidavit on my personal knowledge. 
2. Attached as Exhibit A is an email that I received from Connie Taylor dated 
January 19,2007, wherein Ms. Taylor advised me of her undivided interest in the shares in AIA 
Services and Crop USA and the requirement that she be involved with any agreement impacting 
the shares. This email was in response to Connie Taylor learning of settlement discussions 
between Reed Taylor and John Taylor. She made clear to me her community property interest in 
the shares of AlA Services and Crop USA. 
3. Attached as Exhibit B is the Bylaws of AlA Services Corporation which were 
provided to me by AlA Services Corporation. 
4. Attached as Exhibit C are copies of the annual reports submitted by AlA Services 
to the Idaho Secretary of State disclosing the officers and directors of AlA Services, which I 
downloaded from the Idaho Secretary of State website. The reports show that Reed Taylor was 
listed as a member of the board of AlA Services in 2001, but not in the five subsequent years. 
DATED: This 26th day of June, 2007. 
Roderick C. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 26th day of June, 2007. 
Notary Public or Idaho 
Residing at: LetlJiCfJ tm 
My commission expires: J.12.4-lfOJ2 
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Roderick C. Bond 
From: Connie [ctaylor@clarkandfeeney.com] 
Sent: Friday, January 19, 2007 3:29 PM 
To: Roderick C. Bond 
Subject: Reed Taylor - AlA 
Rod: 
I'd like to confirm our conversation of this afternoon, in which I advised you that I still 
own an undivided one-half interest with John Taylor in all shares of AlA Inc., AlA 
Services, and CROP USA. My approval is required prior to entering into 
any agreement which would impact tbose shares. I understand you will provide me 
with a copy of any documents which are filed with the court. 
Connie 
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NEW RESTATED BYLAWS 
OF 
AIA SERVICES CORPORATION 
(an'Idaho corporation) 
, , 
ARTICLE I 
OFFICES ' 
Section 1.1 Registered Office.. The registered office of the 
corporation required by the Idaho Business Corporation Act to ~e 
maintained in the State of Idaho may, but need not be, identical withtpe 
principal office' in the State of Idaho; and the address of the registered 
office may be changed from time to time by the Board of Directors or the 
President of the corporation. (Idaho Code Sections 30-1-12{a) and 3D-l-
B. ) 
Section 1.2 Principal Office; Other Offices. The corporation shall 
alsoh~ve and maintain an office or principal, place o,f business in 
Lewiston, Idaho or at such other place as may ,be fixed by the Board of 
Directors, and may also have offices at such other places,both within and 
without the State of Idaho. as the Board of Directors may from time to 
time determine or the business of the corporation may require. 
ARTICLE II 
CORPORATE SEAL 
Section 2.1 Corporate Seal. The corporate seal shall consist of 
a die bearing the name of the corporat.ion and the inscril?tion, "Corporate 
Seal -- State of Idaho". The seal may be use~ by causing it or a 
facsimile thereof to be impressed or affixed or in any other. manner 
reproduced. The seal may be altered at the pleasure of the Board of 
Directors. (Idaho Code Section 30-1-4{c)). ' 
ARTICLE III 
STOCKHOLDERS I HEETINGS 
Section, 3.1 Place of Meetings. The Board of Directors may 
designate any place, either within or without'the State of Idaho, as the 
place of meeting for any annual meeting or for - any special meeting of 
stockholders called by the Board of Directors. A waiver of notice signed 
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by all, stockholders entitled to vote at a meeting may designate any place, 
either within or without the State of Idaho, as the place for the holding 
6f such meeting. If no designation is made, or if a special meeting be 
otherwise called, the place of meeting shall be the principal office of 
the corporation in the State of Idaho. (Idaho Code Section 30-1-28). 
Section 3.2 Annual Meetings. The annual meeting of the 
stockholders of the corporation shall be held on the first Monday in the 
month of May each year at the hour of 10: 00 0 I clock a. m.) or on such other 
date and at such other time which may from time to time be designated by 
the Board of Directors. for the purpose of electing directors and for the, 
transaction 'of such other busin~ss as may properly come before the 
meeting. (Idaho Code Section 30-1-28). 
Section 3.3 Special-Meetings. Special meetings of the stockholders 
of the corporation may be called a1:. any tim~. for any purpose or. purposes, 
by the Board of Directors Or by the holders of not less than one-fifth 
'(1/5) o~ all outstanding shares of stock of the corporation entitled to 
vote at' the meeting or by the president of the corporation. Special 
meetings of the stockholders of the corporation may not be called by any 
other person or persons. (Idaho Code Section 30-1-28). 
Section 3.4 Notice of Meetings. Written notice stating the place, 
day and hour of the meeting end, in case of a special meeting, the purpose 
or purposes for which tlir- meeting is called, shall, unless otherwise 
prescribed by statute, be delivered not less than ' ten nor more than fifty 
days before the date of the meeting, either personally or by mail, by~r 
at'the direction of the president, or the secretary, or the officer or 
other persons calling the meeting, to each stockholder of record entitled 
,to vote at such meeting, or 'to, each specified beneficial stockholder 
certified for the purpose of receiving such notice under Section 3.10. 
(Idaho Code Section 30-1-29). 
Such notice of any meeting of stockholders may be waived in writing, 
signed by the person entitled to notice thereof, either before or after 
such meeting, and will be waived by any stockholder by his attendance 
thereat iIi person or by proxy, except when the stockholder attends a 
meeting for the express purpose of objecting. -at the beginning of the 
meeting, to the transaction of any business because the meeting is not 
lawfully called or convened. Any stockholder so waiving notice of such 
meeting shall be bound by the proceedings of any such meeting in all 
'respects as if due notice hereof had bee~ given. (Idaho Code Section 30-
1-144). 
Section 3.5 Quorum. Except as otherWise provided in the Articles 
of Incorporation, a majority of the outstanding shares, of the corporation 
entitled to vote, represented in person or by proxy. shall constitute a 
quorum at a meeting of stockholders. Any shares, the voting of which at 
said meeting has been enjoined, or which for any reason cannot be lawfully 
voted at such meeting, shall not be counted to determine a quorum at such 
meeting. In the absence of a quorum any meeting of stockholders may be 
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adjourned, from time to time, -by vote of the holders of a majority of the 
shares represented thereat; but no other business shall be transacted at 
such meeting. The stockholders present at a duly organized and convened 
meeting where a quorum has been presen,t can continue to transact business 
as a quorum until adjournment, notwithstanding the withdrawal 6f enough' 
stockholders to leave less than a quorum. Except as otherwise provided 
by law. the Articles of Incorporation or these Bylaws. if .; quorum is 
present, the affirmative vote of a majority of the shares represented at 
the meeting and entitled to vote on the subject matter shall be the act 
of the stockholders. (Idaho Code Section 30-1-32). 
Section 3.6 Adjournment and Notice of Adjourned Meetings. Any 
meeting of stockholders at which a quorum is present, whether annual or 
special, may be adjourned from time to time by the vote of a majority of 
the shares, the holders of which are present either in person or byproxY.-
When a meeting is adjourned to another time or place, notice need not be 
given of the adjourned meeting if the' time and place thereof are announced 
at the meeting at which the adjoux:nment is taken. At the adjourned 
meeting the'corporation may transact any business which might have been 
transact-ed at the original meeting. If the adjournment is for more than 
thirty (30) days, or if after the adjournment a new record date is fixed 
for the adjournment meeting, a notice of the adjourned meeting shall be 
given to each stockholder of record entitled to vote at the meeting. 
Section 3.7 Proxi:'e'S. At all meetings of stockholders. a 
stockholder may vote either in person or by proxy executed in writing by 
the stockholder or by his duly authorized attorney-in-fact. Such proxy 
shall be filed with the secretary of the corporation before or at the time 
of the meeting. No proxy shall be valid after eieven (11) months from the' 
date of its ,execution, unless otherwise provided in the proxy. (Idaho 
Code. Section 30-1-33(c». -
Section 3.8 Voting Rights. Except as otherwise provided in the 
Articles of Incorporation, each outstanding share, regardless of class, 
entitled to vote shall be entitled to one vote upon each matter submitted 
to a vote at a meeting of stockholders. Cumulative voting of shares shall 
not be permitted in the election of directors. For the purpose of 
determining those stockholders entitled to vote in any meeting of the 
stockholders~ excep~ as otherwise provided'by law, only persons in which 
names shares stand on the stock record of the corporation on the record 
date, as provided in Sections 3. 11 and 7.4 - of these By laws, shall be 
Emtitled to vote at any meeting of_ stockholders. All elections of 
directors shall be by written ballot. 
Section 3.9 Voting of Shares by Certain Holders. Shares standing 
in the name of another corporation, domestic or foreign. may be voted by 
such officer, agent or proxy as the bylaws of such other corporation may 
prescribe or, in the absence of such provision, as the Board of Directors 
of such other corporation may determine. {Idaho Code Section 30-1-22(e». 
Shares held by an administrator, executor, guardian or conservator 
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may be voted by him, either in person or by proxy, without a transfer of 
such shares into his name. Shares standing in the name of a trustee may 
be voted by him, either in person or by proxy; but no trustee shall be 
entitled to vote shares held by him without a transfer of such shares into 
his name. (Idaho Code Section 30-1-33(f». 
Shares standing in the name of a receiver may be voted by such 
receiver; and shares held by or under the control of a receiver may be 
voted by such receiver without the transfer thereof into his name if 
authority so to do be contained in an appropriate order of the court by 
which such receiver was appointed. (Idaho Code Section 30-1-33(g». 
A stockh~lder whose shares are pledged shall be· entitled to vote 
such shares unt.il the shares have been transferred into ·the. name of the 
pledgee; and thereafter the pledgee shall be entitled to vote the shares 
. so transferred· unless the pledgor sh.all have obtained from the pledgee a 
proxy to vote or take other action 'thereon in accordance with law. (Idaho 
Code Section 30-1-33(c)(3),(h». 
Neither treasury shares of its own stock held by the corporation, 
nor shares held by another corporation if a mahority of the shares 
entitled to vote for the elections of directors of such other corporation 
. is held by the corporation, shall be voted at any meeting or counted in 
determining the total number of outstanding shares at any given time. 
(Idaho Code Section 30-1-35(b»). 
T Section 3.10 Joint Owners of Stock. . If shares or other securities 
having voting power stand of record in the names of two (2) or more 
persons, whether fiduciaries, members of a partnership. joint tenants, 
tenants in c·ommon, tenants by the entirety, or otherwise, or if two (2) 
or more persons have the same fiduciary relationship respecting the same 
shares, unless the Secretary is given written notice to the contrary and 
is' furnished with a copy of the instrument or order appointing them or 
creating the relationship wherein it is so provided, their acts with 
respect to voting shall have the following effect: (a) if only one votes, 
his a"ct binds all; (b) if more than one votes, the act of the majority so 
voting binds all; (c) if more than one votes, but the vote is evenly split 
on any particular matter, each faction may vote the securities in question 
proportionally. If the instrument filed with the secretary shows that any 
such ·tenancy is held in unequal interests, a majority or even-split for 
the purpose of this Section 3.10 shall be a majority or even-split 
interest. 
The Board of Directors may adopt by resolution a procedure whereby 
a stockholder of the Corporation may certify in writing to the corporation 
that all or a portion of the shares registered in the name of such 
stockholder are held for the account of a specified person or persons. 
The resolution shall set forth (a) the classification of stockholder who 
may certify, (b) the purpose or purposes for which the certification may 
be made. (c) the form of certification and information to be contained 
therein, (d) the number of days before or after any record date or date 
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of closing of the stock transfer books. and (e) such other provisions with 
respect to the procedure as are deemed necessary or desirable. Upon 
receipt by the corporation of a certification complying with the 
procedure, the persons specified in the certification shall be deemed, for 
the purpose or purposes set forth in the certification, to be the holders 
of record of the number of shares specified in place of the shareholder 
making the certification. (Idaho Code Section 30-1-2(f)). 
Section 3.11 List of StoCkholders. The secretary shall make, at 
least ten (10) days before every meeting of stockholders, a' complete' 
recorl'l of the stockholders entitled to vote at such meeting or any 
adjournment thereof. arranged in alphabetical order and shOWing the 
addresses of each stockholder and the number of shares registered in the 
name of each stockholder. Such record shall be open to the examination 
of any stockholder, for any purpose germane to the meeting. during 
ordinary business hours, for a period of at least ten (10) days prior to 
the meeting, either at a place within the city where the meeting is to be 
held, which place shall be specified in the notice of the meeting or, if 
not specified, at the place where the meeting is to be held. The list 
shall b~ produced and kept open at the time .and place of meeting •. and 
shall be subject to inspection by any stockholder during the whole time 
of the meeting for the purposes thereof. (Idaho Code Section 30-1-31). 
Section 3.12 Organization. At every meeting of stockholders, the 
Chairman of the Board o£fD"irectors, or, if a Chairman has not been 
appointed or is absent, the president, or, if the president is absent, the 
most senior vice president present, or. in t1).e absence of' any such officer, 
a chairman of the meeting chosen by a' majority in interest of the 
stockholders entitled to vote, present in person or by proxy, shall act 
as chairman. The secretary or, in his absence, an assistant secretary 
directed to do so by the president, shall act as secretary of the meeting. 
Section 3.13 Nomination of·Directors. Nominations of persons for 
. election to the Board of Directors of this corporation at the annual 
meeting of stockholders may be made at such meeting by or at the direction 
of the Board of Directors, by any nominating committee or person appointed 
by the Board of Directors, or by any stockholder of the corporation 
entitled to vote for the election of directors at the meeting who timely 
complies with the notice procedures herein set forth. To be timely, a 
stockholder's notice must be delivered to, ~r mailed to and received by, 
the secretary of the corporation at the corporation t s principal executive 
offices not later than the December 31 immediately preceding the annual 
meeting. 
Section 3.14 Business Introduced by Stockholders at Annual 
Meetings. Where business introduced by a stockholder is not specified in 
the notice of annual meeting, then (in addition to any other applicable 
requirements) for business to be properly introduced by a stockholder at 
an annual meeting of stockholders, the stockholder must have given timely 
notice thereof in writing to the secretary of the corporation. To be 
timely, a stockholder's notice must be delivered to, or mailed to and 
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received by, the secretary of the corporation in the same manner and 
subject to the same time requirements provided in Section 3.13 of these 
Bylaws for stockholder notice of nominations to the Board of Directors. 
A stockholder's notice must set forth, as to each matter the stockholder 
proposes to bring before the meeting, (a) a brief description of the 
business desired to be brought before the meeting and the reasons for 
conducting such business at the meeting. (b) the name and record address 
of the stockholder proposing such business, .(c) the class, series and 
number of shares of the corporation's stock which are beneficially owned 
by the stockholder, and Cd) any material interest of the stockholder in 
such business. 
Section 3.15 Informal Action by Stockholder. Any action required 
or permitted to be taken at a meeting of the stockholders may be taken 
without a meeting if a consent in writing, setting forth the action so 
taken,' shall be ,signed by all of the stockholders entitled to vote with 
respect to.the subject matter thereof. Such consent shall have the same 
effect as a unanimous vote of stockholders. (Idaho Code Section 30-1-
145). 
ARTICLE IV 
DIRECTORS 
Section 4.1 Nt.miber;",. Qualifications. The number of directors 
presently authorized is six (6). The authorized number of directors of 
the corporation shall be fixed. and may be increased to a~many as nine 
or decreased to as few as one, from time to time by the Board of Directors 
ei ther by a resolution or a byTaw duly adopted by the Board of Directors. 
No decrease in the number of directors constituting the Board of Directors 
shall shorten the term of any incumbent director. Directors need not be 
residents of the State of Idaho or stockholders unless so required by the 
Articles of Incorporation. If for any cause the directors shall not have 
been elected at an annual meeting, they may be elected as soon thereafter 
as convenient at a special meeting of the stockholders called for that 
purpose in the manner provided by law or in these Bylaws. (Idaho Code 
Sections 30-1-28, 30-1-35 and 30-i-36). 
Section 4.2 Tenn. Each director shall serve until the next annual 
meeting of stockholders and his successor is duly ~lected and qualified, 
or until his death, resignation or removal. (Idaho Code Section 30-1-36). 
Section 4.3 Newly created Directorships and Vacancies. Newly 
created directorships resulting from any increase in the number of 
directors and any vacancies on the Board of Directors resulting from 
death, resignation; disqualification, removal or other cause shall be 
filled by the affirmative vote of a majority of the remaining directors 
then in office (and not by stockholders), even if less than a quorum of 
the authorized Board of Directors. A director elected to fill a vacancy 
shall be elected for the unexpired term of his predecessor in office. The 
stockholders may elect his successor at the next annual meeting of 
NEW RESTATED BYLAWS OF 
AlA SERVICES CORPORATION - P. 6 
~70 
AFFIDA VIT OP-kODERICKC. BOND '. AIA000967 
stockhold~rs or at any special meeting duly called for that purpose and 
held prior to the next annual meeting. 
Section 4.4 'Powers. All corporate powers shali be exercised by and 
under the authority oft and -the business and affairs of the corporation 
shall be managed under the direction of, the Board of Directors except as 
may otherwise be provided in_ the Idaho Business Corporation Act or the 
A~ticles of Incorporation. (Idaho Code Section 30-1-35). 
Section 4.5 Resignation. Any director may resign at any time by 
delivering his written resignation to the secretary, such resignation to 
specify whether it will be effective at a particular time. upon receipt 
by the secretary or at the pleasure of the Board of Directors. If no such 
specification is made. it shall be deemed effective at 'the ple-asure of the 
Board of Directors. When one or more directors shall resign from the 
Board of Directors, effective at .. a future date. a majority of the 
directors then in office, including those who have so resigned, shall have 
power to fill such vacancy or vacancies, the vote thereon to take effect 
when such resignation or resignations--shall hecome effective; and, subject 
to Section 4.3, each director so chosen shall hold office for the 
unexpired portion 6f the terms of the director whose place shall be 
vacated and until his successor shall have been duly elected and 
qualified. 
Section 4.6 Remov~:'At a special meeting of stockholders called 
for the purpose in the manner hereinabove provided, the entire Board of 
Directors, or any individual director, may be removed from office, with 
or without cause, and one or more ne~ directors may be elected. by a vote 
of stockholders holding a majority of the outstanding shares then entitled 
to vote at an election of directors. The holders of the corporation IS 
Stated Value Preferred Stock being entitled to elec~ one (1) director by 
the provisions of the Articles of Incorporation. the provisions of this 
Section 4.6 shall apply, in respect to the removal of the director so 
elected, to the vote of the holders of the outstanding shares of-Stated 
Value Preferred Stock and not to the vote of the outstanding shares'as a 
whole. (Idaho Code Section 30-39.) 
Section 4-.7 Meetings. 
(a) Annual Meetings. The annual meeting of the Board of 
Directors shall be- held imm~diately after the annual meeting of 
stockholders and at the place where such meeting is held. No notice of 
an annual meeting of the_Board of Directors shall be necessary; and such 
meeting shall be held for the purpose of electing officers and transacting 
such other business as may lawfully come_before it. (Idaho Code Section 
30-1-43) . 
(b) Other Meetings. Regular and special meetings of the 
Board of Directors, or of any committee designated by the Board. may be 
held at any place within or without the State of Idaho (Idaho Code 
Section 30-1-43). 
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(c) Telephone Meetings. Any membe.r of the Board of 
Directors~ or of any committee thereof" may participate in a meeting by 
means of conference telephone or similar communications equipment by means 
of which all persons participating in the meeting can hear each other at 
the same time; and participation in a meeting by such means shall 
constitute presence in person at such meeting. (Idaho 'Code 30-1-43). 
(d) Notice of Meetings. Notice of the time and place of any' 
regular or special meeting of the Board of Directors shall be given at 
least three (3) days previously thereto by written notice delivered 
personally or mailed to each director at his business address, or by 
telegram; provided that the Board of Directors may provide, by 
rescitution, the time and' place, either within or without the State of 
Idaho, for the holding of regular meetings without notice other than such 
resolu~ion. Any director may waive notice of any meeting, in writing, at 
any time before or after the meeting. The attendance of a director at a 
meeting shall constitute a waiver of notice of such meeting, except where 
a director attends a meeting for the express purpose of objecting to the 
transaction' of any business because the meeting is not lawfully called or 
convened. Neither the business to be transacted at, nor the purpose of, 
any regular Dr special meeting of the Board of Directors need be specified 
in the notice or waiver of notice of such meeting. (Idaho Code Section 
30-1-43). 
(e) Waiver of Notice; Consent. The transaction of all 
·business at any meeting of the Board of Directors, or. any committee 
thereof, however called or noticed, or wherever held" shall be as valid 
as though taken at a meeting duly held after regular call and notice, if 
a quorum is present and if, either before or 'after the meeting, each of 
the directors not present signs a written waiver of notice, or a consent 
to ho 1ding such meeting, or an approval of the minut~s thereof. All such 
waivers, consents or approvals shall be filed with the corporate records 
or made a part of the minutes of the meeting. (Idaho Code Section 30-1-
43, 30-1-144). 
Section 4.8 Quorum'and Voting. 
(a) Quorum. A majority of the number of directors fixed by 
or in the manner prOVided in Section 4.1 shall constitute' a quorum for the 
transaction of business at any meeting of the Board of Directors. If less 
than such majority is present at any meeting, a majority of the directors 
present may adjourn the meeting from time to time until the time fixed for 
the next regular meeting of the Board of .Directo!s, without further notice 
other than by announcement at the meeting. (Idaho Code Section 39-1-40). 
(b) Majority Vote. At each meeting of the Board of Directors 
at which a quorum is present, all questions and business shall be 
determined by a vote of a majority of the directors present; and the act 
of the majority of the directors present shall be the act of the Board of 
Directors, unless a different vote is required by law; the Articles of 
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Incorporation or these Bylaws. (Idaho Code Section 30-1-40). 
(c) PreSumption of Assent. A director of the corporation who 
is present at a meeting of the Board of Directors. (or any committee 
thereof) at which action on any corporate matter is taken shall be 
presumed to have assented to the action taken unless his dissent shall be 
entered in the minutes of the meeting or unless he shall file his written 
dissent to such action with the person acting as the secretary of the 
meeting before the adjournment thereof or shall forward such dissent by 
registered mail to the secretary of the corporation within three (3) days 
after the adjournment of the meeting. Such right to dissent shall not 
apply to a direc·tor who voted in favor of such action. (Idaho Code 
Section 30-1-35). 
Section 4.9 Action Without a Meeting. Unless otherwise restricted 
by the Articles of Incorporation or these Bylaws, any action required or 
permitted to be taken at any meetihg' of the Board of Directors or of any 
committee thereof may be taken without a meeting. if a consent in writing, 
setting forth the action so takeri is signed by all members of the Board 
of Directors or of the committee, as the case may be. (Idaho Code Section 
30-1-44) . 
Section 4.10 Fees and Compensation. By resolution of the Board of 
Directors, a fixed fee or ~!ilary payable in cash or the corporation IS 
stock or any combination t-liereof. with or without expenses or attendance, 
may be allowed for serving on the Board of Directors and I or. attendance at 
each meeting of the Board a£". Directors and at each meeting of any 
commi ttee of the Board of Dire~tors. Noting herein contained shall be 
construed to preclude any director from serving the corporation in any 
other capacity as an officer, agent, consultant, employee, or otherwise 
and receiving compensation therefor. (Idaho Code-Section 30-1-35), 
Section 4.11 Performance of Duties. A director shall perform his 
duties as director, including his duties as a member of any committee of 
the Board of Directors on which he may serve, in good faith, in a manner 
he reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the corporation, and 
with such care as an ordinarily prudent person in a like position would 
use 'under similar, circunistanc~s" In performing -his duties, a direct~r 
shall be entitled to rely on information, opinions, reports or statements, 
including financial statements ann other financial data, in each casc 
prepared or presented.by: 
Ca) One (1) or more officers or employees of the corporation 
whom the director reasonably believes to be reliable and competent 
in the matters' presented; 
(b) Counsel, public accountants or othe~ persons as to 
matters which the director reasonably believes to be within such 
. persons' professional or expert competence; or 
(c) A committee of the Board upon which he does not serve, 
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duly designated in accordance with a prOV1S10n of the Articles of 
'Incorporation or the Bylaws, as to matters within its designated 
authority,. which committee the director reasonably b~lieves to merit 
confidence; but he shall not be considered to be acting in good 
faith if he has knowledge concerning the matter in question that 
would cause such reliance to be unwarranted. 
A person who so performs his duties shall have no liability by reason of 
being or having been a director of the corporation. (Idaho Code Sections 
30-1-35, 30-1-42). 
Section 4.12 Committees. 
(a) Executive Committee. The Board of Directors may, by 
resolution adopted by a majority of the full Board of Directors, appoint 
an Executive Committee to consist of one (1) or more members of the Board 
of Directors. The Exe~utive Committee, to the extent permitted by law and 
specifically granted. hy the Board of Directors. shall have and may 
exercise when the Board of Directors is not in session all powers and 
authority of the Board of Directors in the management of the business and 
affairs of the corporation, except such committee shall not have the power 
or authority to (i) declare dividends or distributions, (ii) approve or 
recommend to stockholders actions or proposals' required by the Idaho 
Business Corporation Act to be approved by stockholders, (iii) designate 
candidates for the office 6f:director, for purposes of proxy solicitation 
or otherwise, or fill vacancies on the Board of Directors or any committee 
. thereof, (i v) amend the By laws, (v) approve a plan of merger not requiring 
stockholder approval, (vi) reduce earned or .capital surplus, (vii) 
authorize or approve the reacquisition of shares unless pursuant to a 
general formula or method specified by the Board of Directors, or (viii) 
authorize or approve the issuance or sale of, or ny contract to issue or 
sell, shares or designate the terms of a series of a class of shares, 
provided that the Board of Directors, having ·acted regarding general 
authorization for the issuance or 'sale of shares, or any contract 
therefor, and, in the case of a series, the designation thereof, may, 
pursuant to a general formula or method specif ied by the Board by' 
resolution or by adoption of a stock option or other plan, authorized a 
committee to fix the terms of any contract for the sale of the shares and 
to fix the terms upon which such' shares may be issued or sold, including, 
without limitation, the price, the ,dividend rate~ prov1s10ns for 
redemption, sinking fund, cc;mversion, voting or preferential rights" and 
provisions for other features of a.class of shares,-or a series ofa class 
of shares, with full power in such committee 'to' adopt any final resolution 
setting·forth all the terms thereof and to authorize the statement of the 
terms of a series for filing with the Secretary cif State under.the Idaho 
Business Corporation Act. (Idaho Code Section 30-1-42). 
(b) Other Conmitte.es. The Board of Directors may, by 
resolution adopted by a majority of the full Board of Directors, from time 
to time appoint such other committees as may be permitted by law. Such 
other committees appOinted by the Board of Directors shall consist of one 
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(1) or more members of the Board of Directors, and shall have such powers 
and perform such duties as may be prescribed by the resolution or 
resolutions creating such committees; but in no event shall such committee 
have the powers denied to the Executive Committee in Section 4.12(a). 
(Idaho Code Section 30-1-42). 
(c) Terms. The members of all committees of the Board of 
Directors shall· serve at the pleasure of the Board of Directors. The 
Board of Directors, subject to the provisions of subsections (a) or (b) 
of this Section 4.12, may at any time increase or decrease the number of 
members of a committee or terminate the existence of a committee. The 
membership of a committee member shall terminate on the date of his death 
or voluntary resignation. Any committee member may resign at any time by 
giving written notice to the presldent or secretary of the corporation. 
The Board of Directors may at any time for any reason, with or without 
cause, remove any individual committee member; and the Board of Directors 
may fill any committee vacancy created by death, resignation, removal or 
increase in the number of members of the committee. The Board of 
Directors may designate one or more directors as alternate members of any 
committee~ who may .replace any absent or disqualified member at any 
meeting of the committee; and, in addition, in the absence or 
disqualification of any member of a committee, the member or members 
thereof present at any meeting and not disqualified from voting,'whether 
or not he or they constitute a quorum, may unanimously appoint another 
member of the Board of Di--tef'tors to 'act at the meeting in place of any 
such absent or disqualified member . 
. 
(d) Meetings. Unless the Board of Directors shall otherwise 
provide, regular meetings of the Executive Committee or any other 
committee appointed pursuant to this Section 4.12 shall be held at such 
times and places as are determined by the Board of Directors, or by any 
such committee; and when notice. thereof has been g-iven to each member of 
such committee, no further notice of such regular meetings need be given 
thereafter. Special meetings of any such committee may be held at any 
place which has been designated from time to time by resolution of such 
committee or by written consent of all members thereof, and may be called 
by any director who is a member of such committee, upon written notice to 
the members of such committee of the time and place of 'such special 
meeting given in the manner provided for the giving of written notice to 
members of, the Board of Directors of the time and place of special 
meetings of the Board of Directors; proyided that notice of a special 
meeting need not state the business proposed to be transacted at the 
meeting. Notice of any special meeting of any committee may be waived in 
writing at any time before or after the meeting and wi~l be waived by any 
director by attendance thereat, except when the director attends such 
special meeting for the express purpose of objecting, at-the, beginning of 
the meeting, to the transaction of any business because the meeting is not 
lawfully called or convened. Each committee shall elect a presiding 
officer from its members and may fix its own rules of procedure which 
shall not be inconsistent with these Bylaws. It shall keep regular 
minutes of its proceedings and report them to the Board of Directors for 
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its information at the meeting thereof held next after the proceedings 
shall have been taken. A majority of the authorized number of members of 
any such committee shall constitute a quorum for the transaction of 
business; and the act of a majority of those present at any meeting at 
which a quorum is present shall be the act of such committee. 
(e) Responsibility. Neither the designation of an Executive 
Committee or other committee. the delegation thereto of authority, nor 
action by such committee shall relieve the Board of Directors> or any 
member thereof, of any responsibility or duty imposed by law. 
Section 4.13 Organization.. At every meeting of the Board of 
Directors, the Chairman of the Board of Directors, or, if a chairman has 
not been appointed or is absent, ··the president, or if the president i~ 
absent, ·the most senior vice preSident, or. in the absence of any such 
officer. a chairman of the meeting chosen by a majority of the directors 
present, shall preside over the' meeting. The secretary, or in his· 
absence. an assistant secretary directed to do so by the president shall 
act as secretary of the meeting and shall keep regular minutes of the 
proceedings of the Board of Directors. 
Section 4.14 Director Conflicts of Interest. No contract or other 
transaction between the corporation and one or more of its directors or 
any other corporation, firm. association or entity in which one-or more 
of its directors are direc~ts or officers or are financially interested. 
shall be either void or voidable b.ecause of such relationship or interest 
or because ·such director or directors are present at the meeting· of the 
Board of Directors or a committee thereof which authorizes, approves or 
ratifies such contract or transaction or because his or their votes are 
counted for such purposes, if: 
(a) the fact of such relationship or interest is disclosed 
or known to the Board of Directors or committee which authorizes, approves 
.or ratifies the contract or transaction by a vote or consent sufficient 
for the purpose without counting the votes or consents of such interested 
directors; or 
(b) the fact of such relationship or interest is disclosed 
or known to the shareholders entitled to vote and they authorize, approve 
or ratify such contract or transaction by vote or written consent, in 
which vote or consent such interested directors may participate to the 
extent that they are also shareholders; or 
(c) the contract or transaction is fair .and reasonable to the 
corporation and the fact of such relationship or interest is fully and 
fairly disclosed or known to the corporation. 
Common or interested directors may be counted in determining the 
presence of a quorum at a meeting of the Board of Directors or a committee 
thereof which autorizes, approves or ratifies such contract or 
transaction. 
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ARTICLE V 
OFFICERS 
Section 5.1 Officers Designated. The officers of the corporation 
consist of. a president, one or more vice presidents (the number thereof 
to be determined by the Board of Directors), a secretary, and a treasurer ~ 
each of whom shall be elected by the Board of Directors.. The order of 
seniority of vice presidents shall be the order of their nomination,· 
unless otherwise determined by .the Boared 'of Directors. Such other 
officers and assistant officers as may be deemed necessary may be elected 
or appointed by the Board of Directors. Any two or more offices may be 
held by the same person, except the offices of president and secretary. 
(Idaho Code Section 30-1-50). . 
Section 5.2 Tenure and Duties of Officers. 
(a) Term of Office. All officers shall hold office at the 
pleasure of the Board of Directors and until their successors shall have 
been duly elected and qualified, or until their 'resignation or removal. 
If the office of any officer becomes v'acant for any reqson, the vacancy 
may be filled by the Board .of Directors. (Idaho Code·Section 30-1-50). 
(b) The Pres..ufent. The president shall be the principal 
executive officer of the corporation and, subject to the control of the 
Board of Directors, shall in general supervise and control all. of the 
business and affairs 70f the corporation .. He shall, when present, preside 
at all meetings of the stockholders and of the Board of Directors. He may 
sign. with the secretary or any other proper officer of the corporation 
thereunder authorized by the Board of Directors, certificates for shares 
.of th~ corporation, any deeds, mortgages, bonds,' contracts, or other 
instruments which the Board of Directors has authorized to be executed, 
except in cases where the signing and execution thereof shall be expressly 
delegated by the Board of Directors or by these Bylaws to some other 
officer or agent of the corporation, or shall be required by law to be 
otherwise signed or executed; and in general the president shall perform 
all duties commonly incident·to the office of president and such other 
. duties as maybe prescribed by the Board of Directors from time to time. 
(c) The Vice President. In the absence of the president or 
in the event of his death, inability or refusal to act. the vice president 
(or in the event there is more than one vice president, the vice 
presidents in the order designated at the time of their election, or in 
the absence of any designation, then in the order of their election) shall 
perform the duties· of the president and. when so acting, shall hae all the 
powers of and be subject to all the restrictions upon the president. 'Any 
vice president may sign. with ~~e secretary or an assistant secretary, 
certificates .for shares of the corporation; and the vice president shall 
perform other duties commonly incdent to the office of vice president and 
such other duties as from time to time may be assigned to him by the 
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president or by the Board of Directors. 
(d) The Secretary. The secretary shall: (a) attend all 
meetings and keep the minutes of- the proceedings of the stockholders and 
of the Board of Directors in one or more books provided for that purpose; 
(b) see that all notices are duly given in accordance with the provisions 
of these Bylaws or as required by law; (c) be custodian of the corporate 
records and of the seal of the corporation and see that the seal of the 
corporation is affixed to all documents the execution ~f which on behalf 
of the corporation under its seal is duly authorized; (d) keep a register 
of the post office address of each sbareholder which shall be furnished 
to the secretary by such shareholder; (e) sign, with the president, or a 
vice president, certificates for shares of the corporation, issuance of 
which shall have been authorized by resolution of the Board of Directors; 
(f) have general charge of the. stock transfer books of the corporation; 
and (g) in general perform all duties commonly incident to the office of 
secretary and such other duties as from time to time may be assigned to 
him by the president or by the Board of Directors. 
(e) The: Treasurer. The treasurer shall: (a) h~ve charge and 
custody of and be responsible for all funds and securities of the 
corporation; (b) receive and give receipts for monies·tlue and payable to 
the corporation from any source whatsoever, and deposit all such monies 
in the name of the corporation in such banks, trust companies or other 
depositories as shall be .se~ected in accordance with the provisions of 
Article VI of these Bylaws; and (c) in .general perform all of the duties 
commonly incident to the office of t~easurer and such other duties as from 
time to time maybe assigned to hi~ by the president or by the Board of 
D.irectors. If required by the Board of Directors, the treasurer shall 
give a bond for the faithful discharge of his duties in such sum and with 
such surety or sureties as the Board of Directors shall det.e~ine. 
(f) Assistant Secretaries and Assistant Treasurers. The 
assistant secretaries, when authorized by the Board of Directors, may sign 
with the president or a vice president certificates for shares of the 
corporation the issuance of which shall have been authorized by a 
resolution of the Board of Directors. The assistant treasurers shall 
respectively, if required by the Board of Directors, give bonds for the 
faithful discharge of their duties in such sums and with such sureties as 
the Board of Directors shall determine: The assist.ant secretaries apd 
assistant treasurers, in general shall perform such duties as shall be 
assigned to them by the secretary or the treasurer, or by the president 
or the Board of Directors. 
Section 5.3 ResiJmCi.tions. Any officer may resign at any time by 
giving written notice to the Board of Directors or to the president or to 
the secretary. Any such resignation shall be effective when received by 
.the person o'r persons to whom such notice is given, unless a later time 
is specified therein, in which event the resignation shall become 
effective at such later time. Unless otherwise specified in such notice, 
the acceptance of any such resignation shall not be necessary to make it 
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Section 5.4 Removal. Any officer or agent may be temoved by the 
,Board of Directors whenever, in its judgment, the best interests of the 
corporation will be served thereby; but such removal shall be without 
prejudice to the contract rights, if any, of the person so removed. 
Election or appointment of an officer or agent shall not of itself create 
contract rights. (Idaho Code Section 30-1-51). 
Section 5.5 Compensation. The compensation of the officers shall 
be fixed from time to time by the Board of Directo~s. No officer shall 
be prevented from receiving such compensation by reason of the fact that 
such officer is also a director of the corporation. 
ARTICI.K VI 
EXECUTION OF CORPoRATE INSTRUMENTS AND 
VOTING OF SECURITIES OWNED BY THE CORPORATION 
Section 6.1 Execution of Corporate Instruments. The Board of 
Directors may, in its discretion. determine the method and designate·the 
signatory officer or officers, or' other person or persons, to execute on 
behalf of the corporation any corporate instrument or document, or to sign 
on beha1f·of the corporation the corporate name without limitation, or to 
enter into contracts on beKaif of the corporation. except wher.e otherwise 
provided by law or these Bylaws; and such execution or signature shall be 
binding upon the corporation. Authorization granted to any person 
hereunder may be general or confined to specific instances • 
. Unless otherwise specifically determined by the Board of Directors 
or otherwise required by law, promissory notes, deeds of trust, mortgages 
and other evidences of indebtedness of the corporation, and certificates 
of shares of stock owned· by the corporation,· shall be executed, signed or 
endorsed by the president or any vice president., and by the secretary or 
treasurer or any assistant secretary or assistant treasurer. All other 
instruments and documents requiring the corporate signature may be 
executed as aforesaid or in such manner as may be directed by th.e Board 
of Directors. 
Section 6.2 Loans. No.loan shall be cOh.tracted on behalf of the 
corporation and no evidence of indebtedness shall be issued in its name 
unless authorized by resolution of the Board of Directors. Such 
authorization may be general or confined to specific instances. 
Section 6.3 . Deposits and Checks. All funds of the corporation not 
otherwise employed shall. be deposited from time to time to the credit of 
the corporation in such banks, trust companies or other depositories as 
the Board of Directors may select. All checks and drafts drawn on banks 
or other depositaries on funds to the credit of the corporation or in 
special accounts of the corporation shall be signed by 'such person or 
persons as the Board of Directors shall authorize to. do so. Such 
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authorization may be general or confined to specific instances. 
Section 6.4 Voting of Securities Owned by the Corporation. All 
stock and other securities of other corporations own~d or held by the 
corporation for itself, or for other parties in any capacity, shall be 
voted, and all proxies .with respect thereto shall be executed, by the 
person authorized to do so by resolution of the Board of Directors, or, 
in the absence of such authorization, by the president or any vice 
president. 
ARTICLE VII 
SHARES OF STOCK 
Section 7.1 Foun and Execution of Certificates.· Certificates 
representing shares of the corpor~tion shall be in such form as shall be 
determined by the Board of Directors. Such certificates shall be signed 
by the president or a vice president and by the .secretary or an assistant 
secretary and may be sealed with the corporate seal or a facsimile 
. thereof. The signatures of such officers upon' a certificate may be 
facsimiles.if the certificate is manually signed on behalf. of a transfer 
agent or a registrar, other than.! the corporation itself or one of its 
employees. In case any officer, transfer agent, or registrar who has 
signed or whose facsimile signature has been placed upon a certificate 
shall have ceased to be suth- officer, transfer agent or registrar before 
such certificate is issued, it may' be issued by the corporation with the 
same effect as if he were such officer transfer agent or registrar at the 
date of issue. (Idaho Code Section 30-1-23). 
Section 7.2 Lost Certificates. The corporation may issue a new 
certificate of stock in place of any certificate theretofore issued by the 
corporation alleged to have been lost, stolen, destroyed or mutilated; and 
the corporation may require the owner of such lost,' stolen, destroyed or 
mutilated' certificate, or his legal representative, to give the 
corporation a bond sufficient to indemnify it against any claim that may 
be made against the corporation on account of the alleged loss, theft, 
destruction or mutilation of any such certificate or the issuance of such 
. new certificate. 
Section '7.3 Transfers. Each certificte for shares shall be 
consecutively numbered or otherwise identified,. The name:and address of 
the person to whom the shares represented thereby are issued, with the 
number of . shares and date of issue. shall be entered on the stock transfer 
books of the corporation. All certificates surrendered to the corporation 
for transfer shall be cancelled; and, except as.provided in Section 7.2, 
no new certificate shall be issued until the former certificate for a like 
number of shares shall have been surrendered and cancelled. Transfer of 
record shares of stock of the corporation shall be made only on the stock 
transfer books of the corporation by the holder of record thereof Or by 
his legal representative, who shall furnish proper evidence of authorfty 
to transfer, or by his attorney thereunto authorized by power of attorney 
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duly executed and filed with the secretary of the corporation. and on 
surrender for cancellation of a properly endorsed certificate or 
certificates for a like number of shares. 
Section 7.4 Fixing Record Dates. In order that the corporation may 
determine the stockholders entitled to notice of or to vote at any meeting 
of stockholders or any adjournment thereof, or to express consent to 
corporate action in writing without a meeting, or to receive payment of 
any dividend or other distribution or allotment of any rights or to 
exercise any rights in respect of any change, conversion or exchange of 
stock or for the purpose of any other lawful action. the Board of 
Directors may provide that the stock transfer books shall be closed for 
a stated period but not to exceed. in any case, fifty (50) days. If the 
stock transfer books shall be closed for the purpose of determining 
stockholders entitled to notice of or to vote at a, meeting of 
stockholders. 'such books shall be closed for at least ten (10) days 
immediately preceding such meeting: In lieu of closing the stock transfer 
books, the Board of Directors may fix, in advance, a record date for any 
such determination of stockholders. Such record date shall be not more 
than fifty (50) days and, in the case of a meeting of stockholders. not 
less than ten (10) days prior to the date on which the particular action, 
requiring such determination ofs,tockholders, 'is to be taken. If the 
stock transfer books are not-closed and no record date is fixed: (a) the 
record date for determining stockholders entitled to notice of or to vote 
at a meeting of stockholderS~shall be'at the close of business on the day 
on which notice is mailed, or, if notice is waived, at the close of 
business pn the day next preceding the day on which the meeting is held; 
(b) the ~ecord date for determining stockholders entitled to express 
consent to corporate action in writing without a'meeting, when no prior 
action by the Board of Directors is necessary, shall be the day on which 
the first written consent -is expressed; and (cl the record date for 
determining stOCkholders for any other purpose shall be at the close of 
business on the day on which the Board of Directors adopts the resolution 
relating thereto. A determination of stockholders of record entitled to 
notice 'of or to vote at a meeting of stockholders shall apply to any 
adjournment of the meeting; provided, however, that the Board of Directors 
may fix a new record date for the adjourned meeting. (Idaho Code Section 
39-1-30)'. 
Section 7.5 Registered Stockholders. The corporation shall be 
entitled to recognize the exclusive right of a person registered in its 
books as the owner of shares to receive dividends and to vote as such 
owner, and shall not be bound to recognize any equitable or other claim 
to or interest in such share or shares on the part of any other person 
whether or not it shall have express or other notice thereof. eXcept' as 
~therwise provided by the laws of Idaho. 
Secti<m 7. 6 Issuance,. Transfer and Registration of Shares. The, 
Board of Directors may make such rules and regulations, not inconsistent 
with law or with these Bylaws, as it may deem advisable concerning the 
issuance, transfer and registration of certificates for shares of the 
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capital stock of the corporation. The Board of Directors may appoint a 
transfer agent or registrar of transfers or both; and may require all 
certificates for shares of the corporation to bear the signature of either 
or both. 
ARTICLE VIII 
OTHKR. SEClJRITIKS OF TIi:K CORPORATION 
Section 8.1 Execution of Other Securities. All bonds, debentures 
and other corporate securities· of the corporation, other than stock 
certificates, may be signed by the president or any vice president, or 
sucn other person as may be authori~ed by the Board of Directors; and the 
corporate seal may be impressed· thereon or a facsimile of such seal 
imprinted thereon and attested by the signature of the secretary or an 
assistant secretary; provided, however, that where any such bond, 
debenture or other corporate security shall be.authenticated by the manual 
signature of a trustee under an ind,enture pursuant to which such bond. 
d~benture or other corporate security shall be issued, the signatures of 
the persons signing and attesting the corporate seal on such bond, 
debenture or other corporate security may be the imprint facsimile of the 
signature of such persons. Interest COUp1::ms . appertaining to any such 
bond, debenture or other corporate security, authenticated by a trustee 
as aforesaid, shall be signed by the treasurer or an assistant treasurer 
of the corporation. or such~iher person as may be authorized by·the Board 
of Directors, or be imprinted thereon the facsimile signature of such 
person. In case any off~cer who shall have signed or attested any bond, 
debenture or other corporate security, or whose.facsimile signature shall 
appear thereon or on any such interest coupon, shall have ceased to be 
such officer before the bond, debenture or other· corporate security so 
signed or attested shall have been delivered, such bond, debenture or 
other corporate security nevertheless may be adopted by the corporation 
and issued and delivered as though the person who signed the same or whose 
facsimile signture shall have been used thereon had not ceased to be such 
officer of the corporation. 
ARTICLE IX 
DIVIDENDS 
Section 9.1 Declaration and Payment of Dividends • Dividends upon 
the capital stock. of the corporation, subject to the provisions of the 
Articles of Incorporation. if any.. may be declared . by the Board of 
Directors pursuant to law at any regular or special meeting. Dividends 
may be paid by the corporation in cash. in property~ or in shares of its 
capital stock, subject to the provisions of the Articles of Incorporation. 
(Idaho Code Section 30-1-45). 
Section 9.2 Dividend Reserve. Before payment of any dividend, 
there may be set aside out of any funds of the corporation available for 
dividends such sum or sums as the Board of Directors may from time. to 
NEW RESTATED BYLAWS OF 
AlA SERVICES CORPORATION - P. 18 
AFFIDAVIT OF RODERICK C. BOND 
AIA000979 
, . 
. . : 
time, in its absolute discretion, think proper as a reserve or reserves 
to meet.contingencies, or for equalizing dividends, or for repairing or 
maintaining any property of the corporation, or for such other purpose as' 
the Board of Directors shall thirik conducive to the interests of the 
corporation; and the Board of Directors may modify or abolish any such 
reserve in the manner in which is was created . 
.ARTICLE XI 
INDEMNIFICATION OF DIRECTORS, OFFICERS t 
EMPLOYEES AND 0'l'BER .AGENTS 
Section 11.1 Directors and Executive Officers The corporation 
shall indemnify the directors and executive officers of the corporation 
or another .enterprise to ·the full extent permitted by the Idaho Business 
Corporation' Act, as the same exis~s or may hereafter be amended (but. in 
the case of any such amendment, only to the extent that such amendment 
permits the corporation to provide broader indemnification rights than 
siad Act permitted the corporation to provide prior to such amendment); 
provided. however, that the corporation may limit the exte.nt of' such 
indemnification by individual contracts with its directors and executive 
officers; and provided. further, that the corporation shall not be 
required to indemnify any director or executive officer in connection with 
any proceeding (or part ...... tilereof) initiated by such person or any 
proceeding by such person against the corporation or its directors, 
officers, employees or other agents unless (a) such indemnif~cation is 
expressly required to be made by la~; (b) the. proceeding was authorized 
by the Board of Directors of the corporation or (c) such indemnification 
is provi~ed by the corporation under the Idaho Business Corporation Act. 
(Idaho Code Section 30-1-S(a),(b». 
Section 11.2 Other Officers! Employees and Agents. The corporation 
shall have the power to indemnify other officers ~ employees and other 
agents of the corporation or another enterprise as set forth in the Idaho 
Business Corporation Act. (Idaho Code Section 30-1-S(a), (b». 
Section 11.3 Good Faith. For purposes of any determination under 
this Bylaw, a director, officer. employee or other agent of the 
corporation or another enterprise shall be deemed to have acted in good 
.faith and in a manner he reasonably believed to be· in or not opposed to 
the best interests of the corporation, and, with respect to any criminal 
action or proceeding. to have had no reasonable cause to believe that his 
conduct was unlawful, if his action is based on the records or books of 
account of the corporation or another enterprise, or on information 
supplied or reports made to him by the officers of the corporation or 
another enterprise in the course of their duties, or on the advice of 
. legal counsel for the corporation or another enterprise or on information 
or records given or reports made to the corporation or another enterprise 
by an independent certified publiC accountant or by an appraiser or other 
expert selected with reasonable care by the corporation or another 
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enterprise. The provisions of this Section 11.3 shall not be deemed to 
be exclusive and/or to . limit in any way the circumstances in which a 
person may be deemed to have met the applicable standard of conduct set 
forth by the Idaho Business Corporation Act. (Idaho Code Sections 30-1-
S(a),(b); 30-1-35). 
Section 11.4 Another Enterprise. The term' "another enterprise ll as 
used in this Article XI shall' mean any other corporation, partnership. 
joint venture, trust or other enterprise, including any employee. benefit 
plan.. or which a person is or was serving at the request of the 
corporation as a director, officer, employee or other agent. (Idaho Code 
Section 30-I-5(a),(b)). 
Section 11.5 Expenses. The corporation shall advance .. prior to the 
final disposition of any proceeding, promptly following request therefor. 
all expenses incurred by any director.. officer, or e1)lployee or other agent 
of the corporation or another 'enterprise in connection with such 
proceeding upon receipt of an undertaking by or on behalf of such person 
to repay said amount if it should be determined ultimately that such 
person is not entitled to be indemnified under this Article XI or 
otherwise. (Idaho Code Section 30-I-S(e)). 
Notwithstanding the foregoing, unless otherwise determined pursuant 
to Section 11.6, no advance shall be made by the corporation if a 
determination is reasona1:tl:fand promptly made (a) by the Board of 
Directors by a majority vote of a quorum consisting of directors who.were 
not parties to the proceeding, or (b) if such quorum is not obtainable or, 
even if obtainable, a quorum of disinterested.directors so directs, by 
independent iegal counsel in a written opinion that, based upon the facts 
known to the decision-making party at the time such determination is made, 
such person acted in bad faith or in a manner that such person did not 
believe to be in or not opposed to the best interests of the corporation, 
or, with respect to any criminal proceeding, such person believed or had 
reasonable cause to believe that his conduct was unlawful. (Idaho Code 
Section 3D-I-Sed)). 
Section 11.6 Enforcement. Without the necessity of entering into 
a~ express. contract, all rights to indemnification and advances under this 
Article XI shall be deemed to.be contractual rights and to be effective 
to the same extent and as if provided for in a contract betwe.en the 
corporation and the perso~ who serves as a director, officer, employee or 
other agent of the corporation or another enterprise at any time while 
this Article XI and relevant provisions of the Idaho Business Corporation 
Act and other applicable law. if any, are in efefct. Any right 'to 
indemnification or advances granted by this Article XI to any person shall 
be enforceable by or on behalf of the person holding such right in any 
court of competent jurisdiction if (a) the claim for indemnification or 
advances is denied,' in whole or in part, or (b) nO'disposition of such 
claim is made within ninety (90) days of request therefor. The c;taimant . 
in such enforcement action, if successful in whole or in part, shall be 
entitled to be paid also the expense'of prosecuting his claim. It shall 
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be a defense tOo any such action that the claimant has not met the 
standards of conduct which make it permissible under the Idaho Bus·iness 
Corporation Act for the corporation > to indemnify the claimant for the 
amount· claimed; but the burden of proving such defense shal.! be on the 
corporation. Neither the failure of the corporation (including its Board 
of Directors, independent legal counselor its stockholders) to. have made 
a determination prior> to the commencement of such action that 
indemnification of the claimant is proper in the circumstances because he 
has. met the applicable standard of conduct set forth in the Idaho Business 
Corporation Act, nor an actual determination by the corporation (including 
its Board of· Directors. independent legal counselor i tsstockholders) 
that the claimant has not met such applicable standard of conduct, shall 
be a defense to the action or create a presumption that claimant has not 
met the applicabe standard of conduct. 
Section 11. 7 Non-exclusivitv of rights. The rights conferred on 
any person by this Article XI shall not be exclusive of any other right 
to which such person may now or hereafter ~e entitled under any statute, 
provision of the .Articles of Incorporation, >or Bylaws, agreement, vote of 
stockholders or disinterested directors or otherwise, both as to action 
in :his official capacity and as to action in another capacity while 
holding office. -The corporation is specifically authorized to enter into 
individu~l contracts with any or all directors, officers, employees or 
other agents of the corporation or another enterprise respecting 
indemnification and advancl'!§~· as prOVided by law. (Idaho Code Section 30-
I-S(f». . > 
Section 11.8· Survival of rights. The rights conferred on any 
person by this Article XI shall continue as to a person who has ceased to 
be a director, officer. employee or other agent of the corporat"ion or 
another enterprise and shall inure to the benefit of the heirs, executors 
and administrators such a person. (Idaho Code Section 30-1-5(i». 
Section 11.9 Amendments. Any repeal or modification of this 
Article XI shall only be prospective and shall not affect the rights under 
this Article XI in effect at the t~e of the alleged occurrence of any 
action or omission to act that is the cause of any proceeding against any 
agent of the corporation or another enterprise. 
Section 11.10 Savings Clause. If this Article XI of the Bylaws or 
any portion hereof shall be invalidated on any ground by any court of 
competent jurisdiction, then the corporation shall nevertheless indemnify 
each agent to the full extent permitted by any applicable portion of this 
Article XI that shall not have been invalidated, or by any other 
applicable law. 
ARTICLE XII 
NOTICES 
Section 12.1 Notice to StoCkholders. Whenever under > any provision 
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of these Bylaws notice is required to be given to any stockholder, it 
shall be given in writing, timely and duly deposited in the United States 
mail,· postage prepaid. and addressed to his last known post office address 
as shown by the stock transfer books of the corporation or its transfer 
agent -or to such other last known address of which the corporation may 
have notice. Such notice to any stockholder shall be deemed to be 
delivered when deposited in the United States mail in accordance with this 
Section 12.1. (Idaho Code Section 30-1-29). 
Section 12.2 Notice to Directors. Any notice required to be given 
to any.director may be given by'the method stated in Section 12.1, or by 
telegram except that such notice other than one which is delivered 
personally shall be .sent to such address as such director shall have filed 
in writing with the secretary, or;-in the absence' of such filing, to the 
last known post office address of such director. (Idaho Code Section 30-
1-43). 
Section 12.3 Address Unknown. If no .address of a stockholder or 
director be known, notice may be sent to the office of the corporation 
required to be maintained pursuant to Section 1.1 hereof . 
.. Section 12.4 Affidavit of Hailing. An affidavit of mailing, 
executed by a duly authorized and competent employee of the corporation 
or its transfer: agent appointed with resp~ct to the class of stock 
affected, specifying' the na:nle and address or the names and addresses ot 
the stockholder or stockholders, or director of directors, to whom any 
such notice or notices was or ~ere given, and the time and method of 
giving the same, shall be conclusive evidence of the statements therein 
contained. 
- Section 12.5 Time Notices Deemed Given. All notices given by mail, 
as above provided, shall be deemed .tohave been given at the time of 
mailing; and all notices given by telegram shall be deemed to have been 
given at the sending time recorded by the telegraph company transmitting 
the notices. 
Section 12.6 Methods of Notice. The period or limitation of time 
within which any stockholder may exer·cise any option or right, or enjoy 
any privilege or benefit, or be required to act, or within which any 
director may exercise any power or right, or enjoy any privilege, pursuant 
to any notice sent him in the manner abov~ provided, shall not be affected 
or extended in any manner by the failure of such stockholder or such 
director to receive such notice. 
Section 12.7 Failure to Receive Notice. The period or limitation 
of time within which any stockholder may exercise any option or right. or 
enjoy any privilege or benefit, or be required to act, or within which any 
director may exercise any power or right. or enjoy any privilege, pursuant 
to ~my notice sent him in the manner above provided, shall not be affected 
or . eXtended in any manner by the failure of such stockholder or such 
director to receive such notice. 
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Section 12.8 Notice to Person with 'Whom Communication is Unlawful. 
Whenever notice is required to be given, under any provision of law or of 
the Articles of Incorporation or Bylaws of the corporation, to any person 
with whom communication is unlawful, the giving of such notice to such 
person shall not be required and there shall be no duty to apply to any 
governmental authority or agency for a license or permit to give such 
notice to such person. Any action or meeting which shall be taken or held" 
without" notice to any such person with whom communication is unlawful 
shall have the same force and effect as if such notice had been duly 
given. In the event that the action taken by the corporation is such as 
to require the filing of a certificate under any provision of the Idaho 
BuSiness Corporation Act, the certificate shall state, if such is the fact 
and if notice is required, that notice was given to all persons entitled 
to receive notice except such persons with whom communications is 
unlawful. 
Section 12.9 Waiver of Notice. Whenever any notice is required to 
be given to any stockholder or director of the corporation under the 
provisions of these Bylaws or under the provisions of the Articles of 
Incorporation or under the provisions of the ~daho Business Corporation, 
a waiver thereof in writing signed by the person or persons entitled-to 
such notice, whether before or after the time stated therein, shall be 
deemed equivalent to the giving of such notice. (Idaho Code Section 30-
1-144) . _;r~" 
ARTICLE XIII 
Section 13.1 Amendments." These Bylaws may be altered, amended-or 
repealed and new Bylaws may be adopted by the Board of Directors or by the 
stockholders at any regular or special meeting. 
ARTICLE XIV 
LOANS TO DIRECTORS AND OTHERS 
Section 14.1 Certain Corporate Loans and Guaranties. The 
corporation may make loans of IDoney or property to, or guarantee the 
obligations of, or otherwise use "its credit to assist any officer or other 
employee of the corporation, its "parent or a subsidiary, including any 
such person who is also a director of the corporation or its parent or any 
subsidiary. or adopt any employee benefit plan or plans authorizing such 
loan, guaranties or other assistance, upon the approval of the Board of 
Directors alone if the Board of Directors determines that such a loan or 
guaranty or plan may reasonably be expected to benefit the corporation. 
In all other circumstances. the corporation shall not lend money or USe 
its credit to assist its directors without authorization in the particular 
" case by its stockholders. (Idaho Code Section 30-1-47). 
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Roderick C. Bond 
Ned A. Cannon, ISBA #2331 
SMITH, CANNON & BOND PLLC 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
508 Eighth Street 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
Telephone: (208) 743-9428 
Fax: (208) 746-8421 
Paul R. Cressman, Jr., ISBA #7563 
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F'ILED 
lXJ1 JUN 2] R1J 12. 38 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
REED 1. TAYLOR, a single person, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
AlA SERVICES CORPORATION, an 
Idaho corporation; AlA INSURANCE, INC., 
an Idaho corporation; R.JOHN TAYLOR 
and CONNIE TAYLOR, individually and 
the community property comprised thereof; 
BRYAN FREEMAN, a single person; and 
JOLEE DUCLOS, a single person, 
Defendants. 
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ERRATA SHEET FOR PLAINTIFF 
REED J. TAYLOR'S REPLY IN 
SUPPORT OF MOTION TO AMEND 
COMPLAINT, OBJECTION TO 
DEFENDANT R. JOHN TAYLOR'S 
JOINDER, REPL Y TO DEFENDANT 
CONNIE TAYLOR'S RESPONSE 
AND SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSE 
IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' 
LR.C.P. 12(b)(6) MOTION 
Plaintiff Reed Taylor submits this Errata Sheet for corrections made to his his Reply in 
Support of Motion to Amend Complaint, Objection to R. John Taylor's Joinder, Reply to 
Defendant Connie Taylor'S Response and Supplemental Response in Opposition to Defendants' 
ERRA T A SHEET - 1 ~q'-l 
ORIGI l 
I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) Motion: 
ERRATA SHEET 
Page 9: Deleted "has also been followed by Idaho District Court" after 
"contractual obligations" and inserted "involves contracts where" 
Page 10: Inserted "San Carlos Irrigation and Drainage District v. Us., 23 Cl.Ct. 
276,279-80 (U.S. Cl. Ct. 1991)(Emphasis added); see also" before 
"Minidoka" 
Page 10: Inserted "9th Cir." in place of "D. Idaho" 
Page 10: Inserted "(In a continuing obligations contract, either the U.S. repudiated 
the contract or it did not repudiate the contract and the statute of 
limitations does not bar claims for disputed years)" after "1998)" 
Page 13: Inserted "9th Cir." in place of "D. Idaho" 
Various: Inserted several "III" and hard returns after Page 10 to ensure sentences 
and headings were appropriately located. 
DATED: This 2ih day of June, 2007. 
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SMITH, CANNON & BOND PLLC 
AHLERS & CRESSMAN PLLC 
By:-r---"''---____ ........... _____ _ 
Ned A. Cannon 
Paul R. Cressman, Jr. 
Attorneys for Plaintiff Reed 1. Taylor 
Roderick C. Bond 
Ned A. Cannon, ISBA #2331 
SMITH, CANNON & BOND PLLC 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
508 Eighth Street 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
Telephone: (208) 743-9428 
Fax: (208) 746-8421 
Paul R. Cressman, Jr., ISBA #7563 
AHLERS & CRESSMAN PLLC 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
999 Third Avenue, Suite 3100 
Seattle, Washington 98104-4088 
Telephone: (206) 287-9900 
Fax: (206) 287-9902 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
REED J. TAYLOR, a single person, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
AIA SERVICES CORPORATION, an 
Idaho corporation; AIA INSURANCE, INC., 
an Idaho corporation; R. JOHN TAYLOR 
and CONNIE TAYLOR, individually and 
the community property comprised thereof; 
BRY AN FREEMAN, a single person; and 
JOLEE DUCLOS, a single person, 
Defendants. 
Case No.: CV-07-00208 
PLAINTIFF REED J. TAYLOR'S 
MOTION AND MEMORANDUM OF 
LAW TO DISSOLVE PRELIMINARY 
INJUNCTION AGAINST REED J. 
TAYLOR 
Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor ("Reed Taylor") moves the Court to dissolve the Preliminary 
Injunction previously entered against him: 
III 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION AND MEMORANDUM 
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~q~ 
ORIGI Al 
I. RELIEF REQUESTED AND EVIDENCE RELIED UPON 
Reed Taylor requests an order dissolving the preliminary injunction issued against him. 
Reed Taylor relies on this Motion and Memorandum of Law, the Affidavit of Roderick C. Bond, 
and the Court's file as evidence. 
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
On February 26, 2007, the Court granted the Defendants' Motion for a Temporary 
Restraining Order against Reed Taylor and set cash bond at $10,000. The Defendants' posted 
cash security of$10,000. See Affidavit of Roderick C. Bond, ~ 2. On March 8, 2007, the Court 
granted the Defendants' Motion for Preliminary Injunction against Reed Taylor. See Opinion 
and Order on Defendants' Motion for Preliminary Injunction, p. 7. 
On May 31, 2007, the Court denied Reed Taylor's Motion for Reconsideration, but 
increased the amount of the required bond for the preliminary injunction issued against Reed 
Taylor to $200,000. See Opinion and Order on Plaintiffs Motions for Reconsideration, 
Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order, p. 13. 
As of the morning of June 28, 2007, the Defendants have failed to post the required 
$200,000 ordered by the Court. See Affidavit of Roderick Bond, ~ 2. 
III. LEGAL AUTHORITY AND ARGUMENT 
"No restraining order or preliminary injunction shall issue except upon the giving of 
security by the applicant, in such sum as the court deems proper. .. " I.R.c.P. 65(c). 
The requirement for the posting of a bond for a preliminary injunction is mandatory. 
Valley View Farms v. Westover, 96 Idaho 615, 615, 533 P.2d 736 (1974); Hutchins v. Trombley, 
95 Idaho 360,365,509 P.2d 579 (1973). 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION AND MEMORANDUM 
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In Hutchins v. Trombley, 95 Idaho at 365, the Idaho Supreme Court specifically 
addressed the mandatory requirement of security for a preliminary injunction to be issued: 
[W]e hold that before an injunction is issued under Rule 65 the giving of security by the 
applicant for the payment of costs, damages and attorneys fees as provided in Rule 65(c) 
is mandatory, unless the trial court makes a specific finding based upon competent 
evidence that no such costs, damages or attorneys fees will result to the restrained party 
as a result of a wrongful issuing of the injunction or restraining order. Since there is no 
such finding in this case, the trial court improperly issued the order pendente lite without 
requiring security as provided for in Rule 65(c). 
Id (Emphasis in original). 
Here, the Court ordered the Defendants to post a bond in the amount of $200,000 as 
security for the preliminary injunction issued against Reed Taylor on May 31,2007. However, 
the Defendants have failed to post the required bond or cash equivalent. 
Reed Taylor is entitled to have the preliminary injunction against him dissolved and he 
should be awarded his attorneys fees and costs from the $10,000 cash bond presently held by the 
Court as provided under LR.C.P. 65(c). 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The Preliminary Injunction against Reed Taylor should be dissolved and he should be 
awarded his attorneys' fees and costs. 
DATED: This 28th day of June 2007. 
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SMITH, CANNON & BOND PLLC 
AHLERS & CRESSMAN PLLC 
Rd 'kC~J"d ~J!' o enc . rn<,~<ft;;';'" 
Ned A. Cann'on /~. 
Paul R. Cre ~, Jr. 
Attorneys or Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, Roderick C. Bond, declare that, on the date indicated below, I served a true and correct 
copy of Plaintiffs Notice of Hearing, Plaintiffs Motion and Memorandum of Law to Dissolve 
Preliminary Injunction against Reed Taylor, Affidavit of Roderick C. Bond in Support of 
Plaintiffs Motion to Dissolve Preliminary Injunction, and Proposed Order Dissolving 
Preliminary Injunction on the following party(s) via the methodes) indicated below: 
David A. Gittins 
Law Office of David A. Gittins 
P.O. Box 191 
Clarkston, W A 99403 
Attorney for Defendants Duclos and Freeman 
Michael E. McNichols 
Clements Brown & McNichols 
321 l3 th Street 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
Attorneys for Defendant R. John Taylor 
Jonathan D. Halley 
Clark & Feeney 
P.O. Box 285 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
Attorney for Defendant Connie Taylor 
Gary D. Babbitt 
D. John Ashby 
Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley LLP 
877 Main Street, Suite 1000 
P.O. Box 1617 
Boise, Idaho 83701-1617 
Attorneys for AIA Services and AlA Insurance 
Via: 
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
(X) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) Facsimile 
Via: 
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
(X) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) Facsimile 
Via: 
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
(X) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) Facsimile 
Via: 
(X) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
(X) Facsimile - (208) 342-3829 
Signed this 28th day of June, 2007, at Lewiston, Idaho. 
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RODERICK C. BOND 
NED A. CANNON, ISB #2331 
Smith, Cannon & Bond PLLC 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
508 Eighth Street 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Telephone: (208) 743-9428 
Fax: (208) 746-8421 
PAUL R. CRESSMAN, JR., ISB #7563 
Ahlers & Cressman PLLC 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
999 Third Avenue, Suite 3100 
Seattle, Washington 98104-4088 
Telephone: (206) 287-9900 
Fax: (206) 287-9902 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
REED J. TAYLOR, a single person, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
AlA SERVICES CORPORATION, an 
Idaho corporation; AlA INSURANCE, 
INC., an Idaho corporation; R. JOHN 
TAYLOR and CONNIE TAYLOR, 
individually and the community property 
comprised thereof; BRYAN FREEMAN, 
a single person; and JOLEE DUCLOS, 
a single person; 
Defendants. 
Case No.: CV-07-00208 
REED TAYLOR'S MOTION TO COMPEL 
PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS FROM 
AlA SERVICES CORPORATION AND AlA 
INSURANCE, INC. 
REED TAYLOR'S MOTION TO COMPEL PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS 
71315.1 (#100021.1) 
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Plaintiff, Reed J. Taylor ("Reed Taylor"), submits this Motion to Compel the 
Production of Documents from AlA Services Corporation and AlA Insurance, Inc. 
(co llecti vel y "AlA"). 
I. BRIEF STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This Motion is in regards to the AlA's responses to Reed Taylor's First Requests 
for Production of Documents to AlA ("Requests for Production"). In response to Reed 
Taylor's Request for Production, AlA has refused to provide relevant and discoverable 
documents without a valid basis. Reed Taylor now requests that the Court enter an Order 
compelling AIA to produce documents identified below in this Motion. 
Reed Taylor served AlA with his Requests for Production on March 23, 2007. 
See Affidavit of Paul R. Cressman, Jr. ("Cressman Aff.") Exhibit A. AlA provided its 
responses to Requests for Production to Reed Taylor on approximately May 22, 2007. 
Cressman Aff., Ex. B. On May 30, 3007, counsel for Reed Taylor contacted counsel for 
AlA for the purpose of scheduling a discovery conference in accordance with I.R.C.P. 37. 
On Thursday, June 7, 2007, counsel for Reed Taylor and counsel for AlA engaged in a 
telephonic discovery conference in which the parties discussed each of AlA's responses 
to Reed Taylor's requests for production. Cressman Aff., ~ 5. 
After the discovery conference, Reed Taylor sent a letter to counsel for AlA 
which confirmed the matters discussed in the discovery conference aJ;ld set forth in 
writing Reed Taylor's positions with respect to each of the requests for production. 
Cressman Aff., Ex. C. On June 13, 2007, AlA responded with a letter which raised the 
same objections and refused to produce documents again requested by Reed Taylor. 
Cressman Aff., Ex. D. On June 13,2007, AlA also served supplemental responses to its 
discovery requests in which it agreed to produce certain documents, but again refused to 
produce documents which were discussed during the LR.C.P. 37 discovery conference. 
Cressman Aff, Ex. E. This Motion to Compel concerns only the request for production 
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documents which were the subject of the CR 37 discovery conference and which AlA 
continues to refuse to produce to Reed Taylor. 
II. STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
Whether Reed Taylor is entitled to an Order compelling AlA to produce, pursuant 
to LR.C.P. 26(b)(1), relevant and discoverable documents in response to Reed Taylor's 
Requests for Production? 
III. LEGAL AUTHORITY 
A. Reed Taylor Attempted to Resolve This Matter Without Court Action, But 
AlA has Refused to Produce Discoverable Documents. 
I.R.C.P. 37(a)(2) governs this motion to compel, and the rule provides as follows 
in pertinent part: 
(2) Motion.... [1]f a party, in response to a request for inspection 
submitted under Rule 34, fails to respond that inspection will be permitted 
as requested or fails to permit inspection as requested, the discovering 
party may move for an order compelling ... inspection in accordance with 
the request. The motion must include a certification that the movant has in 
good faith conferred or attempted to confer with the party not making the 
disclosure in an effort to secure the disclosure without court action. 
Reed Taylor, through his counsel, complied with l.R.C.P. 37(a)(2) by 
participatirig in a telephonic discovery conference with counsel for AlA in which the 
parties discussed each of the issues that are raised below in this motion. Cressman Aff. ~ 
5. Reed Taylor in good faith attempted to resolve this dispute without court action, but 
due to AlA's refusal to produce relevant documents this motion is required. !d. 
B. The Documents Requested by Reed Taylor Are Discoverable in This Action. 
The Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure that governs the scope of discoverable 
information is broadly drafted to pennit the discovery of all relevant admissible evidence 
and the discovery of inadmissible evidence if it could lead to the discovery of admissible 
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evidence. The only limit on discovery is if the evidence sought is privileged. The rule, 
LR.C.P. 26(b)(1), provides as follows in pertinent part: 
Unless otherwise limited by order of the court in accordance with these 
rules, the scope of discovery is as follows: (1) Parties may obtain 
discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the 
subject matter involved in the pending action, whether it relates to the 
claim or defense of the party seeking discovery or to the claim or defense 
of any other party, ... It is not ground for objection that the information 
sought will be inadmissible at the trial if the information sought 
appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible 
evidence. 
Federal Courts interpreting the identical Federal rule have consistently held that 
the rule allowed the broadest possible discovery. See, e.g., Hicman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 
495,67 S.Ct. 385,91 L.Ed. 451 (1947). In Hicman, the U.S. Supreme Court discussed 
the scope of discovery under this rule and observed that: 
No longer can the time-honored cry of 'fishing expedition' serve to 
preclude a party from inquiring into the facts underlying his opponent's 
case. 
329 U.S. at 507, 67 S.Ct. at 392. The only limitation on discovery of unprivileged 
material under the rule is that it could lead to the discovery of admissible evidence, which 
is such a broad standard that at the discovery stage a party may in fact engage in a fishing 
expedition. See 8 Wright & Miller, Federal Prac. & Proc., sec. 2008. 
For the reasons stated below, the documents requested in Reed Taylor's Requests 
for Production are discoverable under I.R.C.P. 26(b)(1) and the Court should enter an 
order compelling AlA to produce the requested documents. 
1. Broad Discovery Is Appropriate Based on Reed Taylor's Contract 
and Fraud Based Causes of Action and AlA's Affirmative Defenses 
and Counterclaims. 
Broad discovery is appropriate in this case based on the numerous causes of 
action alleged by Reed Taylor and AlA's numerous defenses and counterclaims it has 
alleged. Reed Taylor'S Fourth Amended Complaint alleges the following causes of 
action against AlA, and certain individuals: (1) breach of contract; (2) fraudulent 
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transfers; (3) misrepresentation and fraud; (4) conversIOn; (5) alter ego/piercing the 
corporate veil; (6) equitable indemnification; (7) account stated/monies due; (8) unjust 
enrichment; (9) constructive trust; (10) director liability; (11) specific performance; and 
(12) breach of fiduciary duties. See Reed Taylor's Fourth Amended Complaint. 
In response to Reed Taylor's complaint, AlA raised nine affirmative defenses, 
including an affirmative defense that an agreement the parties allegedly entered into on 
July 1, 1996 modified the Promissory Note and an affirmative defense that the parties 
orally modified the agreements at various times since the Promissory Note was entered 
into on August 1, 1995. See AlA Answer. AlA has also alleged the following 
counterclaims against Reed Taylor: (1) intentional interference/good faith and fair 
dealing; (2) intentional infliction of emotional distress; (3) intentional interference with 
prospective economic advantage/intentional inducement of termination of contracts with 
companies; (4) declaration of invalidation of proxy; (5) injunctive relief; and (6) trespass. 
The numerous causes of action alleged in this case by both Reed Taylor and AlA 
demonstrate that this case is not a "run of the mill" breach of contract case. Given the 
complex nature of this lawsuit, broad discovery is appropriate and it is AIA's burden to 
prove that evidence is not discoverable. Reed Taylor is entitled to obtain discovery from 
AlA regarding his causes of action against AlA and AlA's affinnative defenses and 
counterclaims against him. 
2. RFP No. 10: The E-mails of the AlA Officers John Taylor, Bryan 
Freeman and JoLee Duclos are Discoverable. 
Electronic information, including e-mails, are discoverable under the recently 
enacted LR.C.P. 34( a), which provides that a paliy may obtain discovery of "electronic 
and data storage devices in any medium which constitute or contain matters within the 
scope of Rule 26(b) ... " LR.C.P.34(a). Although no reported decisions in Idaho have 
addressed this rule, Federal courts interpreting the analogous Federal rules have 
consistently held that electronic data, including e-mails, are discoverable. Rowe 
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Entertainment, Inc. v. William Morris Agency, Inc., 205 F.R.D. 421, 428 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) 
(There is no justification for precluding discovery of defendants' e-mails on the ground 
that such discovery was unlikely to provide relevant information or would invade the 
privacy of non-parties); Playboy Enters. v. Welles, 60 F. Supp. 2d 1050, 1053 (S.D. CaL 
1999) (E-mails contained on defendant's hard drive are discoverable). 
Reed Taylor's RFP No.1 0 provides as follows: 
Request for Production No. 10: All e-mails sent, carbon-copied or 
received by R. John Taylor, Byran Freeman, JoLee Duclos, and all other 
officers, directors, and managers of AlA Services Corporation and AIA 
Insurance, Inc. 
AIA responded by refusing to produce the e-mails and raising a number of 
objections. Specifically, AlA objected on the grounds that the request was "overbroad, 
unreasonable, burdensome and oppressive." Cressman Aff., Ex. B. AlA further stated 
that "[t]here exist millions of e-mails which cannot be sorted (11.3 Gig of infonnation)." 
Id. After the discovery conference, AlA's counsel conceded that the e-mails were kept in 
an electronic format that could be searched and sorted, and AlA removed this objection 
in its supplemental responses to RFP No. 10. Cressman Aff., Ex. E (AlA's Supplemental 
Responses). In response to a request from counsel for Reed Taylor, AlA's counsel also 
stated that AlA's e-mails are kept on a Microsoft Exchange 5.5 server. Cressman Aff., 
Ex. F (E-mail to Mr. Ashby). 
a. RFP No. 10 is Not Overbroad, Unreasonable, Burdensome and 
Oppressive. 
Contrary to AlA's objections, RFP No. lOis not overbroad, unreasonable, 
burdensome and oppressive. E-mails that are kept on a Microsoft Exchange 5.5 server 
can be searched, sorted, and downloaded with ease by any IT professionaL Affidavit of 
Allan Muchmore ("Muchmore Aff."), '9. AlA has two IT professionals on its staff who 
could sort these e-mails and convert them to a format to be produced to Plaintiff. 
Cressman Aff., Ex. B (Attached Ex. E to Supplemental Responses identifies Bryan 
Freeman and Ken Goods in IT for AlA Insurance). Based on the size of AlA's e-mail 
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file, 11.3 gigabytes as stated by AlA, the entire process of sorting these e-mails and 
putting them on disks that could be produced would be approximately six hours. 
Muchmore Aff., ~ 10. For much of this time, the process can be unattended. Id. In 
addition, 11.3 gigabytes of data is not large. Id. at ~ 8. For example, 11.3 gigabytes of 
data is one-third of the overall capacity of most I-Pods currently in the pockets of 
millions of teenagers across the country. !d. 
Finally, Reed Taylor also attempted to lessen the cost of privilege review of the e-
mails by offering to AlA that the parties entering into a "Claw-Back Agreement". 
Cressman Aff., Ex. G. These Agreements are specifically pennitted under the new 
Federal rules, and allow the parties to enter into an agreement whereby any privileged 
documents inadvertently produced in discovery must be immediately returned by the 
party issuing the requests and the privilege is not waived by the production of the 
document. AIA has not responded to that offer. 
b. E-mails Are Highly Relevant to This Cause of Action. 
E-mails have become the most important piece of discovery in this digital age and 
thus are commonly referred in the legal community as "truth mails." The truth is often in 
e-mails due to their contemporaneous authorship denying the events in question. 
Similarly, in this case, the truth is in the e-mails sent and received by the officers of AlA, 
and Reed Taylor is entitled to discover those e-mails. 
For example, Reed Taylor has already obtained, in infonnal discovery, an e-mail 
that is highly relevant and conflicts with the affinnative defenses raised by AlA that the 
Promissory Note was modified. In an e-mail to Reed Taylor's accountant, John Taylor 
stated as follows with regard to Reed Taylor's Promissory Note: "I hope that you and 
[Reed Taylor] can come up with some specific proposals to modify the debt and move us 
toward putting the two companies back together." Affidavit ofEmie Dantini, Ex. A (see 
attached). The e-mail was sent on October 7,2005. ld. The e-mail rebuts AIA's current 
claim that the note was modified prior to this date and the e-mail is a writing that 
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acknowledges that the debt is owed to Reed Taylor. [d. This e-mail demonstrates the 
relevance and discoverability of the information sought in RFP No. 10. 
There are undoubtedly more e-mails like the e-mail John Taylor sent to Mr. 
Dantini that are relevant and will allow Reed Taylor and the Court to reach the truth in 
this action. Also, the credibility of John Taylor is a key component of the case for a 
number of reasons, including but not limited to his allegations that the Note was orally 
modified, and John Taylor's e-mails will be directly relevant to his credibility. AlA's 
complete refusal to produce the e-mails is in violation of the Civil Rules and, at the same 
time, demonstrates the value of these e-mails to Reed Taylor's case. The production of 
the e-mails is not burdensome, and the Court should order that they be produced by AlA. 
c. RFP No. 10 is reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of 
admissible evidence. 
RFP No. lOis also reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible 
evidence. AlA will likely object to RFP No. 10 on the grounds that it seeks all e-mails 
and is not narrowed to request only e-mails regarding particular topics. However, RFP 
No. 10 is reasonably calculated to lead to discovery of admissible evidence because AlA 
has already demonstrated that it cannot be trusted to sort and produce discoverable 
information. 
Counsel for AlA has redacted infonnation from documents produced to Reed 
Taylor which was considered not relevant. Redactions are appropriate only to conceal 
information that is privileged, not information that is allegedly not relevant. Documents 
produced by AlA have demonstrated that AlA has also been redacting relevant and 
discoverable infonnation as well. For example, AlA produced the same document twice 
to Reed Taylor and each document contained different redactions than the other, and a 
comparison of the two shows that AlA redacted relevant infonnation in each instance. 
Cressman Aff., Ex. H, I (12/15/04 Monthly Car Allowance Memo). In the first memo 
(bates AIAOOOI019), AlA redacted the infonnation regarding the $41,450.49 paid by 
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AlA to purchase John Taylor's BMW. ld. at Ex. H. In the second memo (bates 
AIAOOOI031), AlA redacted the amount paid by AlA to John Taylor for rental of certain 
properties. Id. at Ex. 1. The redactions concealed information that was responsive to 
Reed Taylor's discovery requests and which Reed Taylor would have never learned of 
had AlA not inadvertently produced the same document twice. 
Before learning of AlA's redactions of relevant information, Reed Taylor had 
offered to narrow his request to specify only e-mails regarding specific topics. Cressman 
Aff., Ex. G. However, based on the above referenced conduct of AlA, Reed Taylor is no 
longer willing to make this offer. Regardless, it would in fact be more burdensome on 
AlA if Reed Taylor had narrowed his request for e-mails to only those e-mails regarding 
specific topics because AlA would then be forced to perform additional searching and 
sorting of the e-mails to find e-mails responsive to specific topics. 
For the reasons stated above, the e-mails sought in RFP No.1 0 are discoverable, 
the request is not overbroad or unduly burdensome, and the request is reasonably 
calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. The Court should order that 
AlA produce the e-mails in accordance with 1.R.C.P. 26(b)(1) and 34(a). 
3. Documents Created Prior to 5 years Before the Filing of the 
Complaint are Relevant and Discoverable. 
AlA has refused to produce any documents created more than five years prior to 
commencement of this litigation to Reed Taylor on the grounds that Reed Taylor's claims 
are barred by the five year statute of limitations for breach of contract claims. 
Specifically, AlA raised this objection in response to the following discovery requests: 
RFP Nos. 2, 8, 11, 17, 23, 26, 28, 29, and 32. Reed Taylor's discovery requests had 
requested the production of all documents created in the period January 1, 1995 to the 
present (the Promissory Note was entered into on August 1, 1995). For the reasons stated 
below, AlA's documents created prior to five years before the filing of the complaint are 
relevant and discoverable in this action and should be produced by AlA. 
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For the reasons stated in Reed Taylor's Opposition to AlA's CR 12(b)(6) Motion 
and in Reed Taylor's recently filed Reply to AlA's Opposition to his Motion to Amend 
and Supplement Complaint, Reed Taylor's breach of contract claims are not barred by the 
statute of limitations and the documents created prior to five years before the filing of the 
Complaint are discoverable. Although the Promissory Note was original signed on 
August 1, 1995, the note was not due and payable until August 1, 2005. In addition, to 
the extent that any statute of limitations began to run in 1996 (as alleged by AlA), it has 
been tolled by partial payments made by AlA. The evidence of partial payments, 
occurring prior to five years from the date of the complaint, and any acknowledgments of 
the debt being owed in AlA's financials, are relevant to Reed Taylor's tolling arguments. 
In addition, the affinnative defenses and counterclaims raised by AlA in its 
Answer to Reed Taylor's complaint allege causes of action and facts arising prior to five 
years before the date of the filing of the Complaint. See AIA's Answer, p. 7 (Alleging 
numerous modifications, the first of which occurred on July 1, 1996). Based on AL<\' s 
reasoning, Reed Taylor is not entitled to discover the basis for these causes of action 
because they arose prior to five years before the complaint was filed. This is contrary to 
the discovery rules and the Court should order that all responsive documents be 
produced, including those created more than five years before the complaint was filed. 
The accounting infonnation sought by Reed Taylor is directly relevant to AlA's 
counterclaims and affirmative defenses because the documents will reflect, for example, 
whether AlA's financials confirmed the modifications that AlA now alleges. The 
accounting infonnation of AlA is also directly relevant to Reed Taylor's fraud based 
causes of action, reference above in section B.1. 
Finally, AlA's objections that documents created more than five years before the 
filing of the Complaint are based on the incorrect assumption that only admissible 
evidence is discoverable. Under the broad I.R.C.P. 26(b)(1), evidence is discoverable 
even if it is not admissible at trial, if the "information sought is reasonably calculated to 
REED TAYLOR'S MOTION TO COMPEL PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS - 10 
71315.1 (#100021.1) 
lead to the discovery of admissible evidence." LR.C.P. 26(b)(1) (Emphasis added). 
Thus, even if the statute of limitations barred the admissibility of evidence or documents 
created prior to five years before the filing of the complaint, the information IS 
nonetheless discoverable because it could lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. 
4. The Financial Information of AlA is Discoverable And Production of 
the Audits Alone is Not Sufficient. 
~ 
As previously stated in this action, Reed Taylor as the holder of the $6,000,000 
Promissory Note is the single largest creditor of AlA. There is also a significant 
possibility that AlA will not be able to pay Reed Taylor. Reed Taylor has valid reason to 
believe that AlA will not be able to pay the Note as a result of the fraudulent acts of its 
officers. For example, as stated in the Complaint, in 2004, AlA Insurance paid 
$1,510,693 to purchase Series C Preferred Shares in AlA Services from Crop USA, an 
entity in which John Taylor was the single largest shareholder, when AlA Services was 
insolvent. Third Amended Complaint, ~ 2.25. In addition, AlA has entered into a lease 
for $1,250 per month of a parking lot owned by John Taylor, but the lot is not being used 
by AlA. Third Amended Complaint, ~ 2.26, Cressman Aff., Ex. H. In 2004, AlA also 
paid $41,450.49 to purchase a BMW £i'om John Taylor. Cressman Aff., Ex. I. These 
transactions are the basis for Reed Taylor's fraud, conversion, fraudulent transfer, and 
other fraud based claims. Further fraudulent transactions will not be discovered without 
the production of the accounting information of AlA. 
AlA also takes the position in its discovery responses that it will not produce 
certain accounting information because AlA has produced audited financial statements 
for AlA Insurance. Cressman Aff., Ex. D (Babbitt Letter), p. 2. However, financial 
audits are in very large part based upon information provided to the auditors by AlA's 
management. The reason that Reed Taylor seeks additional infonnation is because, based 
on the above transfers, it is likely that transfers have not been disclosed by AlA's 
management to AlA's auditors. In addition, the audits do not disclose the background 
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and factual support, which is the source for more discoverable information regarding 
fraudulent conduct. 
a. RFP No.1, 2: The General Ledgers and Journal Entries are 
Discoverable. 
Reed Taylor's RFP No. I requested the "general ledgers and journal entries" for 
AlA and RFP No.2 requested the supporting documentation for the general ledgers and 
journal entries. Cressman Aff., Ex. A. AIA refused to produce responsive documents. 
Jd. at Ex. E. The general ledgers and journal entries for AlA contain relevant and 
discoverable information. The general ledgers will show the back-up documentation for 
AlA's financial statements, and will describe in detail the debits and credits to the various 
AlA accounts. The journal entries will show the descriptions of accounting transactions 
for AlA, how AlA accounted for them, whether AlA changed how it accounted for the 
transactions, why the changes were made, and all adjusting entries. Obviously, this 
information is relevant to Reed Taylor's fraud based claims and his fraudulent transfer 
claims. In addition, the general ledgers and journal entries may contradict the allegations 
of modification AlA has alleged in it Answer to Reed Taylor's Complaint. For the 
reasons stated, the general ledgers and journal entries of AlA are discoverable and the 
Court should order that the documents be produced. 
b. RFP No.3: The Bank Statements Are Discoverable. 
Reed Taylor's RFP No.3 requested "monthly and other periodic bank statements 
for all bank accounts of AlA Services Corporation and AlA Insurance, Inc., including all 
checks, wire transfers, automatic deposits and withdrawals, credits and debits." 
Cressman Aff, Ex. A. AlA has refused to produce any of the requested documents. Id. 
at Ex. E. The bank statements and checks of AlA will show the deposits and the 
payments of AlA and will provide Reed Taylor with any evidence of additional transfers 
such as those described above. This infonnation is discoverable for Reed Taylor's fraud 
based claims, conversion claims, and fraudulent transfer claims. 
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c. RFP No.5: Accountant Information is Discoverable. 
RFP No. 5 requested "working papers of outside accountants of AlA Services 
Corporation and AlA Insurance, Inc., and all correspondence and e-mails involving such 
accountants." Cressman Aff., Ex. A. AlA has refused to produce any of the requested 
documents. Id. at Ex. E. The documents are relevant to all of Reed Taylor's causes of 
action, including the fraud based causes of action. In addition, the information is not 
protected by the accountant-client privilege for the reasons stated in Reed Taylor's 
Opposition to AlA Motion for a Protective Order. At the very l~ast, the working papers 
of AlA's outside accountants are clearly discoverable even ifIdaho law applies because, 
as stated in Reed Taylor's Opposition, the Federal courts and even the states that 
recognize an accountant-client privilege have not extended the privilege to an 
accountant's work product. 
d. RFP No. 13: Transfers to John Taylor are Discoverable. 
RFP No. 13 requested "documents pertaining to all funds, services, or assets 
advanced or owed at any time by R. John Taylor to AlA Services Corporation or AlA 
Insurance, Inc., including all documents pertaining to any prepayment of such 
obligations." Cressman Aff., Ex. A. AlA responded that it produced the general ledger 
detail for John Taylor, but it refused to produce all responsive documents including the 
documents upon which the general ledgers were based. Id. at Ex. E. Reed Taylor is not 
required to accept only what AlA desires to produce to him. He is entitled to review all 
documents responsive to his request for production. The documents requested in RFP 
No. 13 are relevant to each of Reed Taylor's fraud based and fiduciary duty claims. The 
Court should require that all responsive documents be produced. 
5. RFP Nos. 16, 19: Legal Fee Information is Discoverable. 
a. RFP No. 16: Fee Agreements and Billings In This Case Are 
Discoverable. 
RFP No. 16 requested "documents pertaining to indemnification of any of the 
Defendants in this action or payment of their legal fees and expenses by AlA Insurance 
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or AlA Services Corporation, together with all Notices of Meetings of Shareholders or 
the Board of Directors of AlA Services Corporation of AlA Insurance to address such 
issues." Cressman Aff., Ex. A. This evidence is discoverable because, given Reed 
Taylor's position as the largest creditor for AlA, and that the note is unpaid, Reed Taylor 
has a security interest in the funds used to pay those fees paid by AlA. This evidence is 
also discoverable based on the fraudulent transfer claims. 
AlA produced the AlA Services Corporation Special Meeting of Shareholder 
Minutes, but refused to produce the same for AlA Insurance. !d. at Ex. E. Any Special 
Meeting of the Shareholders of AlA Insurance to authorize the payment of fees is not 
privileged, is relevant, and must be produced. 
In addition, AlA refused to produce any information regarding the payment of 
fees for the defendants on the grounds of the attorney-client privilege. Id. at Ex. E. 
Courts have uniformly held that fee agreements and billing statements are not protected 
by the attorney-client privilege. See Clarke v. American Commerce Nat '[ Bank, 974 F.2d 
127 (9th Cir. 1992) (Attorney billing statements containing infonnation regarding the 
identity of the client, case name, an10unt of fee, and general nature of services provided 
were not protected). To the extent that disclosure of a billing record would reveal a 
confidential client communication the document must be produced, but can be redacted. 
Leach v. Quality Health Senl ., 162 F.R.D. 499 (E.D. Pa. 1995) (Billing records were to 
be produced in redacted form to protect any description of legal services that would 
reveal a client confidence.). Thus, the fee agreements, billing statements, and evidence of 
payment made by AlA on behalf of the Defendants in this action must be produced. 
b. RFP No. 19: Fee Agreements Regarding GGMIT Lawsuit Are 
Discoverable. 
RFP No. 19 requested "[a]ll agreements, fee arrangements, contracts and related 
documents involving AlA Insurance, Inc. or AlA Services Corporation pertaining to the 
litigation known as In re: Universal Liquidator Grain Growers Trust, et al. v. Idaho 
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Department of Insurance (a/k/a GGMIT lawsuit), and the status of such litigation." 
Cressman Aff., Ex. A. AlA responded in its letter after the discovery conference by 
stating that "[t]his request seeks document [sic] protected by the attorney-client privilege. 
The fee agreements that AlA Insurance or AlA Services have in the case of Universal 
Liquidators Grain Growers Trust v. Idaho Dep't of Insur. are privileged." !d. at Ex. D. 
For the reasons stated above in the discussion of RFP No. 16, the fee agreements are not 
privileged and are discoverable. Thus, the Court should order that AIA produce the fee 
agreements and billing statements that AlA Insurance and AlA Services have in regards 
to the GGMIT lawsuit. 
6. RFP No. 29: Addresses of Officers and Directors of AlA is 
Discoverable. 
It is fundamental that the contact information of potential witnesses is 
discoverable. The officers and directors of AlA, and its former officers and directors, are 
potential witnesses in this case and Reed Taylor is entitled to discover their contact 
information, to the extent known by AlA. 
RFP No. 29 requested "[d]ocuments pertaining to the names and addresses of the 
officers and directors of AlA Services Corporation and AlA Insurance, Inc." Cressman 
Aff., Ex. A. AlA responded by stating it would produce the names of the officers and 
directors of AlA Services and AlA Insurance for the previous five years but refused to 
produce the addresses on the grounds that it was an "invasion of privacy." !d. at Ex. D, 
E. For the reasons stated above in section B.2., the names and addresses of the officers 
and directors AlA in their positions more than five years before the complaint was filed 
are relevant and discoverable. In this instance, for example, the former officers and 
directors may have knowledge regarding modifications alleged by AlA in its Answer. 
The former officers and directors may also have knowledge regarding Reed Taylor's 
claims against AlA and AlA's defenses and counterclaims. Reed Taylor is entitled to 
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contact these individuals to detennine their knowledge, if any, regarding these alleged 
modifications. 
In addition, the addresses of the officers and directors of AlA Services and AlA 
Insurance are discoverable. The addresses of these individuals are necessary for Reed 
Taylor to conduct additional discovery, such as noting depositions if necessary. AlA's 
only objection to producing this infonnation is that it is "an invasion of privacy". 
Cressman Aff., Ex. D, p. 5. However, there is no right to privacy with respect to an 
individual's address. AlA's objection is not valid and its refusal to produce this 
infonnation is in violation of the Idaho Civil Rules. Thus, the Court should order that the 
addresses of the officers and directors AlA Services and AlA Insurance be produced. 
7. RFP No. 31: Documents Regarding the Sale ofKATW FM are 
Discoverable. 
AlA Services and/or AlA Insurance are the fonner owners of a radio station 
known as KA TW FM. At some point, AlA Services and/or AlA Insurance sold the radio 
station. RFP No. 31 requested "[ d]ocuments pertaining to the spin off, transfer, or sale of 
the radio station owned at one time by AlA Services Corporation or AlA Insurance, Inc., 
known as KA TW FM." Cressman Aff., Ex. A. AlA responded by refusing to produce 
any documents and objecting based on the "Work Product Doctrine and/or the Attomey-
Client Privilege." Id. at Ex. E. There is no basis for AlA's privilege objections given 
that the request seeks only the sale documents regarding KA TW FM, which are not 
privileged. AlA also objected to the RFP on the grounds of relevance. Id. AlA's 
relevance objection, like its privilege objection, is also without merit. 
As stated above, Reed Taylor is the single largest creditor of AlA. Reed Taylor is 
entitled to discover whether the sale of KA TW FM was an arms-length transaction and 
whether AlA received fair value for the sale of the radio station. If for example, the sale 
was to an interested party for less than fair value, Reed Taylor may have an additional 
claim for fraudulent transfer against the purchaser. These documents are discoverable 
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under the broad I.R.C.P. 26(b)(1) and thus the Court should order that AlA produce the 
documents. 
8. RFP No. 35: Names, Addresses, and Positions of Employees and 
Officers of AlA are Discoverable. 
RFP No. 3S requested "[d]ocuments identifying the names, addresses and 
positions of all employees and officers of AlA Insurance, Inc. and AlA Services 
Corporation." Cressman Aff., Ex. A. AlA objected based on relevance and agreed to 
produce only one document identifying the names and positions of the employees for 
AlA at the year end 2006. ld. at Ex. E. For the reasons stated above in section B.S., the 
names, addresses and positions of AlA's former employees are discoverable and are 
necessary so that Reed Taylor can conduct additional discovery. Under I.R.C.P. 26(b)(l), 
evidence is discoverable if it is reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of 
admissible evidence. AlA's former employees may have knowledge of the modifications 
alleged by AlA, the fraudulent transfers made by AlA, and AlA's acknowledgement of 
the Promissory Note owed to Reed Taylor. Thus, their contact information, known to 
AlA, including addresses, is discoverable in this action. 
C. An Audit of AlA Services Is Not Sufficient to Address the Discovery Issues in 
this Case. 
It is expected that AlA will point to its offer for Reed Taylor to audit AlA 
Services, according to its terms, to show that it has complied with the discovery requests. 
Cressman Aff., Ex. D (Letter from Mr. Babbitt offering AlA Services audit). AlA's 
anticipated argument in this regard is without merit. 
First of all, AlA Services is insolvent and has been for years according to John 
Taylor and thus it is unlikely that AlA Services will have any financial information in 
which to audit. March 1, 2007, Preliminary Injunction Hearing, Testimony of John 
Taylor, p. 82, II. 20-22 ("We discontinued having audited financial statements for AlA 
Services in 1990 because AlA Services has virtually no material assets except for AlA 
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[Insurance], Inc."). Given AlA Service's financial conditions the offer to audit AlA 
Services is really not an offer at all. 
Second, AlA's offer to audit AlA Services was only if the audit was subject to its 
own unreasonable restrictions. For example, AlA would control what documents could 
be copied by Reed Taylor during the audit. Cressman Aff., Ex. D, p. 1-2. AlA's 
restrictions are baseless and not acceptable to Reed Taylor. 
The Court should disregard AlA's arguments with regard to its offer to audit AlA 
Services and require AlA to respond to the Requests for Production of Documents issued 
by Reed Taylor to AlA in accordance with the Civil Rules. 
D. AlA Must Produce a Privilege Log of the Documents It Has Withheld from 
Production to Reed Taylor. 
AlA must produce to Reed Taylor a privilege log identifying documents it has 
withheld from production to Reed Taylor based on privilege. I.R.C.P. 26(b)(5)(A) 
requires AlA to produce a description of the documents it withholds from Reed Taylor on 
the basis of privilege: 
When a party withholds information otherwise discoverable under these 
rules by claiming it is privileged or subject to protection as trial 
preparation material, the party shall make the claim expressly and shall 
describe the nature of the documents, communication, or things not 
produced or disclosed in a manner that, without revealing information 
itself privileged or protected, will enable other parties to assess the 
applicability of the privilege or protection. 
Under the rule, AlA was required to prepare a privilege log of the documents it 
has withheld from production from Reed Taylor based on privilege. AlA failed to 
provide a privilege log with its responses to Reed Taylor'S discovery requests. Counsel 
for Reed Taylor requested that a privilege log be produced in a letter to counsel for AlA 
dated June 8, 2007. Cressman Aff., Ex. C, p. 7. However, contrary to I.R.C.P. 
26(b)(5)(A). AlA has failed to provide a privilege log and failed to respond to Reed 
Taylor's request. Thus, the Court should order that AlA comply with LR.C.P. 
26(b)(5)(A) and produce a privilege log to Reed Taylor. 
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III. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above, the Court should grant Reed Taylor's Motion to 
Compel Production of Documents from AlA Insurance, Inc. and AlA Services 
Corporation. 
DATED: This 28th day of June, 2007. 
SMITH, CANNON & BOND PLLC 
AHLERS & CRESSMAN PLLC 
By:-------F--.e"---- ----
nnon 
Paul R. Cressman, Jr. 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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~Jv ~~ \ CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I, Roder' k C. Bond, declare that, on the date indicated below, I served a true and correct copy 0 eed Taylor's Motion to Compel, Affidavit of Paul Cressman Jr. and 
supporting documents, Affidavit of Allan Muchmore and supporting documents, 
Proposed Order Granting Motion to Compel on the following party(s) via the methodes) 
indicated below: 
David A. Gittins 
Law Office of David A. Gittins 
P.O. Box 191 
Clarkston, Washington 99403 
Attorney for Defendants Duclos and Freeman 
Michael E. McNichols 
Clements Brown & McNichols 
321 - 13th Street 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
Attorneys for Defendant R. John Taylor 
Jonathan D. Halley 
Clark & Feeney 
P.O. Box 285 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
Attorney for Defendant Connie Taylor 
Gary D. Babbitt 
D. John Ashby 
Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley LLP 
877 Main Street, Suite 1000 
P.O. Box 1617 
Boise, Idaho 83701-1617 
Attorneys for AlA Services and AlA Insurance 
Via: 
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
(X) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) Facsimile 
Via: 
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
(X) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) Facsimile 
Via: 
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
(X) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) Facsimile 
Via: 
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered 
e ) Overnight Mail 
eX) Facsimile 
Signed this 28th day of June, 2007, at Lewiston, Idaho. 
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Roderick C. Bond 
Ned A. Cannon, ISBA #2331 
SMITH, CANNON & BOND PLLC 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
508 Eighth Street 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
Telephone: (208) 743-9428 
Fax: (208) 746-8421 
Paul R. Cressman, Jr., ISBA #7563 
AHLERS & CRESSMAN PLLC 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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Seattle, Washington 98104-4088 
Telephone: (206) 287-9900 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
REED J. TAYLOR, a single person, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
AlA SERVICES CORPORATION, an 
Idaho corporation; AlA INSURANCE, INC., 
an Idaho corporation; R. JOHN TAYLOR 
and CONNIE TAYLOR, individually and 
the community property comprised thereof; 
BRYAN FREEMAN, a single person; and 
JOLEE DUCLOS, a single person, 
Defendants. 
STATE OF WASHINGTON) 
: SS 
COUNTY OF KING ) 
Case No.: CV-07-00208 
AFFIDA VIT OF ALLAN 
MUCHMORE IN SUPPORT OF 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO COMPEL 
Allan Muchmore, being first duly sworn, upon oath, deposes and says: 
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MOTION TO COMPEL - 1 
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1. I am Allan Muchmore, a computer consultant doing business under the name 
Muchmore Consulting, located in Seattle, Washington, am over the age of eighteen years, and 
am competent to testify. I make this Affidavit based upon my personal knowledge. 
2. Muchmore Consulting has provided network and computer expertise to law firms 
and other businesses since 2000. I have been working in the field of technology as a technician, 
programmer, network administrator, and consultant since 1986, when not in school. I graduated 
from Georgetown University Law Center with a J.D. in 1994. 
3. I currently maintain seventeen mail servers for seventeen different small 
businesses in Washington State. In the past I maintained mail servers using Microsoft 
Exchange 5.5 software for seven different businesses. Attached as Exhibit A to this Affidavit is 
a copy of my Resume. 
4. I have knowledge of available file recovery and database extraction techniques 
dating back to 1985. Since e-mail has become a ubiquitous mode of communication, I have been 
asked to extract messages by various criteria in hundreds of instances, and in dozens of instances 
in response to formal discovery requests. 
5. As a technology consultant for law firms, I routinely advise and assist attorneys 
with matters involving electronic discovery. 
6. Plaintiff's Request for Production No. 10 requests e-mails sent or received by 
select members of AlA Services Corporation and AlA Insurance Inc. Defendants' only 
objection on technical grounds is that the request is "unreasonable, burdensome and oppressive." 
In support of this objection, Defendants' initially stated, "There exist millions of emails which 
cannot be sorted (11.3 Gig of information)" on pages 9-10 of their May 22, 2007 Response to 
Request for Production. However, in its June 14, 2007 response, Defendants drop the claim that 
the e-mails in question "cannot be sorted," as the Response to Request for Production No. lOis 
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repeated verbatim without this clause. In a conversation with Defendants' counsel on June 19, 
2007, Paul Cressman confirmed that Defendants "have withdrawn the statement that the e-mails 
are not searchable." Mr. Cressman also confirmed that "AlA Insurance uses Microsoft 
Exchange Version 5.5 for its e-mails." 
7. Defendants' remaining justification as to why this Request for Production is 
burdensome involves the total storage size of their e-mails and the quantity of messages they 
have stored. The quantities specified by Defendants are not large for even a very small business. 
Extracting and transporting the number and size of messages specified is a simple matter using 
hardware available at most consumer computer stores and software Defendants should already 
possess. 
8. The storage SIze of the e-mails specified by Defendants does not make it 
burdensome to extract or transport to Plaintiff in order to fulfill the Request for Production. In 
support of the claim that Request for Production No. 10 is "burdensome and oppressive," 
Defendants note their e-mail is "11.3 Gig." This clause appears to state that the requested e-mail 
storage size is 11.3 Gigabytes, typically abbreviated GB. This amount of data is trivial to store 
and transport using even consumer-grade products available at any computer retailer. To put this 
size into perspective, 11.3 GB is about one-third the capacity of a typical iPod music player 
found in millions of teenagers' pockets. This amount of data will fit on three writeable data 
DVD disks, available at a combined cost of under a dollar. 
9. Searching and extracting the requested messages from a store of "millions of 
e-mails" would not be burdensome using a mainstream e-mail system. Defendants reportedly 
store their e-mailsonaserverrunningMicrosoftExchange5.5software.This software stores 
e-mail messages in an organized database, with the ability to query and retrieve groups of 
messages according to various criteria such as sender, recipient, and delivery date. Extracting 
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and producing the requested messages would not require more steps, as the number of e-mails in 
the database increase. Of course the number of seconds or minutes required to retrieve desired 
results will increase with the database size. 
10. I conservatively estimate that the amount of time required by AIA to extract 11.3 
Gigabytes of e-mails to DVDs to produce to Plaintiff would be approximately six hours, though 
for the majority of that time, information could be transferred unattended. I expect any IT 
professional who maintains an exchange server would have the knowledge needed to perform 
these tasks. Also, given that the e-mails are held in a searchable format, the privilege review 
should also require minimal time. 
11. Defendants can extract and produce the requested e-mails stored on an 
Exchange 5.5 server using their existing systems, without the need of purchasing special 
software to extract the e-mails. For example, Outlook includes an "export" function which 
allows a user to save groups of messages to a "PST" file. A PST file is commonly used to 
transport a large quantity of e-mails outside an organization and is ideal for discovery 
production. Once these files are extracted, Outlook could be used to remove privileged content 
by using its powerful search function to find all messages to or from Defendants' counsel, and 
then delete them in a single operation. 
12. If Defendants also have relevant messages stored in a format other than 
Exchange 5.5, similar methods should exist for producing the requested messages in a PST file 
or other transportable format. For example, many firms remove older messages from their 
Exchange server and save them in another format. The most common method of archiving 
messages used by a small business running Exchange software is the PST format mentioned 
above. If Defendants have archived messages to PST files, then those existing files could be 
used for production. If Defendants had archived messages using another software program, 
AFFIDA VIT OF ALLAN MUCHMORE 
IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTION TO COMPEL - 4 
71775,1 (#100021.1) 
similar methods should exist to export those messages to a PST file, or other transportable 
format, for production. 
DATED at Seattle, Washington, this 26th day of June, 2007. 
dA4~/~ 
Allan Muchmore 
SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to on this 26th day of June, 2007, before me, a Notary 
Public for the State of Washington, by Allan Muchmore, known to me to be the person whose 
name is subscribed to the within instrument and acknowledged that he executed the same. 
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l endy M. Wheat-McCoy 
Notary Public in and for the State of Washington, 
residing at Bothell. 
My Commission Expires: June 9, 2010 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, , declare that, on the date indicated below, I served a true 
and correct copy of the Affidavit of Alan H. Muchmore in Support of Plaintiffs Motion to 
Compel on the following parties via the methodes) indicated below: 
David A. Gittins 
Law Office of David A. Gittins 
P.O. Box 191 
Clarkston, Washington 99403 
Attorney for Defendants Duclos and Freeman 
Michael E. McNichols 
Clements Brown & McNichols 
321 - 13 th Street 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
Attorneys for Defendant R. John Taylor 
Jonathan D. Halley 
Clark & Feeney 
P.O. Box 285 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
Attorney for Defendant Connie Taylor 
Gary D. Babbitt 
D. John Ashby 
Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley LLP 
877 Main Street, Suite 1000 
P.O. Box 1617 
Boise, Idaho 83701-1617 
Attorneys for AlA Services and AIA Insurance 
Via: 
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) Facsimile 
Via: 
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) Facsimile 
Via: 
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) Facsimile 
Via: 
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) Facsimile 
Signed this day of June, 2007, at Lewiston, Idaho. 
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EXHIBIT A 
AFFIDVIT OF ALLAN MUCHMORE IN SUPPORT 
OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO COMPEL CfZ7 
ALLAN MUCHMORE 
55 18 1 7Ul Ave NE 
Seattle, Washington 98105 
(206) 985-6881 allan@muchmorecollsulting.com 
Versatile professional with unique combination of technical, legal and computer industry knowledge. 
Over eighteen years experience with computer security, web design, data recovery, network design, 
programming, security, and small business systems. 
PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE 
Technical Consultant, Muchmore Consulting, Seattle, W A 2000 - Present 
Provide full service technical consulting to area business, focusing on the legal industry. Assist firms 
with planning and designing computer networks. Design computer security systems and procedures for 
firms protecting highly confidential data. Assist with data recovery and mining of infonnatiol1 produced 
during discovery. Consult with firms regarding their web presence and site design. Design and program 
custom database applications. 
Director of Information Services, Aiken, St. Louis & Siljeg, Seattle, W A 1994 - 2000 
Focused on technology product management and assistance including: designing and installing Microsoft 
network; creating virtual private network for remote access over the internet; designing security policy 
and internet firewalls; programming customized applications; overseeing computer technician and 
database programmers; and training employees. 
Associate, Hogan Information Services, Oklahoma City, OK 1992 
Developed database with several million records. Designed and implemented a remote information 
retrieval system. Database information now available through Lexis-Nexis service. 
Program Developer, Ikarus Software Gesmbh., Zell am See, Austria 1991 
Developed and programmed The Anti-Virus Utilities, a top selling anti-virus program in Europe. Reverse 
engineered and decrypted viruses to determine removal methods. Published articles describing newly 
released computer viruses. 
PUBLICATIONS AND PRESENTATIONS 
Are We There Yet? The State a/Technology, ALA Region 5 Conference, Calgary, September 2002. 
Security You Can Use, ALA Region 5 Conference, Calgary, September 2002. 
"Virus Defense - A Practical Approach", Peer To Peer Magazine, published by the International Legal 
Technology Association, May 2001. 
EDUCATION AND CERTIFICATIONS 
Admitted to Washington State Bar, 1995 
Juris Doctor, GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY LAW CENTER, Washington, D.C., 1994 
Bachelor of Arts in Economics and Political Science, RICE UNIVERSITY, Houston, Texas, 1990 
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Roderick C. Bond 
Ned A. Cannon, ISBA #2331 
SMITH, CANNON & BOND PLLC 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
508 Eighth Street 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
Telephone: (208) 743-9428 
Fax: (208) 746-8421 
Paul R. Cressman, Jr., ISBA #7563 
AHLERS & CRESSMAN PLLC 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
999 Third Avenue, Suite 3100 
Seattle, Washington 98104-4088 
Telephone: (206) 287-9900 
Fax: (206) 287-9902 
F1LEO 
1fb7 JlN Z.S PM q. 72. 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
REED J. TAYLOR, a single person, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
AlA SERVICES CORPORATION, an 
Idaho corporation; AlA INSURANCE, INC., 
an Idaho corporation; R. JOHN TAYLOR 
and CONNIE TAYLOR, individually and 
the community property comprised thereof; 
BRYAN FREEMAN, a single person; and 
JOLEE DUCLOS, a single person, 
Defendants. 
STATE OF WASHINGTON ) 
: SS 
COUNTY OF KING ) 
Case No.: CV-07-00208 
AFFIDAVIT OF PAUL R. 
CRESSMAN, JR. IN SUPPORT OF 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO COMPEL 
PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS 
Paul R. Cressman, Jr., being first duly sworn, upon oath, deposes and says: 
AFFIDAVIT OF PAUL R. CRESSMAN, JR. 
IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO COMPEL 
PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS - 1 
71810.1 
QZq 
ORIGINAL 
1. I am one of the attorneys for the Plaintiff in the above-entitled action, am over the 
age of eighteen years, and am competent to testify. I make this Affidavit based upon my 
personal knowledge. 
2. Attached as Exhibit A is a copy of Plaintiff Reed Taylor's First Request for 
Production of Documents to Defendants AlA Services Corporation, AIA Insurance, Inc., R. John 
Taylor, Bryan Freeman, and JoLee Duclos ("Requests for Production"), which were issued to 
Defendants on March 21,2007. 
3. Attached as Exhibit B is a copy of Defendants AlA Services Corporation and AlA 
Insurance, Inc. 's responses to Plaintiffs Requests for Production, which I received on May 22, 
2007. 
4. Attached as Exhibit C is a copy of the letter dated June 8, 2007, which I sent to 
counsel for AlA that confirmed our discovery conference on June 7, 2007. 
5. On June 7,2007, I conferred with counsel for AlA, in good faith, in an attempt to 
resolve the discovery issues that are the subject of this Motion to Compel, without resort to this 
Court. We were unable to resolve these discovery issues, and Reed Taylor has been forced to 
file the present Motion to Compel. 
6. Attached as Exhibit D is a copy of a letter from counsel for AlA in response to the 
June 7, 2007 discovery conference. 
7. Attached as Exhibit E is a copy of Defendant AIA'a Supplemental Responses to 
Plaiiltiffs Requests for Production which I received on June 13, 2007. 
8. Attached as Exhibit F is a copy of an e-mail I drafted to counsel for AlA, John 
Ashby, which confinned our conversation that AlA Insurance uses Microsoft Exchange Version 
5.5 for its e-mails, and that AlA was withdrawing its objection that the e-mails were not 
searchable. 
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9. Attached as Exhibit G is a copy of the letter I sent to counsel for AlA on June 20, 
2007, in which I offered to narrow the scope of our Requests for Production No.1 0, and that the 
parties enter into a "Claw-Back Agreement" to address AlA's concerns regarding the costs of the 
production of the e-mails requested in Request for Production No. 10. 
10. Attached as Exhibit H is a copy of a document received in discovery from AIA 
entitled "Interoffice Memo-Monthly Car Allowance," and bates labeled AIAOOOll9. 
11. Attached as Exhibit I is a copy of a document received in discovery from AlA 
entitled "Interoffice Memo-Monthly Car Allowance," and bates labeled AIAOOOI 031. 
~ ., 
DATED at Seattle, Washington, this li day of June, 2007. 
SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to on this ,,)8~ day of June, 2007, before me, a Notary 
Public for the State of Washington, by Paul R. Cressman, Jr., known to me to be the person 
whose name is subscribed to the within instrument and acknowledged that he executed the same. 
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endy M. Wheat-McCoy 
Notary Public in and for the State of Washington, 
residing at Bothell. 
My Commission Expires: June 9, 2010 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, , declare that, on the date indicated below, I served a true 
and correct copy of the Affidavit of Paul R. Cressman, Jr. in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss 
and Motion for Protective Order on the following party(s) via the methodes) indicated below: 
David A. Gittins 
Law Office of David A. Gittins 
P.O. Box 191 
Clarkston, W A 99403 
Attorney for Defendants Duclos and Freeman 
Michael E. McNichols 
Clements Brown & McNichols 
321 - 13th Street 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
Attorneys for Defendants, AlA Services 
Corporation, AlA Insurance, Inc., and 
R. John Taylor 
Jonathan D. Halley 
Clark & Feeney 
P.O. Box 285 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
Attorney for Defendant Connie Taylor 
Via: 
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) Facsimile 
Via: 
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) Facsimile 
Via: 
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) Facsimile 
Signed this __ day of June, 2007, at Lewiston, Idaho. 
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RODERlCK C. BOND 
NED A. CANNON, ISB #2331 
Smith, Cannon & Bond PLLC 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
508 Eighth Street 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
Telephone: (208) 743-9428 
Fax: (208) 746-8421 
PAULR. CRESSMAN, JR., ISBA #7563 
Ahlers & Cressman PLLC 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
999 Third Avenue, Suite 3100 
Seattle, Washington 98104-4088 
Telephone: (206) 287-9900 
Fax: (206) 287-9902 
IN THE DISTRlCT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRlCT OF THE STATE OF 
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
REED J. TAYLOR, a single person, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
AIA SERVICES CORPORATION, an 
Idaho corporation; AIA INSURANCE, 
INC., an Idaho corporation; R. JOHN 
TAYLOR and CONNIE TAYLOR, 
individually and the community property 
comprised thereof; BRYAN FREEMAN, 
a single person; and JOLEE DUCLOS, 
a single person, 
Defendants. 
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PLAINTIFF'S FIRST REQUESTS FOR 
PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS TO 
DEFENDANTS AIA SERVICES 
CORPORATION, AIA INSURANCE, INC., 
R. JOHN TAYLOR, BRYAN FREEMAN, 
AND JOLEE DUCLOS 
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TO: AIA SERVICES CORPORATION, AIA INSURANCE, INC., and R. JOHN 
TAYLOR, Defendants; and MICHAEL E. MCNICHOLS, their attorney; 
AND TO: BRYAN FREEMAN and JOLEE DUCLOS, Defendants; and DAVID A. 
GITTINS, their attorney 
You are to make available to Plaintiff, pursuant to Rules 26 and 34 of the Idaho Rules of 
Civil Procedure, the below documents in your possession, custody, and control for the purpose of 
inspecting, photographing, and copying within thirty (30) days from the service hereof. All 
documents are to be produced in their original files. 
1. DEFINITIONS 
A. The term "document" means and includes any and all tangible things and 
documents, whether written, electronic, recorded, graphic, typewritten, printed or otherwise 
visually reproduced, whether in draft or final form, regardless of how obtained or stored, 
including, but not limited to all: papers, general ledgers, check registers, agreements, contracts, 
letters, e-mails, e-mail attachments, electronic calendar entries and notes, electronic files, .pdf 
files, word processing documents and files, cables, spreadsheets, financial statements, balance 
sheets, bank statements, payroll documents,notes, memoranda, correspondence, telegrams, 
commission reports, income statements, vouchers, estimates, patents, books, planners, annual 
reports, diaries, logs, time sheets, reports, studies, minutes, records, checks, wire transfers, video 
tapes, models, studies, schedules, compilations, accounting software, letters of credit, accounting 
books, maps, plans, blueprints, sketches, charts, drawings, diagrams, photographs, movies, films, 
assignments, notebooks, ledgers, bills, statements, invoices, receipts, analyses, surveys, 
transcriptions, and recordings. 
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B. The term "identify" when used with respect to a document, or the description or 
identification of a document, shall be deemed to include a request for the following information 
with respect to that document: 
1) The nature and substance of the document; 
2) The date, if any, which the document bears; 
3) The "identity" of the persons to whom the document is addressed; 
4) The "identity" of all persons having possession, custody, or control of 
each original or legible copy of the document. 
C. The term "identity" or "identify", when used with respect to a person or entity or 
a request for the description or identification of a person or entity, shall be deemed to include a 
request for the following information with respect to such person: 
1) The person's or entity's name; 
2) The person's or entity's last known address; and 
3) The person's or entity's telephone number. 
D. The word "you", "your", or "yours" refers to any of the above-named Defendants, 
and all or any of their agents, representatives, employees, and attorneys. 
2. REQUESTS ARE CONTINUING / TIME PERIOD 
These Requests are ongoing, and you have a duty to supplement and provide additional 
information as it becomes available to you. These Requests for Production cover the time period 
January 1, 1995, through the date this litigation is concluded. 
3. OBJECTIONS 
In the event you seek to withhold any documents on the basis that they may be privileged 
or otherwise not discoverable, you are to supply Plaintiff with a list of the documents for which 
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limitation on discovery is claimed, indicating for each document the date; the author; the name of 
each recipient, addressee, or party for whom such document was intended, if any; the general 
subject matter of the document; and a description of the document. 
REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION 
1. All detailed general ledgers and all journal entries for AIA Services Corporation 
and AIA Insurance, Inc. 
RESPONSE: 
2. All supporting documents for the general ledgers and journal entries of AlA 
Services Corporation and AIA Insurance, Inc. 
RESPONSE: 
3. All monthly and other periodic bank statements for all bank accounts of AIA 
Services Corporation and AIA Insurance, Inc., including all checks, wire transfers, automatic 
deposits and withdrawals, credits and debits. 
RESPONSE: 
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4. All check registers for AIA Services Corporation and AIA Insurance, Inc. 
RESPONSE: 
5. All working papers of outside accountants of AIA Services Corporation and AIA 
Insurance, Inc., and all correspondence and e-mails involving such accountants. 
RESPONSE: 
6. All documents describing the type of accounting system utilized at any time by 
AIA Services Corporation and AIA Insurance, Inc., the type of software for such systems, the 
ability to transfer or download accounting and financial information electronically and into 
Excel, and all other documents pertaining to the accounting systems of AIA Services 
Corporation and AIA Insurance, Inc. 
RESPONSE: 
7. All documents pertaining in any way to AIA Services Corporation and AIA 
Insurance, Inc. sharing, lending, or advancing expenses, personnel, funds, resources, and 
premises with any other company, including, but not limited to, Crop USA Insurance Agency, 
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Inc., Sound Insurance, Pacific Empire Communications Corporation, Pacific Empire Holdings 
Corporation, Pacific Empire Radio Corporation, Radio Leasing, LLC., Radio Leasing II, LLC., 
and any other entity, association, or party, including all checks and other documents pertaining to 
reimbursement or payments to AIA Services Corporation and AlA Insurance, Inc., and any 
associated accounts receivables, loans, or credit arrangements. 
RESPONSE: 
8. All credit authorizations, lines of credit, credit arrangements, and related 
documents of AIA Services Corporation and AIA Insurance, Inc. 
RESPONSE: 
9. All corporate books and records of AIA Services Corporation and AIA Insurance, 
Inc. 
RESPONSE: 
PLAINTIFF'S FIRST REQUESTS FOR 
PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS TO 
DEFENDANTS -6 
AFFIDVIT OF PAUL R. CRESSMAN, JR. IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION TO COMPEL PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS 
